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INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
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INDUSTRIAL
GOODWILL
JOHN R. COMMONS
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
FIRST EDITION
SECOND IMPRESSION
McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.
239 WEST 39TH STREET. NEW YORK
LONDON: HILL PUBLISHING CO., LTD.
6 & 8 BOUVERIE ST., E. C.
1919
COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY THE
McGBAW-HiLL BOOK COMPANY, INC.
T»» MAPX.B PXBBB
TORJC PA
CONTENTS
CHAPTBR PAOB
I. Commodity 1
II. Machinery 7
III. Goodwill 17
IV. The Public 28
V. Democracy 37
VI. Solidarity 49
VII. Theory and Practice 62
VIII. Security 65
IX. Labor Market 74
X. Insurance 83
XI. Health 94
XII. The Shop 106
XIII. Education 126
XIV. Loyalty 143
XV. Personality 151
XVI. Depression 168
XVII. The World 187
REFERENCES 198
INDEX. . . 201
INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
COMMODITY
A few years ago I visited the employment office
in a factory of several thousand workers. Scattered
about were a number of sturdy immigrants fresh
from the old country. On that day the manager was
hiring Swedes. He said that the week before he had
been hiring Poles, and before that he had taken on
Italians. It was a good idea, he said, to get them
mixed up. He told me of other large firms in that
city with similar employment managers and a simi-
lar policy. They had an informal club that met
usually once a week.
One of the things of which they were proud was
their plan of forecasting the labor market. If labor
was getting restless they could anticipate it by a
concerted raising of wages 10 per cent until the storm
blew over, and then reduce the wages back again,
thus counteracting the work of agitators.
In order that they might be more accurately
informed of the prospects of the labor market they
had confidential arrangements with certain leaders
of trade unions in the town, so that, if the unions
were bringing organizers into the factories to stir
i
2 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
up unrest, the leaders would let them know in
advance and would tell which establishments would be
organized.
I visited one of the sidewalk offices of one of these
establishments. A hundred men or so were assem-
bled at the gate. The foremen were sending down
their requisitions. The employment officer went
along the line of the unemployed, looked at their
feet, sized up their nationality and fitness, picked
out ten or fifteen and sent them in. The others
stood around with serious faces and then drifted
away.
I went inside the factory. The raw material or
semi-finished product was coming along on trolleys.
One man performed one operation, another man
another. Some highly skilled men in the gang were
paid 50 cents an hour. Some of them seemed to be
scarcely exerting themselves at all; others less adept
were sweating. If any man did not do his part, the
work piled up and he blocked the gang. The busi-
ness of the foreman was, in part, to piece out the spots
where men were not keeping up, or else fire the man
and put in someone who could do it faster. Common
laborers were on the jump, bringing in carts, carrying
away the finished product.
Later I attended a meeting of strikers from that
establishment. A Bohemian stood up and made a
speech. By his side stood a Russian Jew who trans-
lated the speech into English. He pledged himself
never to go back to work until their grievances
were settled. He claimed that they could not make
wages, that they had to work too hard, that they
had to pay a bonus or make a present to the straw
COMMODITY 3
boss in order to keep the job. It seems that this
strike started with a secret union of skilled men, and
five thousand unskilled followed them out without
an organization. It was a spontaneous strike without
preliminary discussion in public. When they came
together afterward for a joint meeting, it was neces-
sary to have an interpreter whom they could trust.
That man was the Russian Jew.
I went through the establishment and came across
the strike-breakers. At noon time I found a group
of Macedonians having a good time dancing and
playing on a bag-pipe made of goat's skin brought
from the Balkan Mountains. The padrone, who
was in charge, could speak English, and told me of
other towns where they had been used as strike-
breakers. Negroes also were brought in, from the
South. The strike was won, but immediately a sec-
ond strike was called on account of alleged discrimi-
nation against the leaders. Naturally the company
decided not to yield again. The men went back and
their union went to pieces.
I visited some of these people at their homes and
boarding houses. They were all eager to save money.
That was their main ambition. At one boarding
house was a big board table without any table cloth.
In the middle of the table was a huge bowl. In that
bowl were pork, cabbage, carrots, turnips, onions, a
juicy steaming porridge. Each man at the table
had his own smaller bowl. In the large bowl was
a great ladle. A man reached over, filled his bowl
and with his implements went to work. Beside this
great bowl were huge loaves of bread. Each man
would go after a loaf of bread, cut off what was about
4 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
right and break it into his bowl. They were sturdy,
vigorous peasants from the hill country of Europe.
Then I went into their sleeping rooms. One room
was big enough to hold three double beds crowded
together. In that room six men slept, and they
crawled over one bed to gei into the next one. They
were saving money to send for their families or to
go back and live.
When the family was here the mother was taking
in boarders. We could now begin to talk to them
without an interpreter. They would tell of their
native country, its beauties, and tell something of
the conditions, comparing their country with this.
Usually the men seemed to earn about five times as
much wages as they could earn in their home country,
20 cents a day there, $1.00 a day here. It would
cost them about two or three times as much to live
here as there, and they could save one-third to one-
half of their wages.
It was their ambition to buy a home or get a farm.
Recently I talked with the immigration agent of the
state of Wisconsin. His business is to go to great
manufacturing centers and find the type of man who
has saved up enough money to buy a farm. For
eight or ten years he has frequently seen something
like the following. These people have worked for a
number of years saving up money. The boy has
gone to work, brought home money, which they have
put in the bank. The girl is working in a factory or
store. She has turned in her savings, and they have
accumulated quite a sum of money. They see an
advertisement in one of the foreign language papers.
They learn of glowing possibilities at some place in
COMMODITY .1
WUconsin or other state. They connect up with that
place and its land agent. They buy the farm. They
place a mortgage on it or sign a land contract. They
go on the farm, find a sandy soil, with much clearing
to be done. They work it a year or so and use up
their money. The mortgage is foreclosed and they
scatter back to the city. It is the business of this
immigration agent of the state of Wisconsin to protect
these people from being defrauded when they buy and
settle, and this he is doing in many cases, but in
others he is thwarted by the old style of land agent.
When these settlers go back to the city, they must
have work. They go to a private employment office.
The employment man describes in attractive terms
a job where they will find work. They pay a fee and
pay for transportation. Recently, at one town in
Wisconsin, thirteen of these people were landed,
sent there for fake jobs. The town authorities had
to send them back to the city. Finally, these people
become migratory workers. It is estimated that of
the migratory workers in this country 50 per cent
are foreign born.
This is the workings of what I call the commodity
theory of labor. Demand and supply determine
wages. You cannot overcome the law of demand
and supply. If labor is scarce, wages will go up.
If labor is abundant, wages will go down. The ebb
and flow of the labor market is like the ebb and flow
of the commodity market.
I suppose it is true that you cannot overcome the
law of supply and demand. But you can see how it
works. The commodity theory of labor is perhaps the
natural way for the merchant to look at it. He sits
6 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
in his office, sends out his orders, buys finished com-
modities, buys in the cheapest market, sells in the
dearest. He does not necessarily see his commodities.
He can usually buy and sell by samples. Other people
might look at it differently. A member of the
engineering profession, for example, might naturally
look on labor, not as a commodity, but as a machine.
II
MACHINERY
That which is bought and sold is not labor but the
product of labor. If the worker is paid by the day or
week it is usually because his product cannot be
accurately measured. If he is paid by the piece the
employer knows exactly what he is buying and how
much he is paying for it. Piece-work furnishes
accurate knowledge of labor costs and estimates of
future costs.
Furthermore, piece-work stimulates the worker to
greater exertion and attention. The rough, tradi-
tional estimate is 25 per cent greater output when
paid by the piece than when paid by the day.
But this greater output has many individual
differences. One man earns more than another at
the same piece-rate. The foreman's business is to
increase output and keep down costs. I knew a
large factory of non-union laborers where every new
man who came in was warned by the others not to
earn more than a certain amount of money.
I knew another where two or three ambitious
workers refused to limit their output on this mere
warning from the others, and then the others organized
a union, demanded the closed shop, won their demand,
then reduced the output of every member so that
no one would earn more than the amount of wages
7
8 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
that they thought the superintendent had in mind
when he cut the piece-rates.
I knew still another where the president of the cor-
poration vigorously denied in public that piece-rates
were ever cut in his plant, and yet the foremen were
cutting them right along.
These cases are not exceptional; they are only illus-
trations of what is universal. Indeed, piece-rates
must be cut, sooner or later, or else either industry will
stagnate, or wage-earners will get all of the gain from
improvements and none will go to the consumer and
the employer, or else the employer will be driven out
of business by competition.
Piece-rate cutting is universal. What is meant
when it is denied is perhaps that the cutting is not
done arbitrarily. This is a question of fact, of defini-
tion, of opinion. The cutting must be done — the
question is how and how often.
Twenty years ago many varieties of premium or
bonus systems of paying wages began to be invented
by engineers in order to abolish automatically the
arbitrary cutting of piece-rates. Mr. F. S. Halsey,
in 1902, stated the situation.1 "From the nature
of the day's-work plan the workman has no direct
share in any increased production which he may bring
about by more intelligent or increased exertion, the
benefits of such increase going wholly to the employer.
. . . From the nature of the piece-work plan, on the
contrary, the employer has no direct share in any
increased production which the workman may bring
about by more intelligent or increased exertion. . . .
1 Sibley Journal of Mechanical Engineering, Vol. XVI, March, 1902.
Reprinted in Commons, Trade Unionism and Labor Problems, p. 274.
MACHINERY 9
In consequence, community of interest between
employer and employee in the reduction of costs is
impossible. ... It is this which it is the prime
object of the premium plan to supply."
Mr. Halsey called the piece-work system a " system
of punishment for doing well." The workman looks
upon these cuts in piece-rates as "an exhibition of
pure hoggishness on the part of the employer/'
but they are, he says, "an integral part of the piece-
work plan, which can no more be operated without
them than a windmill can be operated without wind,
for the reason that as the years go by the whole
tendency of prices is downward."
The premium plan, with its various modifications
under the name of "bonus," "differential piece-rates"
and so on, have this feature in common, that they are
designed automatically to split the difference between
the workman's desire for a minimum wage and the
employer's desire for a maximum output.
The workman has certain minimum costs of living
determined by his standard of living and the customs
of the class with which he associates. Like the coal
and oil and wear and tear of a machine, these must be
met, no matter how inefficient he may be. So, the
minimum wage per day is guaranteed, even though the
product at the piece-rate would yield less than that
minimum.
On the other hand, if every one is paid this minimum,
there is no direct inducement for a man of ability and
ambition to exceed it. Yet the ambitious man does
not need as high a rate as the uniform piece-rate in
order to induce him to exceed it. Furthermore, the
employer also needs inducement to lead him to fix
10
INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
up his machinery and organization so that the work-
man will exceed the minimum. Hence the differential
piece-rate, the bonus, or the premium on increased
output, so that the worker and the employer may
share between them the gain from increased efficiency.
The worker gets his minimum wage and a bonus for
extra output. The employer gets a lower average
cost in wages the larger the bonus or premium earned
by the worker.1 Community of interest is auto-
matically established. The foreman's inducement to
cut the piece-rate has been eliminated, because the
rate has already been cut by agreement in advance.
The workman's inducement to increase his output is
assured, for, by accepting something less than the old
piece-rate, he does not expect to be punished for
earning it.
1 Mr. Halsey gives the following illustration of the workings of
the premium plan where the workman is paid a minimum of $3.00
a day of ten hours, during which he produces 1 piece, and is paid a
premium of 10 cents for each hour saved. Of course, the "premium "
on hours saved for a given product works out the same as a "bonus"
on amount of -product increased for a given number of hours.
THE WORKINGS OP THE PREMIUM PLAN
1
2
3
4
5
Time
consumed,
hours
Wages per
piece
Premium
Total coat of work -
Column 2 + Column 3
Workman's earnings
per hour ™ Column 4
-*• Column 1
10
$3.00
$0.00
$3.00
$0.30
9
2.70
0.10
2.80
0.311
8
2.40
0.20
2.60
0.325
7
2.10
0.30
2.40
0.343
6
1.80
0.40
2.20
0.366
5
1.50
0.60
2.00
0.40
Commons, Trade Unionism and Labor Problems, p. 279.
MACHINERY 11
There are two variables in this ingenious industrial
psychology. First is the base rate, which we call
the task; second is the bonus or premium rate for
exceeding the task.
The early industrial psychologists, like Mr. Halsey,
directed attention to the bonus rate. They were
endeavoring to find a plan by which to lessen the
temptation of the employer to cut the piece-rate.
So they cut it in advance by making the premium
rate say, 50 per cent or 30 per cent of the basic piece-
rate. The straight piece-rate would be a bonus rate
of 100 per cent on the base rate. But if the bonus
rate is 50 per cent of the base rate, then the temptation
to cut it is reduced 50 per cent. If the bonus rate is
30 per cent of the straight piece-rate, then the tempta-
tion to cut it is reduced 70 per cent, and so on.
This psychology turned out to be misdirected, and
the premium system as thus portrayed broke down.
The temptation to cut the rate did not reside in the
bonus but in the task. I knew an establishment
which introduced this premium system on an exten-
sive scale. A man was given a job of say, 100 pieces
at $3.00, and a bonus of 33Ji per cent. If he doubled
his output he would earn $4.00 a day and the labor
cost to the employer would come down from 3 cents
apiece to 2 cents apiece. But he went to work with
ambition and ingenuity. He fixed up his machine
and laid out his work. Eventually he was making
some $7.00 a day. To do this he had increased his
output, not two-fold, but five-fold. Then came the
cut, not in the bonus rate but in the task rate. He
received a surprise in the shape of a change in the
job order. Instead of 100 pieces at $3.00 it became
12 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
200 pieces at $3.00, and the same bonus rate of 83H
per cent. He had to turn out twice as much product
before he could begin to earn the bonus on extra
product.
So the bonus rate is immaterial. The fear that the
employer would cut the bonus rate was misplaced.
The bonus rate is merely an inducement to exceed the
task, and it makes but little difference whether it is
30 per cent or 50 per cent or even 100 or 150 per cent.
The essential thing is the base rate which determines
the task. This is just as essential in straight piece-
work as it is in the premium or bonus system.
Here is where scientific management came in. Mr.
Frederick Taylor made the next great step in advance.
He directed his investigations, not to the bonus rate
or premium rate, but to the task or base rate which
should be required before the premium or bonus
could begin. With the task correctly ascertained he
even advocated a differential piece-rate as high as
150 per cent of the task rate as an inducement to
exceed the output ascertained for the task, and a dif-
ferent rate, lower than the task rate, as an additional
penalty for not coming up to the task.
With this new view of the matter we get back to
the true nature of piece-work described by Mr.
Taylor as a task-and-bonus system. Under the
premium or bonus system the employer will not for
long keep a workman who does not earn the minimum
wage. The minimum wage becomes the task. The
profitable employees are those who earn more than the
minimum. The same is true on straight piece-work.
Piece-work is also a task-and-bonus system, but
with the bonus fixed at 100 per cent of the piece-rate.
MACHINERY 13
But the task is uncertain. Mr. Taylor's great
contribution to the subject was that of accurately
measuring the task in advance, instead of leaving it
to the hit-or-miss, cut-and-try, methods of the old
style piece-work practice. Scientific management,
applied to labor, is scientific measurement of the
laborer's task required to hold the job.
With this new idea there is no difference between
piece-work and the premium and bonus systems except
in the very minor difference of the rate of premium.
Whether it be Mr. Halsey's 33}^ per cent or Mr.
Taylor's 150 per cent, or even straight piece-work
which is 100 per cent of the base rate, is a small mat-
ter. They are just different rates of premium or
bonus on the amount of work a man does over the
task. The task is the real thing and the only thing
that needs scientific investigation.
The first practical application of this important
distinction between the task and the bonus or pre-
mium was that of taking the authority to make
piece-rates away from the foremen and placing it
in the hands of investigators.
The foreman is not an inventor or investigator.
He has come up from the ranks. He operates
according to habit and tradition. He does not know
much about the possibilities of improved processes
and short cuts. More than that, he is busy in getting
out product. He must get men to work and he must
keep down costs. If he makes a mistake in setting
the piece-rate too low he cannot get the workmen;
if he sets it too high they will earn too much. It was
these miscalculations that broke down the premium
system as first applied, just as they had broken
14 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
down the piece-work system which it was hoped the
premium system would correct.
If the rate-fixing is taken away from foremen it
can be placed in the hands of experts, inventors,
investigators. They can study the possibilities of
each job. They can study waste motions and short
cuts. They can standardize the job according to the
easiest and quickest method of doing the work.
They can employ the accurate methods of measure-
ment which distinguish science and engineering from
rule-of- thumb. They can make time-and-motion
studies, and set up specifications for the foreman
and workman to follow. They can study each work-
man and select those who are fitted to each job.
This I call the machinery theory of labor. Labor
is not a commodity — its value determined by demand
and supply — but each laborer is a machine — its value
determined by the quantity of its product. The
theory is not new. Its application is a new discovery
in science and engineering. The commodity theory
is the merchant's theory of buying and selling. The
machinery theory is the engineer's theory of economy
and output. Man is, after all, the most marvelous
and productive of all the forces of nature. He is a
mechanism of unknown possibilities. Treated as a
commodity, he is finished and ready for sale. Treated
as a machine, he is an operating organism to be
economized.
The application of this theory by the engineer is
perhaps the most productive invention in the history
of modern industry. The steam engine, electricity,
chemistry, scientific agriculture, have done much to
MACHINERY 15
ft
increase man's power over nature. But machinery
and factory organization are continually approaching
a limit of diminishing returns. This limit turns atten-
tion to the human factor, and it needs only a candid
attention to the experiments of scientific management
to become convinced of the large resources and unused
possibilities within the human animal which can be
developed when once his motions and energies are
studied and measured as the engineer studies and
measures the other forces and materials used in pro-
duction.1 It differs from the others in that the
science of industrial psychology is added to the
mechanical and biological sciences, and inducement
is nicely adjusted to output through ingenious meas-
urements of compensation.
Other inventions and improved processes have been
opposed and resisted in the past by workingmen, just
as this is more or less resisted. But if we may judge
by what has happened in the past, the cheaper and
more productive processes will win out by the mere
force of competition. The workingmen who resist
successfully gain an empty victory, for their employers
cannot compete with the others, and while they gain
their point for a time, they lose their jobs eventually.
Their resistance is logical, for scientific management
carries to the final limit that disintegration of the
workman's skill and its transfer to the employer,
which began a hundred and fifty years ago with the
inventions of power machinery, the steam engine,
and division of labor. The ancient craft gilds were
rightly known as " mysteries." The member of the
1 Especially the writings of Taylor, Gilbreth, Gantt, Emerson,
Thompson.
16 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
gild learned through his apprenticeship a skill in
manufacture unknown and unpractised by outsiders.
This mystery was his vested right— his property
against all the world. But when machinery or
division of labor took the place of his skill, his
property-right went with it to his employer who
owned the machine.
Scientific management carries the process a step
further. The time-and-motion studies, the blue prints
and specifications, the detailed instructions how to do
the work, become the property of the employer,
and the mechanic no longer hands down by word
of mouth and by example the mystery of his skill.
Where mechanical inventions transferred ownership
of skill to the employer through ownership of the
machine, scientific management transfers it through
blue prints and job studies made by a staff of engineers
and specialists on the staff of the employer.
Naturally, as before, the mechanic resists, but
insofar as scientific management materially reduces
costs by increasing output this resistance will be
gradually undermined and the mechanic will learn,
as he has to some extent in the case of machinery,
to recoup in other directions.
Ill
GOODWILL
The machinery theory, like the commodity theory
of labor, is not false, it is incomplete. You cannot,
it is true, overcome the law of supply and demand.
But you can modify it, if you know how, within limits.
You cannot permanently withstand those improve-
ments which, by enlarging output, reduce costs, but
you can limit the improvement itself at the point
beyond which, if carried too far, it increases costs
elsewhere more than it continues to reduce them.
Successful business is always a scheme of finding
that correct proportion of different factors which brings
the largest net income from all of them together.
At the moment when scientific management was
achieving an evident success, another source of cost,
less tangible but equally important, began to receive
scientific investigation. This attention came first,
not from industry or engineers, but from the field
of vocational education. The Vocation Bureau of Bos-
ton, unable to place its boys in permanent jobs where
their training could be continued after leaving school,
brought the matter before the employment agents of
several corporations. Out of these conferences devel-
oped the Employment Managers' Association of
Boston, with its scientific study of labor turnover.1
1 Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Number
196, p. 42.
2 17
18 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL.
Spontaneously, elsewhere, this hitherto unmeasured
cost of labor received attention, and when, by a bold
stroke of genius rather than science, the Ford Motor
Company doubled its wages, but nevertheless increased
its profits by the mere reduction in cost of labor turn-
over, it became evident to all that the intangible good-
will of labor may be as profitable as the scientific
management of labor.
The laborer is not only a productive machine, he
is a customer. The employer is not only buying his
time or his product, but is also selling to him a job
where he can earn a living. The employer makes a
certain investment on behalf of every customer
and every employee. He furnishes something in
exchange, and he not only wants that customer or
worker to return, satisfied with his treatment, but
also to spread the word and bring others. Goodwill
is good reputation, and reputation is the collective
opinion of those whose patronage is desired.
The engineer treats each laborer as a separate indi-
vidual. This is indeed necessary and right, for he is
such. One machine is not as good as another. One
is fitted for one kind of work, another for another
kind. Selection of individuals is the first step in
scientific management. So it is in scientific goodwill.
But it is more.
Scientific management picks out the individual and
offers him the inducement of making more money.
It separates him out from the group with which he
has consciously or unconsciously, perhaps, identi-
fied himself. It cuts across the solidarity of labor as
a class, unmindful that the laborers are competitors
with each other, that they are buying jobs which they
GOODWILL 19
feel are limited in supply, and that their feeling of
solidarity on this account reprehends the one who
injures his fellows by lessening their chances for jobs,
or who reduces the level of compensation for all by
his self-seeking competition.
But the goodwill of labor is a collective goodwill
that does not play one laborer against another, or
the unemployed against the employed, or take
advantage of the needs of a class, but acknowledges
labor's solidarity of interest as well as the individual
laborer's self-interest.
Scientific management, since it begins and ends
with individuals separated from their fellows, has the
defects of autocracy. It means government by
experts. An expert comes into the factory and makes
a study of the operations of the selected individual.
That individual and his fellow-workers are much con-
cerned about his time studies, his stop-watch, his
cold calculations, which decide for them the amount
of work that shall be portioned out for the task.
But they cannot be consulted. They are objects to
be investigated, not investigators.
But goodwill is reciprocity. It is not government
at all, but mutual concession. It yields as much to
the prejudices and passions, to the conservatism and
even suspicions of patrons as it does to scientific
knowledge of what is good for them. Goodwill is
not necessarily a virtuous will, or a loving will, it is
a beneficial reciprocity of wills, and whether there is
really a benefit or really a reciprocity, is a matter of
opinion and mutual good feeling as much as a matter
of science.
Goodwill is productive, not in the sense that it is
20 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
the scientific economizing of the individual's capaci-
ties, but because it enlists his whole soul and all his
energies in the thing he is doing. It is that unknown
factor pervading the business as a whole, which cannot
be broken up and measured off in motions and parts
of motions, for it is not science but personality. It
is the unity of a living being which dies when dis-
sected. And it is not even the personality of a single
individual, it is that still more evasive personality to
which the responsive French give the name, V esprit de
corps, the spirit of brotherhood, the solidarity of free
personalities.
It is this corporate character of goodwill that makes
its value uncertain and problematical. A corporation
is said to have no soul. But goodwill is its soul.
A corporation owns its goodwill, and the value of
goodwill is reflected in its stocks and bonds. It is
the soul of a going concern, the value of the unity
and collective personality that binds together all its
parts hi a living organism.
The engineer or employer can tell exactly what is the
labor-cost of a single operation. The piece-rate shows
that. But the cost of the labor turnover is an over-
head cost that takes into account every relation of
employer and employee. It can be ascertained only
by the uncertain estimates of cost accounting. The
scientific study of goodwill is, first of all, the accurate
analysis of turnover and the apportionment of overhead
costs to each element. When estimates vary as widely
as they do at present, from $5.00 for common labor,
to $400.00 for motormen, as the cost of losing a man
and getting another fitted into his place, it is evident
that the scientific study of goodwill is yet only in its
GOODWILL 21
theoretical stage. And it can never be other than an
estimate of costs depending largely on the bias of the
cost accountant. For, look at the many elusive items
to be taken into account in estimating the overhead
cost of labor turnover, such as cost of hiring, of train-
ing the new worker, of extra power, of lost profits, of
fixed charges on plant while learning, of spoiled work,
of extra wear and tear of machinery, of accidents to
green employees, of loss of business on account of
defective product, and so on.1
It is this unmeasured quality of goodwill that
scientific managers are feeling after when they explain
the breakdown of scientific management. Mr. Taylor
explains it by saying that employers are too hasty
for profits and are not willing to wait for the slow
and patient work of science.2 Mr. Hoxie points out
that of the thirty or forty establishments picked out
by scientific managers and recommended to him for
investigation only two or three had carried out com-
pletely the patient trials, tests, experiments, upon
which alone can science be called scientific.8 Before
time-and-motion studies are even begun with the
workmen, two or three years may be needed to bring
about the proper engineering revision of the physical
plant. Not until that is accomplished is the truly
scientific manager ready to enter the field of labor's
habits, traditions, prejudices and old-fashioned ways
of doing things.
Even then, the expert is only an adviser. He is an
1 The most complete and critical study of the statistics is that
recently made by Sumner Slichter in The Turnover of Factory Labor,
Appleton, 1919.
1 Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management, pp. 128-135.
1 Hoxie, Scientific Management and Labor, p. 29.
22 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
outsider without authority. It is the employer who
installs the devices and controls their use. So,
scientific managers reach the point where they
instruct, not the workman, but the employer. They
urge him to give to the scientific man authority in his
establishment. The employer should give up his desire
for immediate profits and should abdicate in favor of
the scientific engineer. The autocratic method breaks
down at the point where profits without science take
control of the worker.
It is this that stands in the way of any automatic
solution of the labor problem that the engineer may
devise. He can fashion a machine or lay out a factory
and then go away and leave it to work according to
its inherent forces. So he fixes up a scheme of nicely
adjusted measurements and inducements by which
he expects the human machine to turn out a product.
Then he goes away and leaves it to the employer to
operate, in confidence that he has invented an auto-
matic solution of the labor problem.
This might suffice if he could tie up the worker by
a contract that would hold him to work, no matter
what changes subsequently occur. But the labor
contract is not automatic and is not enforceable
according to specifications. It is a new contract every
day and every hour. It is the only contract that is
not sacred. If, when a man is hired for a period of
time, he could be compelled to fulfill his contract,
the result would be involuntary servitude. On the
other hand, if an employer is compelled to keep a
man according to contract, then the employer might
be compelled to have on his hands a man not suited
to his work or not willing to work. So, in the last
GOODWILL 23
forty years, since the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, the labor contract has become univer-
sally, except in the case of certain professional services,
a contract terminable at will without damages col-
lectible in court. The workman can be fired at any
hour of the day and he can quit at any hour, regard-
less of what promise has been made and without a
legal penalty. So the labor contract is new at every
turn of the work that is being done. The laborer is
bargaining while he is working, and his tacit offer
to the employer is the amount of work he is turning
out. If the employer accepts the offer he keeps him
at work. If the employer wants a different contract
the old one is already terminated by the very words
that suggest a change in the amount of work.
Scientific managers have sometimes tried to meet
this situation by stipulating that prices and pre-
miums once set shall never be changed. But this is
impossible, and such a promise must be broken. Good
faith may possibly be kept with a certain individual
even though he may double and treble his wages
unexpectedly. Even that is unlikely. When he leaves
his job, when another takes his place, when unemploy-
ment breaks the connection, the moral obligation may
be deemed fulfilled. A new contract is made, a
different price is set. The individual promise may
not be violated but the contract changes with indi-
viduals. The promise made to one does not hold
with his successor, nor even with him if the job
changes.
Generally, instead of a promise that the price shall
never be changed the promise is made that it shall
hold for a year. This is about as far as the promise can
24 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
go. Even then, the daily work and wages are the
tacit offers made in advance and in contemplation of
their effect on the new bargain when it comes to be
made. There must be a change sooner or later.
Industry is improving, and if no change is made in
the contract, the worker gets the sole benefit of prog-
ress at the expense of capital or the consumer. On
the other hand, competition forces the employer to
cut the rates or go out of business.
So, for these reasons, an automatic system designed
as an ultimate solution to wind up the labor problem
and let it work itself out is impossible. The labor
problem is a daily trial of strength. The socialists
call it a class struggle. It is a continuous bargain
every day and hour, renewed either in the prices that
are to be paid or the amount of product that the
worker turns out. And it is this very renewal of
bargains that constitutes goodwill in law and in fact.
Goodwill is the offspring of liberty and grows in
importance as liberty enlarges. The slave-owner does
not depend on goodwill, else he would emancipate
his slaves. When the labor contract was enforced
in law, the crime of running away was the employer's
substitute for goodwill. And if the employer's
competitors do not have access to his laborers, in
order to give them information about alternative
offers, it is not their goodwill that he depends upon,
but their ignorance.
For goodwill is competitive persuasion. It is
knowledge of alternatives and freedom to choose
them without penalty or sacrifice. If there are no
alternatives, or no knowledge of them, there is no
goodwill. In prosperous times, when alternatives
GOODWILL
are numerous, the turnover increases. In hard times
it is reduced. In prosperous times, too, the workers
reduce their output. In hard times they work
harder. And this is the curious paradox of modern
industry and of the supply-and-demand theory of
labor, that in hard times when there is already an
overproduction of products relative to demand, the
workers still further increase the overproduction by
working harder; while in good times when demand
outruns supply, the workers intensify the undersupply
by still further reducing output. The manufacturer
or merchant reduces his output when there is an
oversupply on the market, but the wage-earner
increases his, and vice versa. Commenting on this
situation during a period of prosperity a great
employer once said to me, " Yes, these fellows will not
work now, but hard times will come and then we will
soak them. " With such a theory and such conditions
it is fear rather than goodwill, retaliation rather than
reciprocity, servility rather than freedom, that gov-
erns labor's production of wealth. Scientific manage-
ment has made a great advance away from this com-
modity theory and its results. To the scientific
study of goodwill and labor turnover we must look for
a still greater advance.
For goodwill is coming to be an intangible asset of
business more valuable than the tangible properties.
It is the life of a going concern. Business goodwill,
commercial goodwill, trade name, trade reputation,
trade marks, often exceed in value the physical
plant and the inventory of stock on hand. Goodwill
is valuable because it lifts the business somewhat
above the daily menace of competition and enables
26 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
it to thrive without cutting prices. And what is
"good credit" but the goodwill of bankers and
investors?
So industrial goodwill is a valuable asset like com-
mercial goodwill and good credit, and becomes so,
more and more, in proportion as laborers acquire more
liberty, power, intelligence and more inclination to
assert their liberties. It too is valuable because it
brings larger profits and lifts the employer somewhat
above the level of competing employers by giving
him a more productive labor force than theirs in
proportion to the wages paid. And this larger
profit reflects itself in the larger value of stocks and
bonds, the higher capitalization of the going business.
Goodwill is the expectation of future profit, and
whether it be the commercial goodwill of patrons and
customers, or the credit goodwill of bankers and
investors, or the industrial goodwill of laborers,
it has its present market value, sometimes greater
than the value of all the tangible property of the
business. Indeed, without goodwill, the tangible
property is a liability rather than an asset.
But goodwill is fragile as well as intangible. It is
not merely past reputation, it requires continuous
upkeep through continuous repetition of service.
It breaks down easily by deterioration, for it is built
up on the most fragile of assets, the freedom of the
will of patrons or workers. It cannot be wound
up and allowed to run itself like a machine. It is
not an exclusive monopoly protected by law like a
patent right. It is not even a contract enforceable
in law. It is just the intangible chance of making a
contract if you can. It is menaced by competitors
GOODWILL 27
who are perhaps just as free and able as the owner
to build up their own goodwill by making contracts,
and only the employer who seriously appreciates the
increasing importance of this aspect of the labor market
will meet successfully either the counter-inducements
of his competitors or the growing demands of the public
that supports the cause of labor.
For it is goodwill that converts the " class struggle"
of socialism into class harmony. It converts retali-
ation into reciprocity. Where it does not exist,
there the public, more and more, is turning to another
theory, not merely the goodwill theory of labor but
the public-utility theory of labor.
IV
THE PUBLIC
Goodwill is a matter of public importance, for it
builds up a harmony of interests, where both parties
gain reciprocal advantage in comparison with com-
petitors. The courts have long recognized this private
advantage as also a public advantage, and finally
Congress created the Federal Trade Commission in
order to help eliminate unfair competition in the
buying and selling of commodities, and thus protect
commercial goodwill.
But fair competition does not eliminate free com-
petition, and free competition may be cut-throat
competition. There are always inefficient competitors
and those who seek advantages by slashing prices.
Their methods are not unfair as long as they do not
get business away from any individual competitor
by unfair methods directed against him individually.
Cut-throat competition is directed against all com-
petitors and brings down the general level of all
prices or wages, since all competitors must meet it.
Goodwill tells nothing of the general level. It tells
only that one concern is making more profit than its
competitors. Free competition tells where the general
level shall be. Goodwill is an individual matter.
Free competition affects the class of competitors
as a whole.
It is for this reason that labor legislation comes in
28
THE PUBLIC 29
to supplement goodwill. Competition tends to bring
the advanced employers down to the level of the
backward. It reduces the general level. Legisla-
tion forces the worst to come up toward the level of
the more advanced and eliminates the backward.
It raises the general level.
There always have been and always will be indi-
vidual employers in advance of anything that legis-
lation has done or can do. The first great employer
of this kind was Robert Owen, one hundred years ago,
who reduced the hours of labor in his cotton mills
to ten per day and made a fortune when others were
working their employees fifteen or sixteen hours.1
Today, when legislation in Wisconsin, for example,
sets the limit of hours for women at 54 per week, a few
leading employers adopt 49, and make more money, for
they get and keep a higher grade of help. Always
individual employers, for one reason or another,
usually a combination of good business and public
spirit, go ahead of legislation and set the example.
Then legislation follows and attempts to force others
to improve conditions, raise wages or shorten hours.
The progressive ones cannot go far ahead of the
general level, and they need not. On the other
hand, legislation could, with difficulty, get popular
or legal support if pioneers had not already shown that
it wa practicable and profitable.
So legislation supplements goodwill and goodwill
pioneers legislation. Goodwill is an individual matter.
Legislation is class legislation. Goodwill raises the
individual above his class. Legislation raises the class
1 See Podmore, Robert Owen, A Biography (London, 1906), Vol. I
p. 162.
30 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
as a whole. Goodwill does not reach the entire field.
For those whom it does not reach, who do not care
for the goodwill of labor, or who are unable, incom-
petent or unprogressive, the state comes in and tries
to force them to do something nearly as good or to
eliminate them entirely.
This may be called the public-utility theory of labor.
If labor were simply a private affair it would be plainly
unconstitutional under our principles of government
to use the sovereign power to take something away
from employers and hand it over to their employees.
The public power cannot and should not be used
for private purposes. But if the welfare of labor is a
part of the public welfare, and if the piece of legisla-
tion in question is suited to the purpose in hand, then
those who stand in the way are an injury to the public
as well as to labor and may be restrained in the public
interest.
To the anarchist or individualist there is no public
purpose. Each individual is sovereign and has a
natural right to do as he pleases. Private benefit
is the only standard of action. To the socialist and
syndicalist both the individual and the nation are
illusions. There is simply one class struggling against
another class, uncontrolled by any genuine ideas of
patriotism, general welfare, or public utility. It is
private war going on without a public purpose.
But in our constitutional democracy a private
benefit or a class benefit may be a public benefit,
depending on circumstances and public opinion. In
the earlier days "the public" was looked upon as
mainly composed of consumers, whose interest was
best promoted by low prices and low wages of pro-
THE PUBLIC 31
ducers. Labor as such was not a part of the public.
Slave labor was private property and the wages and
hours of free labor were not matters of public con-
sequence. Beginning with the protective tariff after
1840, American labor began to have national impor-
tance against the cheap labor of Europe. Public
opinion had changed so that when the new tariffs
came in, the purpose was no longer protection of
capital but protection of labor.1
There were political, humanitarian and economic
reasons for this change in opinion. Labor began to
have the suffrage after the decade 1820. Labor
suffered bitterly during the long depression following
the panic of 1837. Labor began to have purchasing
power, and high wages for home labor would improve
the home market. Thus American labor was recog-
nized as a part of the American nation so far as for-
eign nations were concerned.
But it required many years before labor was recog-
nized as part of the public so far as American employers
were concerned. Most of the legislation protecting
them was declared unconstitutional, as being class
legislation. While it was plainly a public purpose
to protect labor against foreigners it was not such to
protect them against their own employers.
This class of decisions prevailed until 1898 when
the famous case of Holden v. Hardy was decided.2
The legislatures of Utah and Colorado reduced the
1 Mangold, George B., The Labor Argument in the American Pro-
tective Tariff Discussion, University of Wisconsin, Bulletin No. 246,
Economics and Political Science Series, Vol. V, No. 2 (1908); Com-
mons, Labor and Administration, Chapter XVIII, p. 350.
» Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898).
32 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
hours of labor in mines and smelters to eight per
day. The Supreme Court of Colorado declared the
law unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Utah
declared it constitutional. The Supreme Court of
the United States supported the Utah court. Prior
to that time the health of consumers was, of course,
recognized as a public purpose. By that decision it
came to be recognized that workers also were a part
of the public, and legislation on behalf of their health
while at work would not be class legislation but
reasonable classification for a public purpose. A bene-
fit to the workers became a benefit to the public.
The court also advanced the proposition that
instead of the employer and employee being equal
they were unequal in power. Up to that time the
court's notion of equality assumed that the employer
and the employee were equal and had equal power.
It had previously been held that in the case of chil-
dren and women there was inequality. Children and
women could constitutionally be protected, for they
were weak in bargaining power and could not protect
themselves against the employer. Now the court
held that men also were weaker than employers in
bargaining power.
If a class is not able to protect itself against another
class and if there is a public purpose involved, then
class legislation becomes reasonable classification. The
court would not have sustained an eight-hour law
applying to all labor of all classes, but it sustained a
law applying to labor where it was being injured,
under harsh conditions. The court rendered a dif-
ferent decision in the baker's case from New York.
There the legislature tried to limit the hours of labor
THE PUBLIC 33
to 10 per day for bakers. The court said in effect
that there was no public purpose involved, and that
there was no inequality in bargaining power. The
legislation was class legislation, for it attempted to
benefit one class at the expense of another. l
So the court's opinion has differed for different
classes of labor according to conditions and according
to the court's idea of whether there is a public purpose
involved. Labor is not a part of the public unless it
is recognized as having a public importance. The
state or nation cannot legislate for a class of persons
if they are merely private persons and the benefit
is merely a private benefit.
But in the historical development of legislation,
people who have not been a part of the public finally
become a part by being admitted into citizenship
and granted certain rights of public protection by
imposing corresponding duties on other citizens.
Prior to that they are treated as commodities to be
bought and sold according to supply and demand.
Afterward they are treated as citizens with rights
against others on account of their value to the nation
as a whole.
What are the qualities in a person which constitute
that person a part of the public? The first quality is
health. That probably is the most fundamental
public purpose. If a certain class is part of the public,
then the health of that class is important. The
health of that class becomes a public utility.
Next come morality and character. While our
government protects property, yet if property is
deemed to interfere with morals our courts are more
1 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
34 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
destructive than those of other nations. Other
nations perhaps would not permit prohibition of the
liquor traffic without compensation to the distillers
and brewers. In this country, when public opinion
gets to the point where it considers a thing immoral,
our courts refuse to protect that property at all and
the value of the property can be destroyed without
compensation. England, when she freed her slaves,
compensated the owners. In this country that was
not done.
Coercion and oppression are also public disadvan-
tages. In the Holden v. Hardy case it was recognized
that inequality o/ bargaining power was a public dis-
advantage, that the state is concerned in having equal
powers among individuals. Where they are unequal,
if a public purpose is served thereby, the employers
may be deprived, without compensation, of their
greater liberty, power and property rights.
Who is it that decides these questions? Who
decides whether labor is a public utility or not?
Who is it that decides what qualities are of public
importance? In this country it is the voters. We call
then1 decision public opinion. We say that public
opinion decides. But the Supreme Court can veto
public opinion or have a different view from that of
the voters and can place its opinion against the
voter's opinion. So we have judicial opinion as well
as public opinion. If the Supreme Court approves of
what the voters decide, it is constitutional. If it
d es not approve, then it is unconstitutional. The
court can change its opinion and it does change its
opinion, just as the voters change theirs.
What are the conditions that bring about this
THE PUBLIC 35
change of opinion, both judicial and public? First
is the development of economic conditions. Health,
morals, welfare, liberty, power, equality, are all
changed by the changes brought about by modern
industry. Second, labor is a moving force and an
important force in maintaining and operating this
economic machinery. Formerly it was not considered
so important. Now, more and more, we see that
labor is quite as important as the employer. Third, is
the growth in notions of ethics and justice. The
humanitarian notions which began in the decade of
the thirties of the past century have changed both
public and judicial opinion. Fourth, scientific
investigation, knowledge of these conditions, is more
accurate. We have had very little scientific investi-
gation of labor until the past twenty years. The
earliest investigations of health of working people
were made about 1838-1840. They dealt with the
effect of factory conditions on working women and
children. Prior to these investigations public opinion
might be merely prejudiced; now it becomes scientific
and informed. There can be no substantial or safe
progress without scientific investigation. There may
be revolution and reaction, but not progress.
But the constitutional method is based on ascer-
tained facts and goes ahead and stays. It is this
that constitutes "due process of law." It is this that
marks the decisions of the court since the case of
Holden v. Hardy. Since then, the economic and
sociological briefs of Mr. Louis Brandeis and others
have laid before the Supreme Court of the United
States the opinions and investigations of medical
people, of boards of health, of factory inspectors and
36 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
all classes of experts on labor's condition. It is
these that have begun to enlighten the court, and in
proportion as courts and other lawyers adapt in this
way their legal precedents to the new conditions does
the public purpose of labor legislation get recognized
and that which was class legislation becomes reason-
able protection of labor in the interest of the nation.1
1 Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, pp. 422-
430.
DEMOCRACY
Two extreme ideas of democracy gained temporary
triumph during the two great revolutions at the end
of the eighteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
centuries.
The French Revolution brought in the anarchistic
idea of democracy. Every individual was to be abso-
lutely free to do as he pleased. Not only were all
privileges of nobility, church and monarchy abol-
ished, but all corporations, all associations or gilds, all
employers' associations or trade unions, that tied the
individual down by the vote of his association, were
prohibited.1 It was believed that individuals were
equal by nature, and if so, the self-interest of each,
if not interfered with by government or by associations
whose by-laws the government enforced, would
work out harmoniously for the good of all. The
anarchistic idea of democracy is equal liberty for every
individual, but not for any associations of individuals.
We know how this theory of democracy has worked.
If allowed to go on, it ends in the despotism of power-
ful individuals. People are neither equal nor unselfish.
Government has necessarily come in to restrain power-
ful and unscrupulous individuals and classes, and pro-
1 See Dicey, Law and Opinion in England, Appendix, Note I, pp.
467-476.
37
38 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
tect the weak and scrupulous. Besides, individuals
seldom act as individuals. They act as associations.
The Russian Revolution, on the other hand, culmi-
nated in the socialistic idea of democracy. Labor
produces all wealth and is entitled to the whole product.
But the individual laborer is powerless to get that
product. So, organized labor takes possession of the
factories. The owners are disfranchised and the labor
unions operate both the government and the industries.1
The socialistic idea of democracy means the dictator-
ship of organized labor.
We have seen how this theory works. The sovyets
could not get business ability or managing ability to
come in and direct their factories because they had
wiped out profits; and they could not get new capital
to come in because they had ruined credit.
The anarchistic idea of democracy is based on the
hope that individuals will voluntarily be brothers
and live in harmony if they are not coerced by laws
that enforce the rights of property. The socialistic
idea of democracy is based on the hope that class strug-
gle will stop when the only class that governs is the
labor class.
But even brothers do not always live in harmony,
and class struggle never will stop. As long as nature's
resources are limited in supply, as long as labor, science,
capital, and management are needed to increase the
supply of products, as long as the demand for food,
clothing, shelter and other services is greater than
the supply, so long will there be disharmony and
opposition of interests. At one end is consumption of
wealth which always wants more of it. At the other
1 See Ross, Russia in Upheaval, p. 208 ff.
DEMOCRACY 39
end is production of wealth which always means sacrifice
and effort. As long as resources are limited and wants
unlimited there will be struggle between individuals
and classes.
The struggle is permanent and irrepressible, but
may be, and is, reconciled more or less as we go along.
We cannot wait for the millenium either of anarchism
or socialism, for it assumes both perfectibility of
human nature and unlimited supply of products.
That means the life beyond. The war has forced us
to adopt ideas of democracy suited to this imperfect
world.
After Congress and the President had authorized
Mr. Hoover to fix the price of wheat, he looked around
for somebody who could represent the producers of
wheat and somebody who could represent the con-
sumers of flour. He found certain farmer's organiza-
tions that could be said to speak for the farmers.
He found that the body that came nearest to represent-
ing the consumers was the American Federation of
Labor. He asked these organizations to appoint
representatives to assist him, which they did. He
had also his own experts and statisticians. The
farmers wanted $2.50 per bushel. The laborers
thought $1.84 was enough. Mr. Hoover wanted
the wheat in large quantities. After several days
they compromised on $2.20.
This was representative democracy in industry.
It was class struggle reconciled in the public interest.
Mr. Hoover did not fix the price of wheat. Presi-
dent Wilson did not fix the price. It was fixed by
organized labor and organized agriculture. After-
ward an effort was made in Congress to go over this
40 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
price ard place it at $2.50 in the alleged interest of
the farmers. It would have been just as reasonable
for the laborers to have violated the compromise
and for Congress to have put the price at $1.84 in
the alleged interest of the laborers.
Congress does not directly represent either farmers
or consumers. It may be political democracy, but
it is not industrial democracy. Representative de-
mocracy in industry is representation of organized
interests.1 Individuals who are not organized cannot
choose representatives. They must content them-
selves with their tacit proxies given to the organized.
When once organized they can be consulted in advance
of action. The procedure of autocracy is to act first
and consult afterwards. The procedure of democracy
is to consult first and act afterwards.
But democracy cannot quickly consult all individ-
uals whose interests are affected. It comes as near
as possible to doing it when it consults those who have
been freely chosen for the purpose without inter-
ference from other classes, so that they really repre-
sent the individuals of the class affected. No man
who is " disinterested " can represent opposing inter-
ests. But when the interested man is consulted,
then the interests that select him are substantially
consulted. When he agrees, then those with similar
interests have agreed.
For Congress to have fixed the price of wheat at
$2.50 would have been as autocratic as for an oli-
garchy of farmers to have fixed it at that price.
For Congress to have fixed it at $1.84 would have been
1 See Commons, Labor and Administration, p. 55 f; Proportional
Representation, pp. 355-363.
DEMOCRACY 41
to submit to the ''dictatorship of the proletariat.'1
For Mr. Hoover and his staff to have fixed the price
would have been government by "bureaucracy."
For the organized interests to fix it themselves under
expert advice of the nation's food administrator and
his statisticians was the practical democratic way of
doing it. It was the procedure of appealing to the
harmony of interest of both classes for the public good.
Again, the attempt was made for nearly a year to
bring together employers and employees for produc-
tion of munitions of war, under the direction of a
trade unionist as Secretary of Labor. Notwith-
standing his great ability and unquestioned fairness it
was impossible to secure the cooperation of employers.
He represented but one of the opposing interests,
and his staff lacked the business experience and record
of impartiality needed to obtain their confidence.
Finally, the President directed the Secretary of Labor
to select as his advisers representative employers and
employees. He went to the one great organization
of employers, the National Industrial Conference
Board, and to the great organization of employees, the
American Federation of Labor. Each side appointed
five representatives and they in turn each selected the
most representative professional men in the country,
ex-President Taft, to lead the employers, and Frank
P. Walsh to lead the workingmen.
Forthwith this representative body formulated a
national labor program, which the Secretary adopted,
"to maintain maximum production by settling obstruct-
ive controversies between employers and workers."3
Somewhat similar arrangements were made to cover
1 Official Bulletin, April 1, 1918, p. 7.
42 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
all of the vital activities of the Department, including
employment offices, housing, etc. With this staff
of investigators, adjusters, and executives, having
the confidence of all parties, a further step in advance
was made in bringing about the union of efficiency
and democracy.1
Other departments of war administration illustrate
the same principle. The Fuel Administration had its
leading coal operators and the President of the United
Mine Workers of America. The Shipping Board,
the War Industries Board, and others, to a greater or
less degree, formally or informally, followed the same
procedure.
So, in the stress of national peril American democ-
racy called to its aid, not only distinguished indi-
viduals, but the organized opposing class interests
of the nation. The organizations themselves were
incorporated in the framework of government. No
longer were they merely private associations carrying
on private contests, distrusted and even outlawed,
but they were raised to the level of recognized public
importance. Organized labor, organized farmers,
organized capitalists became public utilities.
Democracy takes on a new meaning, the partner-
ship of classes. Like any partnership they have their
disputes. In times of peace or in non-essential
industries, these may be matters of public indifference.
They are private affairs. In time of national peril,
or in strategic industries, they are vital to national
1 Official Bulletin, January 16, 1918, p. 8; April 1, 1918, p. 1; May
14, 1918, p. 1; Wehle, Louis B., "Labor Problems in the United States
During the War," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1918;
Marshall, L. C., "The War Labor Program and Its Administration,"
Journal of Political Economy, May, 1918.
DEMOCRACY 43
security or prosperity. The organizations themselves
perform public functions. The nation cannot live
without enlisting them.
Over and above the individuals composing them,
they become a more embracing public utility. Only
through organization can the modern industrial
worker, whether capitalist or laborer, have an effect-
ive voice either in industry or government. His
liberty is bound to be limited anyhow by the liberties
and powers of opponents or competitors. In his
individual weakness he gains greater power and liberty
through organization. And representative democ-
racy is neither the imagined anarchistic equality of
individuals nor the socialistic dictatorship of labor,
but it is the equilibrium of capital and labor — the class
partnership of organized capital and organized labor,
in the public interest.
The thing may not be always easy in practice. It
may not always work smoothly. Strikes and struggles
may come. But "the public" cannot listen to any
proposal to suppress either kind of organization.
If one is suppressed then the other becomes dictator.
The equilibrium of democracy may not be easy to
work out, but what else is there to do? Even if
suppression is attempted it cannot for long succeed.
The first national crisis sets the suppressor aside.
President Wilson, who in times past had criticized
restrictive practices of unions, yet, when the crisis
came, attended the national convention of organized
labor and pledged the nation's support to their proper
demands.1
1 War, Labor and Peace, Number 9, Red, White and Blue Series,
Issued by the Committee on Public Information, p. 7. An address
before the Convention of the American Federation of Labor, held in
Buffalo, New York.
44 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
And ex-President Taft, whose judicial decisions had
set up standards of government injunctions obstructive
to unionism, when he became responsible for the labor
policy of the war, notified the Western Union Tele-
graph Company that the truce between capital and
labor did not include the maintenance of the " closed
non-union shop."1 In the national peril, the policy
of both the President and the ex-President goes beyond
their earlier opinions as professor or judge, and throws
the weight of the nation on the side of encouraging
unions to go out and organize the unorganized.
Organization is bound to come, in one form or another,
under the stress of economic conditions. Rather
than leave it to the anarchistic or socialistic unions
that propose both to take over the employer's property
and to break down the patriotism of labor, they
place the nation's trust in the unions which through
their representatives had agreed with the employers
to support the industries of the nation. Such a
union serves indeed a public purpose, and no one is in
a better position to know it than he upon whom, like
President Wilson or ex-President Taft, is laid the chief
responsibility of carrying the nation through its crisis.
At the very time when these momentous decisions
were being made by executive departments of govern-
ment, the judicial department handed down a majority
decision holding, in effect, that a union is a mere pri-
vate affair and therefore has no right, against the
employer's wish, to go among his employees and even
persuade them to join the union.2 The corporation,
1 Official Bulletin, June 4, 1918, p. 6.
8 Hitchman Coal and Coke Company v. John Mitchell et al, 245
U. S. 229 (1917).
DEMOCRACY 45
said the majority of the court, "is entitled to the
goodwill of its employees, precisely as a merchant is
entitled to the goodwill of his customers, although
they are under no obligation to continue to deal with
him."
Prior to this decision the similar cases went off on
the allegation of coercion or intimidation. In this
case the decision went to the final limit of prohibiting
even persuasion by the agents of a labor union. Even
the "goodwill" theory was distorted, for goodwill is
competitive persuasion, and this the court attempts
to prohibit, if the competitor is a labor union.
Two opposing rights were in conflict, the right of
the corporation and the right of the trade union.
If both are merely private associations then the right
of the corporation prevails. It had cemented its
rights by oral contracts with its workmen in which
they agreed to work as non-union men. If there is
no public purpose opposed to such contracts, then
even persuasion by labor organizations is an illegal
conspiracy.
The dissenting opinion of the minority of the court
maintained that the efforts of the union to persuade
employees were not illegal since the contracts with
their employers were not like other contracts but were
terminable at will. Neither was the "closed union
shop" policy of the union coercive any more than the
"closed non-union shop" policy of the corporation.
Both policies being therefore persuasive and not
coercive, the persuasion offered to join the union was
legal, provided the purpose of the union was justifiable.
That purpose was "confessedly in order to strengthen
the union, in the belief that thereby the condition of
46 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
workmen engaged in mining would be improved;
the bargaining power of the individual workingman
was to be strengthened by collective bargaining."1
Is such a purpose legal or illegal? The majority
held that it was illegal when it interfered with the
employer's goodwill and labor contracts. The minor-
ity held that it was legal. "It should not," said the
minority opinion, "at this day be doubted that to
induce workingmen to leave or not to enter an
employment in order to advance such a purpose, is
justifiable when the workmen are not bound by con-
tract to remain in such employment."
Thus, in the final analysis, the legality or illegality
of a labor union turns on the opinion of the judge or
the executive or the public as to the public purpose
of the union. If it exists only for a private purpose,
then even its persuasive efforts are illegal. If it
performs a public purpose, then its effort to strengthen
its bargaining power by persuasion is lawful. All
other details and all technical reasoning of the law are
subordinate to this.
Does it, or does it not, serve a public purpose?
Each person must decide for himself. When he
decides, we know his definition of democracy. If
the union performs no public purpose then democracy
is the anarchistic, socialistic or capitalistic definition
of democracy, and only those who have the power may
govern if they wish. But if both associations of
workmen and associations of employers perform a
public service, then neither can be left to dominate
1 Hitchman Coal and Coke Company v. John Mitchell et al, 245
U. 8. 229, 273 (1917),
DEMOCRACY 47
the other, but both unite in a representative democ-
racy as the means of promoting the public welfare.
For, the struggle of capital and labor is almost never
a struggle of individuals. It always involves associa-
tions of individuals. The court starts with a fiction
that a corporation is a " person" and then holds that
an individual worker and an individual corporation
are exactly equal, in that the right of one person to
quit work is exactly equal to the right of the other
person to discharge him. It thereupon declares
unconstitutional all the laws in which the legislature
tries to protect, against employers, the worker's
right to belong to a union, by prohibiting employers
from discharging them solely on account of union
membership.1
These decisions are absurd enough in the case of a
corporation, which is obviously an association of
capitalists. The right of a worker to quit working for
an association of capitalists is by no means equal to
the right of the association of capitalists to discharge
him.
The legal decisions are equally absurd in the case of
a so-called " individual" employer. Every employer,
whether incorporated or not, is an association of
capitalists, for he is an association of all the bankers,
investors, creditors, material men, who have trusted
their capital to him. He speaks as one man for his
association of capitalists.
And the courts have worked out, on behalf of
associated capital, an elaborate and highly perfected
law of " principal and agent." When a foreman,
1 Adair v. U. S. 208 U. S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas 236 U. S.
1 (1915); Cf. Freund, Standards of American Legislation, pp. 225-248.
48 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
or superintendent, or manager, fires an employee
or threatens to fire him, or refuses to deal with him,
he is the agent who concentrates on that man the
combined power of all the capitalists, investors,
and creditors connected with the business. The claim
of laborers to have the right to organize is simply their
claim to come under this law of principal and agent.
The right of labor to organize is but the right of
laborers to speak as one man through one agent
for their association of laborers. The employer
always speaks as a representative of associated capital.
Unless the laborer can speak as a representative of
associated laborers, he cannot speak with equal power.
Neither the nation nor the laborers can remain
content until the Supreme Court reverses these
decisions1 and falls in line with effective democracy.
For, effective democracy is representative democracy.
1 Adair v. U. S. 208 U. S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas 236 U. S.
1 (1915); Hitchman Coal and Coke Company v. John Mitchell et al.,
245 U. S. 229 (1917).
VI
SOLIDARITY
Under the workmen's compensation law, a case in
dispute came before the Industrial Commission of
Wisconsin for decision. A teamster got drunk on
his employer's time, fell off his wagon and was killed.
His widow petitioned for the award of indemnity
to be paid by the employer. The law provided that
no compensation should be paid in cases of " willful
misconduct."
Evidently, from one point of view, it was his own
willful misconduct that caused the teamster's death.
He had even driven out of his way and taken an hour
of his employer's time to go to the saloon and buy
the whiskey that killed him. From the standpoint
of individual responsibility for that particular accident,
the worker alone was responsible and it would be a
flagrant injustice to require the employer to pay $2000
to the widow and orphans on account of an accident
for which the employer was not responsible. So
reasoned the employer and such were the precepts
of the common law which make each individual
responsible for his own acts and not for the acts of other
persons.
But the workmen's compensation law had abolished
the employer's defense of contributory negligence,
except where the contributory negligence was the
"willful misconduct" of the employee. The Com-
4 49
50 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
mission had to decide whether drunkenness was
willful misconduct. If it was, then the widow
and orphans had to suffer the cost of the accident.
If it was not, then the employer had to pay them about
$2000 toward tiding them over the period of poverty
and infancy.
The Commission, after much hesitation, decided
in favor of the widow and orphans. It was not will-
ful misconduct. The drunken man did not intend
to kill himself. They decided that by "willful
misconduct" was meant an injury intentionally
self-inflicted.
The Commission, perhaps, weighed the conse-
quences of willful misconduct rather than the accepted
meaning of the term. Somebody must pay the cost
of accidents. Shall it be the widows and orphans
themselves? Shall it be the tax-payers and the
charities? Shall it be the individual employer? Shall
it be the industry as a whole ? Somebody must decide.
Formerly the widows and orphans paid when the
breadwinner was at fault; then the charities; then the
tax-payers. The Commission figured that the law-
makers intended that the industry should pay the
first cost of accidents. The Supreme Court sustained
the decision.1 Afterward similar cases arose. A
sailor fell overboard while drunk and the employer
was required to pay compensation to his widow and
orphans On the former legal theory of individual
responsibility these decisions could not be justified.
1 Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Mittie Smith, 154 Wis. 105 (1913).
The legislature afterward sustained the opinion and made the law
explicit by substituting "intentionally self-inflicted" for "willful
misconduct."
SOLIDARITY 51
Only on a theory of partnership or solidarity of
interest can they find justification.
Employer and employee are engaged in a common
enterprise. They jointly assume the risks and share
the burdens and benefits of the enterprise.
More than that. They share each other's frail-
ties. The employer takes the workman as he is,
and the workman takes the employer as he is. The
employer gains in some cases and loses in other cases,
and the law attempts to balance one off against
the other. The employer gains in those cases where
he alone is responsible, for, instead of heavy damages
of many thousand dollars where a man is badly
disabled through the employer's fault, he pays
only a moderate compensation previously set forth
in the statute. The employer loses where the worker
is responsible, for he pays the same compensation
as when he himself is responsible.
The law attempts to set off the frailties of one against
the frailties of the other, and to balance off the chances
of human nature with its imperfections as they are.
Each takes the other as he is, with all his frailties.
Each also takes the occupation as it exists, with
all its risks. They engage jointly in a common enter-
prise. The risks of the enterprise and the risks of
each other are shared by each according to a schedule
of prices set forth in advance. If the sailor did not
go to sea he would not drown even if drunk, nor
even if his employer were criminally careless. If
the employer did not own vessels and hire sailors to
operate them he would not run the risk of drowning
drunk sailors, It requires the risks of the business,
52 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
the risks of human nature and the partnership of
capital and labor to produce industrial accidents.
Partnership is an economic fact. It may or may not
be recognized. But if it is a fact it will ultimately force
us to recognize it and give it a place in our theories.
It is a fact forced upon us by the way in which business
is carried on, and by the alternatives that would hap-
pen if we did not accept it. Without even knowing
what we do we are compelled to act sometimes
according to those consequences. The theory comes
afterward and helps us to explain our own acts.
The Industrial Commission, as practical men, acted
perhaps in view of consequences and their idea of the
purpose of the law. Eventually the theory of
solidarity is formulated and serves to justify similar
acts.
The employer who has not yet accepted the theory
of solidarity has a wrong attitude toward the law.
He contests the cases where he is not at fault. He is
litigious and incensed at the injustice of paying dam-
ages due to the frailties of others. He cultivates
ill-will.
Probably 10 per cent of accidents are owing to
infection of trivial wounds. Infection would not
follow an accident if the worker had resorted to the
employer's " first aid." Infection is due to the work-
er's misconduct. Yet the employer takes the worker
as he is and pays the damages of infection. Hernia,
epilepsy, and other frailties, are often inherited
predispositions. Without inherited or acquired weak-
nesses many of the accidents in industry would not
occur. Yet the industry pays the cost of the worker's
defects just as it pays the costs of defects in machinery.
SOLIDARITY 53
What are the consequences of accepting the theory
of solidarity?
A safety engineer showed his general manager that
the time lost on account of accidents would have
turned out 35 more automobiles that year. Safety
work had been classed as unproductive labor. What
the worker suffers from accidents is self-evident.
What the employer suffered was not so plain. Acci-
dent prevention had been considered humanitarian.
When it came to be seen that it produced profits as
well as safety, then it entered the field of good business.
For goodwill benefits both parties, and safety work is
productive, for it builds up the goodwill of labor.
Because good business did not reach all employers,
the several states began to supplement it by legislation.
The public interest in accidents has arisen through
new conditions and motives, well known, such as
the new dangers of modern machinery and trans-
portation, the fire hazard where labor is massed in
factories, the recognition that labor is a part of the pub-
lic, and the labor vote.
Legislation at first was repressive. The employer
was treated as a criminal. New misdemeanors were
created by law. Employers were ordered to safe-
guard machinery. The state appointed special police,
the factory inspectors, to go about and discover if
employers had obeyed the law by installing the safe-
guards. Evidence was collected and prosecution was
started in court. The court presumes every man to
be innocent unless proven guilty and gives him the
benefit of every doubt. If the legislature failed
to specify a certain point of danger, then there was no
misdemeanor in leaving it dangerous. Thus the
54 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
criminal theory of individual responsibility broke
down.
But there was also the common-law theory of
responsibility for injury. Every person must enjoy
his own property in such a way as not to injure others.
If, by his own acts, he invades the rights of others,
he is liable in a suit for damages. But he is not
responsible for the acts of third parties. So, in a
suit for damages by an injured employee, the law
allowed the employer to set up the defense that he
was not responsible, by showing that someone else
was responsible or had assumed responsibility. Per-
haps the employee himself was careless, or he had
assumed the risks of the occupation by the act of
accepting the job, or a fellow-servant was responsible
and should have been the one sued for damages.
The common-law theory of individual responsibility
broke down.
Meanwhile there had been growing up voluntarily
a theory of group responsibility. Employers insured
each other against the risks of accidents by paying
premiums into a common fund which then could be
drawn upon to meet the individual obligation of any
subscriber in case of accident. Voluntarily employers
assumed jointly each other's risks by taking out
insurance with casualty companies. Voluntarily they
acted on a theory of group responsibility.
But they insured themselves against the wrong
thing. They insured themselves against the legal
risk of a law suit and not against the industrial risk
of injury to the worker. Further, they introduced a
third party, the insurance company, between them-
selves and their workers. They agreed not to nego-
SOLIDARITY 55
tiate with their own employees in case of accident
compensation, but to abandon the worker to a third
party at the very moment when they ought to have
devoted themselves most sympathetically to his wel-
fare. Under such a system goodwill was impossible.
This impossible situation could be remedied only by
compulsory compensation and compulsory insurance.
The common-law doctrine of individual responsibility
was therefore revised, and the employer was made
responsible for all accidents, whether they happened by
his own fault, or the fault of a fellow-servant, or the
contributory fault of the injured workman himself,
or by nobody's fault.
Naturally, at first, the courts were inclined to
look upon such a revolutionary law as unconstitutional.
It deprived the employer of rights of property by
compelling him to pay damages when he was not
responsible for injury. The Supreme Court of New
York declared that the workman's compensation law
was unconstitutional, because that court held to the
theory of individual responsibility. The statute de-
prived the employer of his property without due
process of law, because it made him pay damages in
cases where he was not at fault.1 Afterward the
constitution of the state was amended and the court
then accepted the notion of solidarity.
The Supreme Court of the state of Washington
took the opposite view. Employers as a class are
made responsible for accidents to laborers as a class
and can be required to contribute to a common
insurance fund, so that the employer who has no
accidents pays for the accidents in the shops of his
1 Ivea v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271 (1911).
56 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
competitors.1 Partnership of capital and labor,
solidarity of individuals within a class, group responsi-
bility of employers, becomes a theory of jurispru-
dence to a limited extent, in place of the theory of
individual responsibility.2
Statistics showed that accidents accompany indus-
try as a whole, at different rates in different indus-
tries. The individual disappears in the statistical
average. These accidents are a cost of production
which must be met, like the breakage of machinery.
Industry as a whole must bear the expense. Insofar
as the expense is laid upon the laborer it can go no
further. The common-law theory of demand and
supply assumed that the laborer could shift the cost
of the risks of the occupation upon the employer by
demanding and getting higher wages. This was doubt-
ful. At any rate, the individual laborer who met
with the accident could not shift the cost of that
particular accident. He is the ultimate producer
and must endure the ultimate cost. But insofar as
the cost can be laid upon the employer he is in a
position to shift it to the ultimate consumer, by charg-
ing higher prices for the product. He is the worker's
partner, agent and representative, selling the worker's
product to the public. If the public is willing to share
a part of the laborer's cost of accidents then the
employer is the middleman to collect the bill and pay
it back to the laborer.
Provided, however, that all employers are com-
pelled to bear the same expense. If the indifferent,
1 David Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156 (1911).
1 Cf . Freund, Standards of American Legislation, pp. 109-112; Gide
and Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines, pp. 606, 607.
SOLIDARITY 17
or incompetent, or inhuman employer can escape the
expense, then his cut-throat competition prevents
the others from shifting it by charging higher prices.
The class responsibility of employers is the responsi-
bility that the poorest or worst employer owes to the
better employer not to force him down by competi-
tion to his lower level. Where he does not willingly
meet this responsibility, legislation compels him to
do it.
Compulsory compensation for accidents compels
the careless, thoughtless, and inhuman employer to
perform the same service for labor that the careful,
competent or humane is already doing or wants to
do. It raises the level of competition at that point,
eliminates cut-throat competition, enforces the duty
of fair competition, and shifts the cost to the consumer.
Compulsory insurance is the opposite of compulsory
compensation. It compels the careful, competent,
or humane employer to help pay for the accidents
occurring in the shops of his careless competitors.
When this is done voluntarily by an insurance
contract, the employer's property, of course, is not
taken except with his previous approval. When
done by law it is taken without his consent. The
details are immaterial. Whether it be done by
insuring with a certified private insurance company,
or by organizing an employer's mutual, or by paying
into a state fund, or even by the self-insurance of a
large corporation, all are alike in compelling contri-
butions to a common fund adequate to pay the worker
promptly when the accident happens.
Thus class legislation which imposes group respon-
sibility works in two ways: it compels the back-
58 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
ward employer to come up alongside the forward
employer, and compels the forward employer to help
along the backward one.
In this way, it recognizes what the socialists have
called the " class struggle." The employers as a class
are recognized as having a common interest immedi-
ately in opposition to the interests of the laborers as a
class. But it recognizes it only in order to recognize
the larger notion of solidarity. Instead of refusing
to see and acknowledge the opposition of class in-
terests where it really exists, as was the case when it
was held that only the individual was responsible,
it recognizes class antagonism by enforcing partner-
ship and group responsibility. And, instead of the
socialistic idea of eliminating class struggle by eliminat-
ing employers altogether and making organized
labor the sovereign, it eliminates it by making
employers responsible as a class to laborers as a class.
In doing so it makes them responsible for har-
monizing the struggle between capital and labor.
And it does so at the point where the class struggle
was most bitter and humiliating — bitter because
laborers felt that employers were grinding profit out
of their flesh and blood; humiliating because employers,
under the pressure of competition, were not free to
safeguard and compensate their workers as they
knew they should.
Thus compulsory compensation, with compulsory
insurance, enlarges liberty more than it restrains it.
It enlarges it in a different direction. It opens up a
new field for initiative, individuality, enterprise and
even profit. Instead of abolishing profit, as the
socialists would do, it increases profits for the more
SOLIDARITY 59
competent. I know a corporation that had been
paying about $5000 a year for insurance unde the
old employer's liability law, when it paid for only a
small part of the accidents. After the compensation
law had been in effect a year or so it was paying only
about $2000 a year, although it was paying for all
of the accidents. It had simply prevented accidents.
To reduce accidents 70 per cent is not unusual
under this new inducement of more profit. Pro-
gressive employers go far ahead of what had ever
been thought possible and far ahead of what the state
could compel them to do by treating them as criminals.
This class of legislation is not paternalistic or coer-
cive but stimulating and persuasive.
Not only that, it leads the employer to educate his
workmen in safety. Mechanical safeguarding can
accomplish comparatively little. It is the "spirit"
of safety in the workmen that accomplishes most.
Industry is started toward representative democracy,
for, in order to inspire the workmen with the spirit
of safety, their cooperation must be won by taking
their best representatives into a partnership of acci-
dent prevention through safety committees and safety
organization of the shop.
And this goes beyond the shop, into the home. The
National Safety Council, composed of the safety men
of the great corporations, educates the entire nation
in the spirit of safety.1 A new profession is started.
The claim agent, who used to follow up the injured
workman promptly after an accident, in order to
build up his employer's defenses against a damage
1 See Proceedings of the National Safety Council, Chicago, beginning
1912.
60 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
suit, becomes the safety expert and the safety booster,
cooperating with all the workers to benefit both them
and their employer. Civil and mechanical engineers
enlist. All of the high ideals of a profession, all
the missionary zeal of the enthusiast, all the satis-
faction of a noble work that saves life and health,
now animate the members of this profession. They
perform a public service while they bring together
the employer and his hundreds of workers in the
mutual benefits of goodwill. As a profession, they
become independent. They lay down the law of
safety and goodwill even to their employer, just as
the lawyer or the accountant or the engineer tells
him how to conduct his business within their profes-
sional fields.
And government itself takes on a new spirit. It
ceases to be mainly repressive and becomes edu-
cational. A new type of factory inspector comes in,
whose inspiring purpose it is to show the employer
how to prevent accidents, rather than persecute him.
And employers cooperate with government instead of
resisting it. They hire their own safety inspectors
and do their own inspecting, more efficiently than
government police and courts ever could do it.
The final result is, instead of shifting the cost of
compensation for accidents upon the ultimate con-
sumer, through increased prices for products, there
is no increased cost to be shifted. The laborer,
indeed, continues to pay a large share of the cost of
whatever accidents remain unprevented, for no com-
pensation, however great, can fully compensate for
loss of life or limb; but the share of cost that is thrown
upon the employer becomes no cost but a source of
SOLIDARITY 61
profit. The consumer gains, the laborer gains, the
employer gains, and that which started out to compel
compensation to the laborer for his loss of time and his
expense of medical care, turns out to have been the
greatest of all instruments yet invented for preventing
accidents. It enlists for that purpose a powerful
motive that reaches even the remotest stock-holder
who never sees the worker — the expectation of larger
profits through initiative, enterprise, and good busi-
ness. The solidarity of capital and labor becomes the
prosperity of capital, of labor, and the nation.
•
VII
THEORY AND PRACTICE
I have mentioned certain possible theories of labor.
There are others. They are not facts, but theories.
They are assumptions, hypotheses, philosophies,
"principles," so-called, which are employed con-
sciously or unconsciously, to explain the facts, or
to guide in hunting facts, or to weigh the facts, or to
decide what to do in view of the facts.
Everybody acts more or less on one or more of these
theories or sets of principles. Practical people some-
times pride themselves that they deal with facts and
not theories. "Two and two are four." It looks
like a fact. But it is only a theory. It is not true
unless it fits the facts. Two chairs and two beds
are not four windows. Two dogs and two cats are
not always four friends. The theory of "two and
two are four" fits some facts and not others. It
depends on the facts. It is an hypothesis, a guess,
an assumption, a "principle." It is empty until it
has been filled with facts, and then it takes good
judgment to fill it with facts that fit.
One theory or set of principles may be true up to a
certain point, where it comes in conflict with an
inconsistent theory. Then that different theory must
be introduced. The commodity theory explains some
facts about labor, and is a good enough guess up to a
certain point. The machinery theory is another
62
THEORY AND PRACTICE 63
that is satisfactory as far as it fits the facts. Goodwill
is a different theory that may or may not be accepted
according to our opinions regarding the facts and our
wishes as to what we intend to do with the facts. The
public-utility theory supplements the others, and our
theories of democracy, of partnership, of solidarity,
tell us what we will do with certain facts when they
come up.
People differ among themselves mainly because
they give different weights to different theories. The
fanatic, or crank, or mere "theorist," is brother to
the autocrat — he takes only one theory and rides it
through to the death penalty. Such is also the prac-
tical man who insists that two and two are always four,
and doesn't stop to ask, two and two whatf Such people
may become dangerous and then the people with
different theories begin to close in on them. And
the man who rides the commodity theory or the
machinery theory to the limit is probably just as
dangerous as the one who rides the anarchist theory
or the socialist theory or the theory of democracy
or partnership or solidarity to the limit.
The problem of industrial goodwill is really the
problem of finding out how far the different theories
are true and necessary at a given time and place,
under given circumstances and given facts, in order
to guide our acts, to hunt for hidden facts, to weigh
the facts when found, and to get something that will
work reasonably. The man who claims that he
deals with facts and not with theories is usually one
who is simply riding his own theory and calling it a
fact. He thinks that two and two are always four
because he has emptied the theory of facts, or because
64 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
he has got accustomed to using the theory only where
it fits certain facts, or because he is in the habit of
picking out only that small portion of all the facts that
fits his wishes or theory. The sane man is the man of
common sense, who is willing to act on different
theories, or rather on all the theories, and is willing
to investigate and give due weight to all of the facts
in the light of all the theories. Such a man is what
is known in law as " reasonable."
VIII
SECURITY
If the commodity theory of labor is assumed,
consciously or unconsciously, then wages are left
to supply and demand. If the engineering theory is
added, then the individual laborer is made more pro-
ductive by the scientific study of him and his job.
When the goodwill theory is adopted, we find the
beginnings of serious attention to irregularity of
employment. The labor turnover is an angle of the
modern insecurity of labor that has come along with
liberty. If industry is irregular and uncertain, then
a man must be laid off and taken on again and the
number of men hired and fired is increased. But
if an establishment can give steady employment it
can attract and hold workmen as against other
employers whose work is irregular. To regularize
employment is the first step in industrial goodwill.
For, of course, it is not a man's daily wages that
fix his welfare, but it is his earnings over a period
of time. A carpenter at $4.00 a day, 200 days a year,
earns no more than another at $2.70 a day for 300
days. The high wages in the seasonal trades are
largely an illusion, and they sink down to something
like the general level of yearly earnings in the steady
trades. High wages and high earnings are not the
same, though sometimes assumed to be such when
we think only of demand and supply.
6 65
66 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
But periodicity is not uncertainty. It comes
around regularly. It can be calculated in advance.
The amount of unemployment can be discounted.
The high wages in the busy season are a rough com-
pensation for idleness in the off season. Uncertainty
is different. It cannot be even roughly compensated
and is bound up in the unpredictable ebb and flow
of prosperity and depression, and in the rise and fall
of each individual business undertaking.
The effort to regularize business is not new. The
dove-tailing of the coal and ice business, the discounts
on orders in the dull seasons, the working to stock in
the dull season, all and more of them are old ideas.
But it is a new idea and a new impulse that seeks
scientifically to regularize business in order to build
up goodwill in the labor market.
Prior to this idea the main thought was to keep
the plant going at full capacity or to keep a skeleton
organization of the higher grades of employees. If
2000 men can be kept together, then 10,000 can be
added by advertising when business picks up and
can be dropped when it falls off. But if labor turnover
is itself expensive, then it might pay to invest some
thought and money in keeping the 10,000 together.
The dove-tailing is then more carefully figured out,
and the unrecognized gaps are discovered and filled.
Workmen are trained for diversified work, so that
they can change from one product to a different one.
If they earn less at this substitute work, they are
even subsidized by a retainer charged up to the cost
of the principal or more profitable product. They
are paid for versatility as well as for output. The
number of short-time jobs is reduced in one direction
SECURITY 67
and enlarged in other directions. The work is arranged
to come along in a steady flow instead of bunches. An
" emergency squadron " of all-round workers is trained
to help out the workers or departments that get
behind, instead of leaving it to the foremen to hurry
them up. Where the repair gang goes around to fix
up machinery when it breaks down, the emergency
squadron goes around to fix up goodwill.1
If all of these methods fail, then, instead of laying-
off some of the workmen, all of them are put on short-
time. This is the significance of the " basic eight-
hour day." It is not an absolute eight-hour day,
and much of the argument against reducing the
hours of labor is wasted when the " basic day" rather
than the absolute day is proposed.
Almost every industry, including agriculture, might
be put on the " basic eight-hour day" at once, requir-
ing only a little more care in time-keeping and super-
vision. During the first eight hours, regular time is
paid and then time-and-a-half for overtime. This
is almost the universal practice in trade-union agree-
ments. It permits by pre-arrangement an increased
output in the busy season, by adding more hours at
higher rates of pay per hour, instead of more men at the
same rates, and permits both a reduction in hours
and a reduction in labor-cost when business falls off,
but without laying off men. If labor turnover is
expensive, then the basic eight-hour day is eco-
nomical and profitable.
The basic eight-hour day also meets, by arrange-
ment in advance, one of the puzzling facts in the
psychology of labor. Why is it that workmen are
1 Consult Slichter, The Turnover of Factory Labor.
68 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
not willing to take lower rates of pay by the hour or
piece in the dull season? If the employer must cut
prices and offer discounts in order to induce sales
when business falls off, or endeavors to stock up in
order to furnish steady employment, why should not
labor take its share of the off-season or hard-time
burden and do likewise?
It would seem to be simply a question of alternatives.
Labor does take its share of the burden of hard times
and dull seasons, in one way if not in another. If
one-half the force is laid off, they carry the whole
of the burden and the other half carries none of it.
But if the entire force works half-time the burden is
distributed. Workmen seem to prefer the former
alternative. The fact that some of them are out of
work and others getting high wages seems less obnox-
ious than for all of them to be at work at lower wages.
This was not apparently their attitude before trade
unionism began to influence the minds of workers, and
is often not their attitude where trade unionism has
not yet taken hold. Sometimes it is thought that the
workman feels it to be beneath his dignity to work
for less in the dull season than the standard scale in
the busy season. This is a first impression. Back
of it is experience and competition. In order to
bring about a return to the higher rate of wages when
the good season returns, all competitors must act
substantially in unison. The wage-earner who works
at the lower scale in the dull season is not in a position
to insist on the higher scale in the busy seasoo, and
his employer is not likely to pay it unless a sufficient
number of workers insist. And those employers who
do advance to the higher scale must face the competi-
tion of those who do not.
SECURITY 60
In the clothing trades of New York, during several
years, it was this situation that brought on the unor-
ganized strikes at the beginning of each busy season.
The new prices would be made in mass meetings
for the new season and then, as the dull season ap-
proached, competition and unemployment would bring
down the piece-prices until a new season and another
set of mass meetings restored them. In the busy
season all of them were working long hours at high
piece-rates, and in the dull season all were working
short hours at low piece-rates.1
In other seasonal trades the experience is similar,
though less dramatic. It is not loss of dignity, but
loss of control, that impels the workman to insist, if
he can, on the busy price in the dull season. Not
unless all competing wage-earners move together in
the ups and downs of business can this psychology
of bargaining be seriously modified.
But the basic six-hour day or eight-hour day, with
time-and-a-half or double-time for overtime, does
exactly this thing for workers, when paid by the day.
It reduces the hours in dull times, and, by pre-arrange-
ment, reduces the rate of wages per day more than it
reduces the hours. Thus it reduces both hours and
labor-cost of the product in dull seasons and hard
times. This reduction in cost, however, stops at
the six-hour or eight-hour level. There is no suffi-
cient reason, if the eight-hour level does not furnish
enough elasticity, why the basic seven-hour day or
basic six-hour day should not be adopted in those
industries where experience shows that employment
in off seasons or hard times gets down to thirty-five
or forty hours a week.
1 See Commons, Trade Unionism and Labor Problem*, pp. 316-335.
70 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
Then, when the basic hour day is adopted for day
workers, it is but a matter of percentages or differen-
tials added to the piece-rates for piece workers, so
that the piece-rates also shall, by pre-arrangement,
advance when the hours increase and be reduced
when hours are reduced. The basic hour day for
day workers and its corresponding differential per-
centages for piece workers are a modified form of profit
sharing, since, in the busy season or prosperous times
when there is more work for the employee and more
profit for the employer, not only the hours are
increased but also the rates of pay per hour and per
piece are also increased, and vice versa.
Yet too much may be paid for security. Employers
may exact too high a price for it. If the price is
perpetual low wages, the price is too high. If the
price is systematic overtime in order to earn living
wages, the price is too high. The basic eight-hour
or six-hour day is a good enough theory, when it is
used solely for the purpose of providing elasticity.
It is vicious if used to reduce earnings and not restore
them. It is good enough to tide over depression and
to provide for emergencies and to distribute the bur-
den of unemployment. It is abused if it leads to
low wages and systematic overtime. It is exactly
this possibility of abuse that in the end compels labor
unions and legislation to set the absolute maximum
hours of labor, which cannot be abused, regardless
of emergencies or fluctuations in employment.1
1 Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, pp. 204r-
260. See also Docket 37, National War Labor Board, Molders v.
Wheeling Mold and Foundry Company (1918) ; reprinted in American
Federationist, November, 1918, p. 1000.
SECURITY 71
The theory of trade unionism meets insecurity by
reducing hours or restricting output. Apparently,
if there is not enough work to go around, it is pure
hoggishness for some to work long hours while others
are unemployed, or to take the work from others by
speeding up and doing it all yourself. Short hours
and reduced output make work for the unemployed.
The theory is good enough in hard times or dull
seasons, and indeed is a sound theory when there is not
enough work to go around. It serves to distribute
the limited total amount of work.
But the theory is not good enough to meet the
fluctuations of industry as a whole. These fluctua-
tions are changes in the total amount of all kinds of
products that are produced, and the fluctuations
spread over the whole world at about the same time.
There would be just about as much unemployment on
a universal eight-hour day as on a universal twelve-
hour day, and just about as much if everybody
worked half as hard as he does, or twice as hard.
For unemployment goes by fluctuations. It comes
and goes by seasons or by prosperity and depression
throughout the world.
If we had a universal eight-hour day in time of
prosperity, it would have to be reduced to seven hours
or six hours, or less, in time of depression, in order to
distribute the reduced total amount of work. Elas-
ticity has to be provided somewhere to meet these
fluctuations. The elasticity may be provided by
laying off a part of the force in hard times and taking
them back in good times, or by reducing hours all
around in hard times and increasing them in good
times. The one method is the method of unemploy-
72 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
ment for some, the other the method of distributing
unemployment and regularizing employment for all.
Not until some method is found to stop the world's
fluctuations of prosperity and depression as a whole
can industry avoid the necessity of choosing one or the
other of these unfortunate alternatives.
The theory of socialism offers this method,., and the
weightiest argument for socialism is the unemployment
produced by capitalism. The socialistic theory,
indeed, may be said to sacrifice everything else in order
to get security of employment. And, to the unem-
ployed or half employed workers, why should they
not sacrifice everything else? What is the use of
private initiative without bread and butter? What
is the use of liberty and efficiency without security?
Why should employers be permitted to use unemploy-
ment as a club to drive down wages and to control
even the opinions and politics of workingmen?
Surely, security of employment, or at least security
of minimum earnings in time of depression, is one of
the tests of the stability of capitalism. Fluctuations
in industry and employment are a condition that must
be met in one way or another. Unhappily, these
world fluctuations make it impossible to look for-
ward to a fixed regular income or regular work.
Overwork and big earnings in busy seasons and good
times, underwork and small earnings in dull seasons
and hard times, are the most serious defect of industry,
and the one hardest to meet. But while they make
impossible a fixed regular income, they do not make
impossible a much greater security when once atten-
tion is seriously directed toward it.
The matter is one for investigation and ingenuity
SECURITY 73
in each particular case. Scientific management accom-
plished unbelievable results when once engineers
and business men began to experiment according to
its principles. Scientific goodwill may likewise be
ingenious when managers and employers begin to
experiment with it. The foremost of its principles is
security — the privilege of looking forward to a secure
income — and security not for a few but for all. The
employer, or association of employers, or nation
of employers, that sets its engineers, accountants,
statisticians, scientific managers, along with the labor
organizations and shop committees, to work out the
problem of security of employment, or at least
security of earnings, is rescuing capitalism at the point
where it stands most in need of goodwill.
IX
LABOR MARKET
Goodwill is a competitive advantage. Its value
consists in ability to get or keep desirable customers
or workers away from rivals. The best workers, on
the average, are not the unemployed but those
already holding good jobs. The labor turnover does
not show itself strongly among this class of workers.
It occurs among the newly hired, the less skilled, the
boys, young men, girls, and those holding the less
desirable jobs.
It is here that the public interest also concentrates.
Those who have steady desirable jobs are, of course,
not moving about, except occasionally when they can
evidently better their position. Theirs is indeed a
normal and desirable turnover, for it is a necessary
alternative to promotion. But, for the others, their
excessive turnover is a detriment to themselves,
their employers and the nation.
The natural and most satisfactory method of
recruiting new workmen is through their friends or
acquaintances already employed in the establishment.
This method works a treble benefit. It is a com-
pliment to the worker if he is asked to recommend
somebody; it is a help to the employer in getting a
good selection of recruits; and it is a help to the new
man or boy in getting over the early period when he is
74
LABOR MARKET 75
most likely to be discouraged. It attaches both tho
old and the new worker to the firm.
But this method assumes that the establishment is
already a good place to work, and it gets good results
because good men are already employed whose rec-
ommendations can be relied upon. In short, it is
simply the natural method by which goodwill is
always built up. An establishment is fortunate, and
indeed has about reached the perfection of goodwill,
if all of its recruiting for new help is accomplished in
this way. It has a steady, loyal force and it grows by
getting new men who are steady and loyal.
No business firm is quite so fortunate as this,
and not many desire to recruit their entire force in
this way. It applies to skilled or semi-skilled men and
to boys beginning as learners, and not generally
to common laborers. Even for these better positions
it cannot take care of emergencies. And even at
its best it runs the risk of cliques and clans in the
shop.
By far the largest source of supply in general is that
of applicants seeking work, either at the gates or at
employment offices. This means a constant over-
supply of labor relative to demand, a " reserve army"
of labor unemployed but ready to be employed.
Even in the most prosperous times when there seems
to be a real scarcity of labor, this reserve army is not
taken up entirely but shrinks only to an "irreducible
minimum."1 The lowest number of unemployed
among the trade unions of New York over a period
of twelve years was in October, 1906, when it was 5.6
per cent of the total number of all who reported.
1 Beveridge, W. H., Unemployment (1910), p. 60.
76 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
The highest number of unemployed was 40 per cent
in January, 1915.1 These are mostty skilled laborers.
For the unskilled and semi-skilled, if records were kept,
the irreducible minimum would probably appear much
above 6 per cent.
Here, again, it was the necessities of war that
forced public attention and public organization to
take care of this reserve army of labor. At the very
height of the " drive" for more labor, a report made
to the American Federation of Labor in November,
1917, showed large numbers of unemployed in dif-
ferent parts of the country.2 Men were scarce
in some sections, out of work in others.
Ohio was the first state to seize this problem cor-
rectly.3 Other states set out to obtain a doubtful
census of workers, but Ohio set out to organize the
labor market. Within the space of two weeks,
21 free state employment offices were established,
each one located with special reference to railway
centers. A central clearing house was set up at
Columbus. The long distance telephone bills reached
$20.00 to $30.00 a day. The state superintendent
is at the telephone continuously, communicating with
the 20 br/anch offices. When twenty thousand men
were wanted to build the cantonment at Chilicothe,
the contractors were warned not to advertise for help.
Advertising would flood the market at Chilicothe and
1 New York Department of Labor, Special Bulletin, No. 85, July,
1917, pp. 25, 50.
1 Report of Proceedings of American Federation of Labor, 1917, p.
440.
3 See articles by W. M. Leiserson, Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, April, 1918, pp. 53-63; The Survey, April 20, 1918, p.
6fi.
LABOR MARKET 77
rob it at spots elsewhere. It would bring thousands of
men before the work was ready and let them wait in
idleness. Neither was the contractor to engage with
private employment offices. He agreed to hire all his
help through the Columbus office and to call for help
only when needed and in the exact number needed.
Every call was in effect a contract. The Columbus
office then required each of the branch offices to reg-
ister all available labor and to get local employers
to furnish lists of skilled help whom they might tem-
porarily release. Then, for a day when the contractor
wanted two thousand men, exactly two thousand men
were pro-rated over the entire state by telephone;
each local office was ordered to send its quota; no
section of the state was robbed of labor; no workman
made a trip before his work was ready for him, and
the contractor received exactly the number he was
ready to put to work. Likewise, on another day
when one hundred were wanted, or five hundred, and
so on.
The same was true when the cantonment was
finished. The workmen all were registered. Work
was found for them in the state or other states and
they left their Chilicothe jobs to go directly to other
jobs waiting for them.
So simple and common-sense a plan of organization
ought to appeal to employers but it did not until the
crisis of a war overrode their prejudices or broke
their inertia, and even then, it was only in the single
state of Ohio that the state authorities were daring
enough to seize the opportunity to enlist the right
executive ability and to spend the necessary amount
of money.
78 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
For employers are accustomed to advertise when
they want help, not realizing that advertising either
pulls workmen away from other employers or assumes
the existence of a reserve army unemployed. From
the individual standpoint, advertising for labor may be
successful; from the public standpoint it may be
wasteful.
Or employers are accustomed to rely on private
enterprise, which in this case is the competing private
employment offices, not realizing that these have no
interest in conserving labor but merely in getting
as many fees as possible from as many laborers as
possible.
Or, finally, employers' associations have their own
employment bureaus created to help them in fighting
trade unions, and if the public is allowed to set up
free public offices and supplant their association
bureaus, then their power as an organized class
over labor as a class is threatened.
For these various reasons of inertia, prejudice,
or loss of power, employers have either not taken
hold or have actually obstructed the only possible
method by which the labor market as a whole can
be organized in the public interest as against private
interest or class interest.
Somewhat different have been the obstacles set up
by labor, organized and unorganized. Public employ-
ment offices in various states and cities have been
considered by labor to be the special perquisite of
labor, created to help labor find employment. Hence,
labor must control the offices. This means that
labor politicians who can get the labor vote are placed
in charge of the offices. Naturally employers do not
LABOR MARKET 79
patronize them, and they degenerate into a "hang
out" for casual, inferior, and even pauper labor.
Even when the crisis of war was upon the nation
and the disorganized labor market threatened military
collapse, it required over a year for the trade unionist
Secretary of Labor to be willing to set aside the labor
politicians and the trade unionist pensioners who had
attempted to install a federal system of employment
offices. Finally, the Secretary authorized the Ohio
system to be adopted and extended throughout the
nation.
The things essential in a public employment sys-
tem are competent officials and organization of capi-
tal and labor. The two go together. Expert offi-
cials cannot be obtained unless the position offers
security and promotion. This means a national sys-
tem, the training of young men and women as begin-
ners, the transfer, promotion and salary increase in
higher positions through to the very top of the
system.
To get such officials they cannot be appointed by
trade unionists, nor by employers, nor even by a civil
service commission. The latter gives necessary aid by
its written examinations, in eliminating the evidently
unfit, or fills successfully the merely clerical positions,
but the selection and appointment of those who have
the responsibility of bringing employer and employee
together and filling the jobs by workers who fit the
jobs, can be made only under the joint supervision
and consent of organized employers and organized
workers. The responsibility of these employment
officials is great. Not only must they be "fair" to
both sides in the conflict of capital and labor, but
80 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
there must be not even a suspicion of unfairness.
They are in a position evidently to give a preference
to trade unionists or to strike breakers, and as soon
as they do either, or are suspected of leaning toward
either, their usefulness is gone. Civil service exami-
nations alone cannot bring out this quality of fairness,
although they are essential in preparing the way for
it. It is a matter of judgment and opinion of those
whose conflicting interests are at stake.
This means representative democracy in the civil
service. In one way or another organized capital
and organized labor must jointly have the final de-
termining voice in the selection and promotion of
public employment officers and in the supervision
of their work.
When once the organized but opposing interests
are then brought together as advisers and supervisors
cooperating with the government, they themselves
rise above their class conflicts and suspicions. I
have seen the employer's representatives under these
circumstances even join in the selection of a trade
unionist and a "card" socialist for these important
positions, and have seen the union representatives
join in selecting a non-union contractor or employer.
For "class conflict" is not irrepressible. It can
be bridged over at strategic points. But it cannot
be hurried or rushed. It means consent, and consent
takes time.
The instincts of bureaucracy often stand in the
way of this deliberative partnership. State or gov-
ernment officials and civil service commissions in-
stinctively feel that they know their own business and
are impatient in submitting their judgment to un-
LABOR MARK XT 81
official civilians. They select and promote subordi-
nates according to their own ideas. In this way
bureaucracy grows. But in this delicate matter of
class conflict, at the strategic points where it is liable
to break out, bureaucracy breaks down. It requires
to be supplemented by organized democracy.
In running a public employment office the govern-
ment is " going out after business. " Its patrons are
employers and laborers. If it cannot hold their
patronage it does not get the business. Employers
cease to patronize and workers look elsewhere for
jobs. In the stress of war, when the government is
almost the sole employer, the government officials
can insist that the public offices alone shall be pat-
ronized. In times of peace, it is only the day-to-day
confidence of private employers that they can get
the kind of help they want, that keeps the office on
its feet. If employers run their own private agencies
they, of course, are not disturbed by lack of confi-
dence, for their control is complete. If they patronize
the public offices they abandon insofar a powerful
weapon devised to combat trade unionism. Both
trade unionism and bureaucracy may well admit
employers to partnership on equal terms in controlling
the offices, for only in this way can there be perma-
nently maintained the first great essential in regu-
larizing employment in the interest of both labor and
the nation, a national employment system enjoying
a monopoly as complete as that of the post office.
And employers and employers' associations should
lend their aid in building up this type of public
employment offices, for of all the agencies that de-
moralize labor and intensify the illwill of labor to-
82 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
ward capital, none is more unscrupulously effective
than the competing private employment offices that
live on the fees of unemployed workers.1
1 For further details and discussion, see Commons and Andrews,
Principles of Labor Legislation, pp. 261-293; American Labor Legisla-
tion Review, November, 1915, March, 1918; Final Report of Commission
on Industrial Relations, p. 170 ff; Employment Service Bulletin, United
States Department of Labor, Monthly, beginning January 29, 1918.
INSURANCE
Unions affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor reported that they had paid, in 1917, about
$3,000,000 in death benefits and only $2,400,000 on
account of strikes. Only seven unions did not report
death benefits.1
These benefits are small in amount. Their average
is something over $100.00.2 Provision for the family
after the death of the worker is seldom possible out
of these meagre amounts. Only 23 unions reported
sick benefits, amounting to $840,000. Measured by
the amount of money expended, more important
to organized workers than provision for strikes or
sickness is the craving to be decently buried.
So it is with workers in general. Thirty-eight
million policies are outstanding of the kind known as
" industrial insurance."3 Probably thirty million
workers hold these policies. They are a form of life
insurance. The average amount of the policies is
about $130.00. They, too, are provision for decent
burial.
The expense of conducting industrial insurance is
enormous. In 1916, a leading company received
1 Report of Proceedings of American Federation of Labor, 1917, pp.
33, 36.
1 Twenty-third Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor (1908),
pp. 213-219.
1 Insurance Year Book, 1918.
83
84 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
about $62,000,000 in premiums and returned $29,-
000,000 to policy-holders. l For every dollar paid for
insurance about 53 cents was needed to meet expenses
and profits.
This must be so, for industrial insurance is the
smallest of retail insurance. Premiums are paid
weekly, or when the pay envelope is full. The weekly
premiums are 10, 15, 25 cents, and the insurance
agent collects them in cash from house to house.
The lapses, too, are many. Unemployment, sick-
ness, accident, stops the payment of premiums. The
number of lapses in ten years has been estimated at
nearly two- thirds of the number of policies written.2
Besides the funeral benefits of organized labor and
the funeral benefits of industrial insurance, there
are also the unknown millions of assessment policies
of the unknown hundreds or thousands of sickness
and death fraternal societies.3
The heavy expense of retail insurance suggests the
adoption of wholesale insurance. The employer of
labor is naturally in a position to buy insurance
wholesale for his employees. The first policy of
this kind was taken out in 1912 by a mail-order house.4
Whether this class of insurance is written with a
commercial insurance company, or whether the great
1 See Financial Report for the Year Ending December 31, 1917, Pru-
dential Insurance Company, as made to the Wisconsin Insurance
Commission.
1 Rubinow, Social Insurance, p. 421.
1 See Sydenstricker, E., "Existing Agencies for Health Insurance in
the United States," Proceedings of the Conference on Social Insurance.
Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 212, p. 430.
4 Morris, E. B., Group Life Insurance and Its Possible Development.
Address before the Casualty Actuarial and Statistical Society, 1917.
INSURANCE 85
employing corporation finds that it can more eco-
nomically " carry its own insurance" is immaterial.
If the employer carries the insurance himself, it is
known as an " establishment fund/' or " self-in-
surance, " and is a part of what has come to be known
as a "welfare system." If an insurance company
carries the insurance it is known as "group insurance. "
The characteristic of group insurance, as now written,
is that it picks out certain definite actuarial items from
the larger welfare system and deals with them as a
separate problem. These are life insurance, old
age pensions, perhaps also premature disability,
and sometimes sickness insurance.
The recent rapid spread of group insurance, whether
establishment funds or commercial insurance, shows
that it fits a gap in industry newly recognized and
keenly felt. The financial inducement to the employer
is the reduction of his labor turnover. As stated by
one of the insurance companies in its advertising
circulars, group insurance brings "a closer and more
intimate relation between employer and employee,
the existence of contentment and happiness in the
employee and his family; the cessation of strife and
misunderstanding; the production of incentive and
initiative; the amelioration of the living conditions of
the widow and the orphan; the betterment of com-
munity social conditions; the encouragement and
valuation of the energies in men that count and the
actual return, measure for measure, in dividends."1
Indeed, if these objects can be brought about by
setting aside a premium of 1 to 2 per cent on the
pay-roll, then the investment is likely to be more
1 The Employer and The Employee, pamphlet.
86 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
profitable than any other expenditure of a similar
sum.
For, group insurance is both elastic and cheap.
It can be written to fit any of the circumstances or
wishes of any employer. Usually, it is outside the
accident compensation law. It may cover only
life insurance. If so, it usually covers one year's
wages of each employee, payable in monthly install-
ments. The worker's earnings thus are made to
continue uninterrupted for a year after his death,
for the benefit of his family. The employer may
insure every employee, from the president of the
corporation to the casual laborer. The protection
may be graded according to length of service. It
may be restricted to those who have been with the
company a year, or six months, or one month, or may
take effect for each worker on the day he goes to
work.
The policy may carry other features in addition
to life insurance. It may carry an old age pension,
beginning at sixty-five or other age, running for the
remainder of life, and fixed at any amount deter-
mined by the employer. It may provide for invalidity,
or permanent disability, that is, for premature old
age arising from any cause not otherwise safeguarded.
It may, indeed, include sickness or temporary disa-
bility, though the policies written with insurance com-
panies have seldom gone this far.
The elasticity of group insurance is further evident
in that it may be made, and usually is made, uni-
versal for all employees in the establishment, without
medical examination or selection of risks. It takes
the industry and the workers as it finds them, and
INSURANCE 87
excludes no one on account of physical defects not
otherwise sufficient to exclude him from employment.
And the cost of this life insurance is figured at about
1 to 1M PS? cent on the pay-roll. The premium
payments are made monthly, rising and falling with
the pay-roll.
Presumably, the workers are insured only while
actually working, and if laid off through lack of work,
or if absent through sickness or other cause, the in-
surance lapses, but begins again when work begins.
These are matters of detail, adjustable as may be
desired within the limits of the rate of premium which
the employer decides to appropriate and the extent
of the inducement which he decides to offer to his
employees in consideration of continuing in his service.
For the object of group insurance is the goodwill
of labor. Generally, wherever adopted, whether by
means of an insurance policy or by means of self-
insurance and establishment funds, it is believed to
be followed by a reduction in labor turnover, or by
what is equally valuable, a reduction in strikes and in
the power of organized labor to attract employees
away from their allegiance.
This is, indeed, the ultimate test. Does group
insurance promote the laborer's welfare at the cost of
his liberty? Liberty is not an empty idea, but is the
laborer's means of getting higher wages when times
are good and employers are competing for labor. The
laborer's liberty may be worthless to him in hard
times but it is valuable in good times. The well-known
increase of labor turnover in good times is a rise in
the market value of liberty.
Undoubtedly, and perhaps without exception, em-
88 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
ployers maintain that their group insurance and wel-
fare systems are an addition over and above wages.
They instruct their foremen and employment mana-
gers to pay the market rate of wages, and not to
use welfare or death benefits or group insurance as a
talking point to get below the market rate. But the
real question is, what is its effect on the market rate
itself?
Goodwill is a competitive advantage. If it does not
hold the worker's allegiance against the drawing
power of competing employers, then it yields no
advantage. Life insurance, old age pensions, even
invalidity insurance, may not be strong enough to
hold the young man. The benefit to him is remote
and dim, but the wages offered elsewhere are nearby
and vivid. As he grows older and acquires a family
the expected benefits come nearer and brighter,
and the wages offered elsewhere are comparatively
less attractive.
If all competing employers provided exactly the
same benefits, and if the insurance took effect on the
very day when the worker goes to work, then the thing
that would draw the older worker, as well as the
younger, away from one employer to another would be
the higher present wages and not the higher future
benefits. The employer would have to raise his
wages in order to keep his workers. But as long as
only a few employers carry group insurance and
others do not, then the few need not raise their wages
to the same extent as others, in order to hold their
workers.
One or 2 per cent increase in wages is a very
small increase in good times when wages are going up
INSURANCE 89
5 per cent or 10 per cent or even more. If a
group insurance employer is able by his promise of
future benefits to hold his employees without ad-
vancing their wages as rapidly as others do, then it is
his employees who are paying his insurance premiums.
It only needs that their wages lag 1 or 2 per cent
behind the advancing wages of other employees on
the labor market in order to shift the cost of the in-
surance upon them.
That this is the effect of old age, life insurance and
invalidity systems of welfare is well known to trade
union organizers. They find it difficult to organize
the workers who expect these benefits by remaining
where they are. Their promises that the union will
get them even much higher wages now, perhaps
at the cost of a strike as a last resort, has usually very
little drawing power against the prospect of forfeiting
the future benefits by quitting their jobs. For this
reason, mainly, trade unions are hostile to employers'
group insurance and welfare systems.
Their hostility is probably misplaced. Group in-
surance and welfare systems are coming, because, like
accident compensation, they fill the next largest gap
in the struggle of capital and labor. It is only a little
less bitter and humiliating that employers as a class
should use up their workers for profit and then
neglect them and their families in old age, disability,
and death, than it is that they should grind profits
out of accidents. Public opinion, public welfare,
sympathy, must surely support every employer as
well as the ingenuity and enterprise of the casualty
companies, when they make this next notable ad-
vance toward goodwill between employer and employee.
90 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
The drawback is that they cannot make it universal.
The backward, indifferent, incompetent or small
employer should be brought up to the level of these
pioneers. Only compulsory insurance can bring this
about. If all employers are required by law to
insure all their workers against death, old age and
premature old age, then not only is this form of wel-
fare made universal but it cannot be practised at the
cost of liberty. The workers then are freed from that
menace which now threatens to play upon their
anxiety for decent burial and for the future of family
and self in order to tie them to their jobs.
In the interests of the freedom of labor the hostility
of labor organizers should be directed, not against
group insurance in itself, but against insurance
which is not universal. Eventually, as voluntary
group insurance enlarges and its effects in restricting
liberty are more clearly recognized, it may be ex-
pected that trade unions will more generally approve
compulsory insurance made universal by law.
Compulsory insurance, like compulsory accident
compensation, enlarges liberty by restraining it
in other directions. And employers as a class get
more liberty in the right direction than they lose in the
wrong direction, for then the cut-throat competition
of those who are indifferent or incompetent is elimi-
nated at the point where they intensify class antago-
nism and prevent others from rising above their
level.
Sometimes the objection is raised that compulsory
insurance of this kind implies that the government
must go into the insurance business and greatly
increase the force of government employees. This
INSURANCE 91
is a mistake. Compulsory group insurance merely
requires all employers to do what others are now doing
without compulsion. They may still insure with the
private casualty companies, or may organize employ-
er's mutuals, or the largest may carry their own
insurance and establishment funds if financially
responsible. It is a different proposition for the state
to go into the insurance business and administer a
fund like a private company. States may experiment
in this business. There is much to be said in favor of
a state fund, when efficiently conducted, instead of
commercial insurance.1 But that is a different ques-
tion. The essential thing that the state needs to do
is to determine by law the minimum amount of
benefits to be paid to the workers or their families
and then require employers to take out insurance if
they are not financially responsible. As is done in
accident compensation, the state would set up arbi-
tration boards to hear and decide the disputes that
might come up.
1 See argument* before New York Legislature, April 2, 1918, by
F. Spencer Baldwin, Manager of the New York State Insurance Fund,
and Thomas J. Duffy, Chairman Ohio State Industrial Commission.
New York State Federation of Labor, 1918.
XI
HEALTH
The physical examination of the first two and one-
half million young men for the army revealed about
30 per cent who were physically unfit. The percent-
ages varied widely for different states, the lowest
percentage being 14, the highest 47. 1 This was the
first great American survey of health. The defects
and incipient diseases there revealed were either
unknown to the young men themselves or neglected.
It is roughly estimated that, on the average,
working people in the United States lose eight or
nine days a year on account of sickness.2 They and
their employers probably lose as much more on ac-
count of slow work, poor work, accidents, and pre-
mature old age caused by keeping at work while they
are half-sick. The money loss is incalculable but
must be enormous.3
A certain corporation with four thousand employees,
1 Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War, On
the First Draft under the Selective-Service Act, 1917 (1918), p. 83.
8B. S. Warren and Edgar Sydenstricker, Public Health Bulletin
No. 76, p. 6. Cf . Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Community
Sickness Surveys; Proceedings of the Conference on Social Insurance,
Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 212
(1917), p. 643.
* Computations have been made by Fisher, Report on National
Vitality (1909). Bulletin 30 of the Committee of One Hundred on
National Health, pp. 119-120; Rubinow, Social Insurance (1913),
pp. 214, 222.
92
HEALTH 93
some seven years ago, started a compulsory sick
benefit society for its employees. Every employee is
required to pay 50 cents a month into the fund, and
the corporation adds an equal amount. No employee
is taken on without a physical examination. The
company stands to lose a considerable amount of
money expended in training employees, and each man
is an investment. On this account the risks in the
benefit society are selected risks, and the dollar a
month for each employee goes further than it would
for unselected risks. It has been found that, while
on the average the estimated time lost through
sickness by workpeople is eight or nine days a year,
this company has reduced the lost time to four and
one-half days. Since the average earnings of the men
are about $3.00 a day, it needs only a saving of two
or three days in lost time to enable the workmen to
make up the dues of $6.00 a year in the benefit
society.
But the benefit society takes care, also, of most of
the ailments of the worker's family, and when, at
the end of seven years, it was found that a reserve
fund of $60,000 had accumulated, the society, with-
out additional dues, added the care of the mother
at child-birth and all obstetrical treatment. So that
at a cost of $12.00 a year for each employee, all of
his own medical care and that of his family are
provided.
It was found at first that the workers did not
sufficiently call upon the physicians of the society in
the early stages of illness, and so the society stationed
physicians at each shop every morning where the
workmen could consult them without extra time or
94 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
fear of being considered a nuisance. In short, the
society encouraged the very thing that is often raised
as an objection to universal health insurance, namely,
the multiplication of unnecessary calls upon the doctor.
And this is, indeed, the prime object of health
insurance — not the cure of illness after it has set in,
but the prevention of illness. And the only complete
preventor of illness is the doctor. The government
of the United States furnishes President Wilson with
a high-grade physician who attends him constantly,
not with medicines but with advice. A millionaire
has his private physician. This benefit society does
for four thousand workers daily what the nation or
great wealth does for the President or the millionaire.
The benefit society engages its physicians and
surgeons on part-time contracts, the minimum com-
pensation being at a salary rate of $3000 a year.
The physicians have also their private practice. The
society has constantly in its service two nurses for
home visiting, but does not pay for hospital care.
The primary object of this association is sickness
prevention. But when sickness cannot be prevented,
the loss of wages is partly made up by cash benefits.
Here is the difficult problem of health insurance.
At one extreme, if a cash benefit is paid equal or
approximate to the lost wages, the premium on feigned
sickness is so great as to amount to a general demorali-
zation of the entire labor force. At the other extreme,
if no sick benefit is paid, the anxiety of the worker
over the loss of wages is a serious impediment to
recovery and to that state of mind which is willing
to lay off long enough to get well.
This benefit society has hit upon a workable medium
HEALTH 95
between these two extremes. No cash benefit is
paid during the first seven days laid off. Then $1.00
a day is paid for 100 days. Then 50 cents a day for
the second 100 days. Then, if permanent invalidity
ensues, the lump sum of $150.00 provided in the by-
laws, is paid to the worker, and thereafter he both
loses his employment with the company and his
membership in the society. A funeral benefit also
is paid.
The society is strictly a temporary sickness society
and does not provide for life insurance, for super-
annuation, or for permanent disability. As a strictly
sickness society it recompenses the worker for his
lost wages to the extent of perhaps one-third or one-
fourth of his loss, and thus relieves his anxiety in
part but not enough to tempt malingering.1
What does the corporation gain by means of this
society? It spends some $25,000 a year at the rate
of $6.00 for each employee, or say one-half of 1
per cent, on its pay-roll, and what does it get in return
that justifies the management in their reports to
the stockholders?
How shall we measure the intangible asset, good-
will? How shall we measure the money value of
good health?
In the first place we must measure it partly by
1 The most complete and detailed analysis of the features of an Em-
ployees' Benefit Association is the series of articles by W. L. Chandler
in Industrial Management, beginning February, 1918. A voluntary
association has, perhaps, an advantage over the compulsory system
above described. It is not intended to close employment against
those incapable of passing a physical examination. See By-Laws,
Employee's Mutual Benefit Association, Milwaukee Electric Railway
and Light Company.
96 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
faith. It rests in part on the "will to believe."
No measurement can be devised that will satisfy
the short-sighted or greedy stockholder. Goodwill
and good health are an overhead. They belong to
I'esprit de corps, the spirit of the going concern,
the morale of confidence and hope.
And a benefit society cannot be separated out and
measured apart from the other intangible factors that
go to make up goodwill, th Ife employees are con-
vinced or even suspicious that the benefit society
is imposed in order to tie them to their jobs and to
shift over to them in low wages the money contributed
by the company under the name of benefits, then,
instead of an asset it becomes a liability. I have
known of benefit societies which caused strikes in-
stead of goodwill. The very same schedule of dues,
physical examinations, medical care and cash benefits,
in the hands of one management will win loyalty,
in the hands of a different management — ill will.
There is no invariable standard of measurement
that can pick out the benefit society and measure it
independently of the other parts of the company's
policy toward labor.
We may pick out symptoms and they are good as
far as they go, but not conclusive. We may show
the reduction in lost time from improved health, the
reduction in accidents from improved attention,
the reduction in turnover from improved loyalty, the
increase in output from improved vigor, but these
are partial and not convincing. Each establish-
ment must be judged as a whole and by itself. All
of the facts and all of the parts must be put together,
and then a large element of faith in humanity, of
HEALTH 97
enthusiasm for human welfare, of pride in good work,
and even of patriotism in contributing to the physical
and moral health of the nation, must be added before
health insurance of one's employees will appeal to
the management or the stockholders as a good
investment.
Here is exactly where compulsory health insurance
comes in.1 Only a small proportion of all employers
and corporations are sufficiently educated, interested,
public spirited, and financially able to adopt health
insurance for their employees. The state can never
hope to bring the others up to the level of the most
progressive, but it can establish minimum standards
and require all to come up to a certain lower level.
If this is wisely done, then the more progressive are
in a position to go as far ahead of the legal minimum
as their ingenuity and enterprise may suggest.
There have been many and various proposals put
forward for universal health insurance.2 It can hardly
be expected that all the details can be worked out
satisfactorily in advance. There is room for many
experiments and much ingenuity. Especially must
any satisfactory plan be based on existing American
conditions and afford room for private initiative in
working out the details.
1 Arguments pro and con of health insurance will be found in Com-
mons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, p. 385 ff. See refer-
ences there cited : Hoffman, Facts and Fallacies of Compulsory Health
Insurance, published by Prudential Press, Newark, N. J.; Rubinow,
Social Insurance (1913); American Association for Labor Legislation
publications.
1 See especially draft of bill introduced by Senator Nicoll, New York
Senate, February 18, 1918. Also model bill recommended by a com-
mittee of the American Association for Labor Legislation, 131 E. 23d
St., New York.
98 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
Most of the American states are already in a posi-
tion to authorize and require these experiments to be
made. They have their accident compensation com-
missions, their schedules of indemnity, their organiza-
tion of compulsory accident insurance. To these may
be added health insurance by requiring of all employers
a minimum provision for medical and hospital supplies
and treatment and a minimum attendance of qualified
physicians and nurses.
Whether employees should be required to contribute
equally with the employer depends on the extent
to which the benefits are carried. If the families
of wage-earners are included, as well as the wage-
earner himself, the employee should evidently con-
tribute. If the employer is already carrying group
insurance or a fund for old age, disability and death,
the employee should evidently contribute to the sick-
ness fund. The essential thing is that, where em-
ployees contribute they have equal representation
in the management.
If their plan meets the minimum standards of the
law and shows the financial security required for an
insurance scheme, it is then certified by the state
authorities and the association is permitted to proceed.
The state authority retains supervision and acts as
an appellate court in the settlement of disputes.
These are perhaps the essential minimum legal
requirements. Over and above them remains oppor-
tunity for all or any voluntary schemes, designed
by employers, trade unions or fraternal societies.
Fraternal societies and trade unions find their field
in the provision for cash benefits. It would probably
be preferable that the cash benefits should be left
HEALTH 99
entirely to voluntary schemes, and that the legal
minimum standards should make no requirement
whatever of cash benefits in case of temporary disa-
bility through illness.
Two practical considerations lead to this suggestion :
if cash benefits are required by law, then the thought
and energies of employers, employees and state offi-
cials are diverted away from the prime object of
health insurance, which is sickness prevention with
its medical and hospital care and early diagnosis.
If cash benefits are required by law, then innumer-
able disputes arise as to the amount of benefits; the
dangerous menace of malingering is forced into the
problem; suspicion and invidious investigations of
individuals are fomented by law. But with cash
benefits eliminated from the requirements of the law,
all of the funds and all of the energies of all parties,
so far as legislation is concerned, are directed to the
single purpose of adequate care for sickness, adequate
hospital and medical equipment, and adequate meas-
ures of prevention.
Equally important is the other practical considera-
tion. Relieved of medical and hospital care and sick-
ness prevention the voluntary associations of trade
unions, fraternal societies, and employers' mutuals
have a free and exclusive field for that which they
can do much better, the provision for cash benefits.
This field they have begun to cultivate. Almost
none of the local trade unions that provide sick
benefits, make any provision for medical and hospital
service, or for regular employment of physicians, or
for the prevention and early diagnosis of disease.
If they employ a physician it is to prevent malinger-
100 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
ing.1 Their sick benefits are nearly always simply
cash benefits. They leave the field of protection
and prevention, medical and hospital treatment,
practically untouched, and limit themselves to the
field of cash payments at time of sickness. A com-
pulsory system of cash benefits would interfere with
their work. A compulsory system of insurance for
medical and hospital care not only would not inter-
fere with the work of unions, fraternals and mutuals,
but would strengthen the appeal for voluntary cash
insurance.
On the other hand, health insurance, covering the
first three months or six months of sickness, should
be combined with group insurance or establishment
funds for old age, death and permanent disability
beginning at the end of the health insurance period.
Here cash benefits are evidently required, and are
not likely to be provided by other existing agencies.
And, most of all, here the menace of malingering no
longer holds as a valid objection. The principles of
group insurance have already been worked out sci-
entifically by private insurance companies. Perma-
nent disability begins at the end of say three months
or six months illness. Superannuation begins at say
sixty or sixty-five or seventy years of age. The
amount of the benefits is, of course, determined by
the amount of the premiums that seem expedient
to be required.
There is a sentimental objection to these plans of
1 Sydenstricker, E., "Existing Agencies for Health Insurance in the
United States," Proceedings of the Conference on Social Insurance,
Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, No, 212
(1917), pp. 467, 473.
HEALTH 101
mandatory insurance. It is said, "Why should an
honest, hard working, thrifty, employee be compelled
to contribute to a fund to support the thriftless and
vicious employee whose illness and disability are
brought on by his own fault ?" " Why should a pros-
perous employer be compelled to contribute to the
funds that help out the less prosperous, or be compelled
to contribute to workmen and their families for whose
illness he is not responsible ?"
These questions are naturally suggested by the
extremely individualistic American way of looking at
things. But modern competitive industry, national
peril, and solidarity of interest are answering them.
A serious menace to the wages of workingmen is
the cut-throat competition of the less competent. If
10 per cent of the workingmen are thriftless and vicious,
then the competition of that 10 per cent is a load on
the neck of the 90 per cent. They and their unfortu-
nate families are thrown upon the labor market, and
it is one of the benefits of universal insurance that it
helps in some degree to take them off the market.
The honest, thrifty worker is already paying a part
of the cost of the thriftless and vicious, but he is
paying it through the invisible pressure of competi-
tive wages. Health insurance, properly worked out,
is a visible payment designed to remove that invisible
pressure.
And why should the employer pay when he is not
responsible? This was the very question raised
against universal accident compensation. Since that
question has been answered, individual employers
have been paying for accidents caused by other em-
ployers or by their own employees. So it is with
102 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
health and disability and old age. Employers as a
class are concerned with the health and efficiency
of labor as a class. They are already paying invisi-
bly for illness and inefficiency. Their costs are al-
ready shifted more or less upon the public. To pay
openly into insurance funds is but to pay visibly
toward removing an indefinite, but actual, invisible
expense.
Thus the answer to the individualistic question is
the solidarity of interests. Competition distributes,
by its unseen but powerful pressure, the accidents,
illness and disabilities of labor among all employers,
all employees, and the public. Neither the total
expense nor the share borne by either can be measured.
But health insurance, with disability and superannua-
tion, measures off and distributes among them all
a minimum expense for reducing an immeasurable
but enormous expense.
But this argument of solidarity, like the argument of
individualism, cannot be carried too far. It is as
false as the other if pushed to extremes. Carried to
the extreme it is socialism, just as individualism
carried to its extreme is anarchism. The reasonable
man and the reasonable nation must find by experience
and wisdom the point where the two principles can
be combined and get the maximum value from the
combination.
It is for this reason that the principle of solidarity,
or compulsory insurance, should go to the extent of
only the minimum necessary to get the one essential
thing — national health. If properly worked out,
this insurance principle enlists in the cause of sickness
prevention and national efficiency the most tangible
HEALTH 103
and effective of earthly inducements — the financial
inducement. By reducing the amount of sickness
and by postponing the period of disability, the monthly
insurance premiums are reduced, and can be seen and
measured by every employer and every worker.
And it cannot be said that modern employers as a
class are not responsible in part for the early disa-
bilities and short working life of laborers as a class.
While salaried men, professional men, employers
themselves, and those who make an early escape
from manual labor, begin to reach their high levels of
efficiency at forty years of age, the modern factory
worker has passed his zenith at forty. His long hours
of work, his compulsory work when ill, his periods
of unemployment, his fatigue and confinement are
among the outstanding causes. No individual em-
ployer is responsible. No individual can do much
better than his competitors. All are responsible
together, for competition forces them into a solidarity
of responsibility. All must therefore work together
to meet their joint responsibility. And compulsory
insurance, up to a certain point, is the modern method
of enforcing joint responsibility.
Perhaps, at no other point will the enforcement of
this joint responsibility of employers be more awaken-
ing than in the attention it will focus on the evils of
the piece-work system. The piece-work, bonus or
premium system, enables employers to evade their
responsibility for the health and long life of workers.
It throws the responsibility on the worker himself
for exerting himself. By its continuous nervous
strain day after day and year after year, it eventually
wears out the worker. It wears out women faster
104 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
than men, the ambitious faster than the sluggish,
and eventually weakens the tissues and admits the
germs of disease.
Doubtless " payment by results" is a necessary
method of payment, but carried to the extreme of the
piece-work system, it is destructive of results through
premature disability. At no point in the industrial
system is there greater need of focusing the ingenuity
and enterprise of employers, of employment managers,
engineers and industrial service workers, than at the
point of taking a long-life view of piece-work. The
system doubtless gets immediate results hour by
hour, but somebody must pay for its later results.
The employer shifts these later results on the worker
himself and on the nation through sickness, premature
old age and short life. Mandatory insurance for
health, for disability, superannuation and death,
not merely requires employers as a class to carry a
part of these burdens, but, most of all, induces them as
a class to engage their business ability and ingenuity
in the direction of reducing the amount of the burden
itself by earnestly investigating and then effectively
removing the causes that produce the burden.
And this responsibility is not responsibility merely
to labor — it is responsibility to the nation. The na-
tion took millions of workers from the factories and
shops. The first thing it did was to attend to then*
health. It gave them an unexpected vigor that fac-
tory and shop had suppressed. And when, with these
powerful new bodies and this aroused patriotism they
fought in Europe for national liberty, they also fought
for the nation's business. Shall they afterward go
back into the factory and shop and again be subjected
HEALTH 105
to the competitive deterioration of health? Neither
their own aroused intelligence nor the nation's future
industrial progress will permit it. They have learned
the power of joint action and the spirit of comrade-
ship. The awakened employer, who sees the future,
will surely provide for the future and will arouse his
sluggish fellow-employer. And can he do it in any
other way so effectively as by placing on all employers
the legal duty, first of all, of joining in mutual asso-
ciations of employer and employee to safeguard the
health and prolong the working life of them all?
XII
THE SHOP
The five or six thousand employees of a manu-
facturing company went out on strike without previous
organization. After several weeks the company made
a settlement and took the workers back as a union.
The main demand of the strikers was higher wages.
This was granted. But the company discovered
that what they wanted was control of discipline. The
company thought that it had been running its own
business, but it discovered that the labor end of
its business had been run by foremen and superin-
tendents. The issue with the union turned out to be
whether the union or these minor executives should
control the discipline.
Wages were the apparent demand. The real
grievance was the accumulation of petty complaints,
often unfounded, against the minor executives of the
company. The company thought that, by granting
the demand for wages they could have peace for a
while. They found that nearly every rule or com-
mand given by their minor executives brought on the
menace of a strike. The issue was not wages but
discipline. And this is always the issue of unionism.
Soon after the agreement became effective the com-
pany relieved the executives of their final power of
discipline and established a labor department with a
106
THE SHOP 107
chief who reports direct to the company. The
labor department investigates all complaints; rec-
ommends to the company a course of action; conducts
all negotiations with the union; superintends all
hiring and firing; manages the hospital, rest room and
welfare work; is responsible for the observance of
state and municipal labor laws; endeavors to educate
the foremen and workers in conciliation; has direction
of all adjustments of wages, piece prices and operat-
ing efficiency. In short, discipline is separated from
production.
Considerable ingenuity, experimentation and a code
of procedure were necessary to make this separation.
The foreman now does not discharge a worker. He
gives him a " complaint memorandum." If this
is disregarded he gives him a " suspension slip."
This removes him from the pay-roll until reinstated
by the labor department. This department acts
at once. It either restores him "on probation,"
or orders a temporary lay-off or a discharge. The
worker then has an appeal, if he wishes, to the "trade
board." This is a shop committee of one workman
and one foreman, presided over by a neutral chairman
employed and paid equally by the company and the
union. It gives a hearing, takes testimony, and may
order reinstatement or modification of the penalty.
Finally, an ultimate appeal for either side lies to
the "board of arbitration" — one person appointed
by the company, one by the union, one by agreement
of both parties. The "trade board" is the "trial
court" — it gives the parties a hearing, investigates
facts, takes testimony. The "board of arbitration "
is the supreme court of the shop — it decides ques-
108 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
tions of law, interprets the constitution, makes the
law.
The machinery seems complex. It would be com-
plex if it had to act on every case of discipline. Autoc-
racy is always more simple than democracy. It
acts without consulting. Consultation takes time
and acts according to rules. After this particular
machinery got into working order many months
have passed at times without an appeal to the high
board of arbitration.
The reason is, " precedent." A case once decided
is a rule of law for all succeeding cases. Like the
Constitution of the United States, the agreement
has become a " government of law and not of men."
A man is not deprived of his job without "due process
of law." This is the difference between democracy
and autocracy, and the reason why the machinery of
democracy is complex and that of autocracy is simple.
But when men learn to act according to law and
precedent, then democracy also is simple enough.
Its machinery is called in only when men are alleged
to act contrary to the rule of law. Its strength resides
in being ready to act and not needing to act.
This is the reason why democracy needs education.
When this particular shop scheme was started, many
of the workers were newly arrived immigrants,
acquainted only with the despotisms of Austria,
Hungary, Russia. Many were what is now known
as bolshevistic, or revolutionary, socialists opposed
to the wage system and believers in the immediate
sovereignty of labor. Many were successful agitators,
hostile to employers as a class. In course of time
their employers were astonished at the change in
THE SHOP 109
attitude that came over them. Misinformed, self-
seeking, unscrupulous leaders began to lose influence.
The other class of leaders came to the front, skilled
in negotiation, competent in pleadings and cross-
examinations before the trade boards, efficient and
firm in organizing, in leading and disciplining the
unruly among the workers. They have been learning
democracy and due process of law.
And the employers confess that they too have
learned. They had resented interference and limita-
tion of their authority. They wanted unrestricted
liberty. The machinery of consultation and dis-
cussion was vexatious. On innumerable occasions
they had to change their plans and policies against
their will.
But they learned that it was worth while to be
protected against themselves; that they needed to
make it impossible to violate or overlook the rights
of their employees. Especially they learned to ap-
prove of checks calculated to restrain then- agents
from arbitrary and unjust acts toward fellow-em-
ployees. In short, what they think they have learned
is that, by admitting labor into the councils and
authority of the company, they are winning industrial
peace and the goodwill of labor.1
This is, indeed, a hard thing to learn for the business
man and engineer who has been accustomed to depend
upon his own judgment. The things that workers
deem important often seem so petty to him, who is
accustomed to large dealings, that to be compelled
to listen to their grievances is wholly vexatious.
1 The Hart, Shaffner and Marx Labor Agreement, pamphlet published
by the company, Chicago, 1916.
110 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
I knew a highly competent specialist in office and
factory management. He made a thorough investi-
gation of the arrangement of desks and the routing
of papers among the clerks in the offices of a certain
large establishment, and then proceeded to rearrange
the floor plan. The clerks came in to work one morn-
ing and found their desks shifted about. The man
next to a good window was set over in a different
corner. Another had his place. Instead of increasing
the efficiency of that office the specialist had succeeded
only in reducing it. He had not investigated all
of the facts. He had thoroughly investigated the
mechanical efficiency and the floor plan, but had not
investigated the goodwill of the clerks. To him, the
protests of an individual clerk who lost his good win-
dow were but a petty grouch.
But that clerk was part of a going concern. A code
of procedure and a line of promotion had grown up
in that office. To all of the clerks it was nearly as
important to be promoted along the line from dark
corners to good windows as to be promoted in salary
or authority. They had learned to look forward to
that promotion. Their devotion to present work had
been built up largely on that expectancy. The
goodwill of the whole office force had grown up on
that floor plan. The specialist had investigated
the floor plan but not the collective goodwill that went
with it.
And how could he have investigated that goodwill
except by collective negotiation with the entire force?
If he accidentally heard the protest of one or two he
might very well turn it down as a petty and selfish
grouch. But had he consulted them all together
777 K SHOP 111
through their committee freely chosen among them-
selves, he would have found that the grouch of one
was the concern of all. His scientific floor plan might
have been delayed, would certainly have been changed,
but in dozens of details he might have contrived
to fit his expert judgment of mechanical efficiency
into an equally expert judgment of spiritual effi-
ciency. The one might be his own private judgment—
the other his share in a collective judgment.
I do not know that this machinery of collective
democracy can be successfully imposed by law where
the employer or manager is unwilling. But willing-
ness can be educated. Legislation is a crude and
impersonal method of education. Willingness is a
personal and every-day attitude of mind that sees
the need and then does things before being compelled
to do them. Often, however, willingness is preceded
by a jolt. The present-day jolt is the freedom and
unrest of labor. No capitalist more powerful has
lived in America than John D. Rockefeller. While
the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, with the aid
of the state government, was successfully resisting
and overcoming the strike of the greatest labor
organization in the country, the management called
to their aid a leading authority on collective shop
organization. They adopted and installed substan-
tially all of the machinery of representative democracy
above described that would have been adopted
had the union been successful. The employees of
each mining camp elect by secret ballot their repre-
sentatives to act on their behalf in all matters per-
taining to safety, health, housing, recreation, educa-
tion, wages, hiring and firing. Rules of procedure,
112 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
appeals from decisions of lower boards to higher
boards— substantially all of the arrangements described
above for a different establishment were adopted. In
order to guarantee good faith, the State Industrial
Commission of Colorado is made the highest board
of appeal in case of dispute between the company and
the employees. The rules protect the right of em-
ployees to organize by prohibiting any discrimination
either by the company or its employees on account
of membership or non-membership in any society,
fraternity, or union.1 After the apparently success-
ful operation of this plan for a period of two years,
the Rockefeller interests proceeded to install it in
their refineries and properties elsewhere.2
The Rockefeller plan was adopted voluntarily, that
is, without recognition of organized labor. In this
respect it is paternalistic rather than democratic.
It is handed down rather than forced up. One of the
penalties of democracy is the cost of learning by
experience. And the history of democracy, whether
in politics or industry, has been a history of costly
experience in self-government.
Perhaps this is a necessary cost and inevitable.
Many labor leaders think it is. They prefer complete
defeat and no organization at all, to a paternalistic
union organized by the employer. In some respects,
this attitude is like that of revolutionary socialism.
It is better to let conditions get as bad as possible
because only then is revolution attractive to the
oppressed. Bolshevistic socialism is generally found
1 Of. Industrial Representation Plan, published by Colorado Fuel
and Iron Company, Denver, Colorado (1915).
2 See Survey, April 13, 1918.
THE SHOP 113
in accord with reactionary capitalism, both of them
standing firmly on their ultimate principles and natu-
ral rights, and both of them preventing the gradual
introduction of democracy through half-way measures.
The outcome is necessarily revolution and counter-
revolution, revolt and reaction.
So with the history of labor organization. It has
often been a long history of cycles of strikes and de-
feat, labor dictatorship alternating with employer
dictatorship. But constitutional democracy in poli-
tics and industry has generally been procured by
half-way measures. It may have its revolts, but
generally they are anticipated by concessions in
advance. The advance may not be great, but it
stands, and is a starting point for a new advance.
And this, because democracy must be built on edu-
cation, good faith and goodwill. Education in self-
government is slow. Good faith is experience of
previous good faith. Goodwill is reciprocity. There
is no conclusive reason why constitutional democracy
may not start with the employer as with the employees.
It depends on his good faith and goodwill. If he
starts it as a subterfuge he is probably laying up
trouble for himself and for others. If he starts it
and continues it with recognition that as fast as pos-
sible the workers shall learn to govern themselves
and to govern the shop in cooperation with himself,1
then he is truly performing a public service for a
nation which has admitted to its suffrage millions of
voters unaccustomed to democracy.
Organization, whether it begins with the workers
or with the employers, must always begin at the
1See Filene, E. A., "Why the Employees Run Our Business,"
System, December, 1918.
8
114 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
bottom, in the shop, rather than at the top by legisla-
tion or national organizations of capital and labor.
The national organizations of labor in England and
America began in the earlier days as shop unions.
Then these shop unions came together as local unions
in a town or district. It was not until railway trans-
portation had brought shops and towns into competi-
tion that national unions arose in order to equalize
competitive conditions. At first, the national control
was weak. The national conventions were assemblies
of delegates from local sovereign unions. Gradually
the national union was granted increasing powers. It
took away from local unions their control over finances
and strikes. Then, in turn, it organized new local
unions, financed them, and conducted their strikes and
negotiations.
But, in all this cycle of shop, district, nation, and
back to district and shop, it is the shop, after all,
that constitutes the real unit of organization. It
may be effaced for a time; the local or district union
may dominate; control may be centralized at a dis-
tance, but it is in the shop that employer and employee
meet every day. It is there that trouble begins and
there that the real business of collective action goes
on. The national organization is the agent of the
shop organizations.
And, in the newly awakened spirit of collective
action, the employer, like the union, begins with his
own shop. If employers organize on a national scale
to contend with unionism, unions must parallel
then* organization. If employers devote their atten-
tion to the real business of unionism, they attend to it
each in his own shop. It is here that their initiative,
THE SHOP 115
originality, enterprise, personality, count. If they
subject themselves to the dictates of a national asso-
ciation of employers they are likely to lose the chance
to outrun their competitors in the new race for collect-
ive goodwill.
They may be compelled to submit to a national
association of employers. That is one thing. But
if they voluntarily submit to others then they abdicate
the control of their own business at the very point
where modern business is most delicately in the balance.
Under the old system of competition and unregulated
supply and demand, they might distance their com-
petitors by cutting wages and driving labor, and, to
protect themselves against the results of these prac-
tices they were often forced to join with their fellow-
employers on a national scale. Under the new im-
pulse of competitive goodwill, they naturally wish to
be free from the control of the national labor unions.
They cannot be free from that control if they submit
to the control in their own shops of a national associa-
tion of employers.
This is not saying that national associations, either
of employers or of unions, have no place in the awaken-
ing new spirit of collective action. They have a
place, but it is different. Their new place is more
professional and educational, and less executive and
governmental. It is the place for comparing notes
and statistics, sharing experiences, telling each other
of their successes and showing how it is done in deal-
ing with labor. It is less and less the place for
depriving the employer of his freedom to deal with his
own employees in his own shop. Employers' associa-
tions will and must expand, but they should become
116 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
great educational conferences on the methods, the
purpose and the spirit of shop organization, rather
than law-making bodies for their members.1
Likewise with national organizations of labor unions.
The unparalleled solidity and executive power of
the national unions in America, compared with
organized labor in other countries, can be traced to
the hostility of American employers and courts.
With state protective legislation declared unconsti-
tutional and with militant employers' associations,
the natural line of development has been toward
centralization of power in the hands of the national
officers of a hundred or more national unions.2
Yet, while this very centralization was going on in
the different unions, a great educational conference,
with very little executive or legislative power over
the constituent unions, has been enlarging its field.
The authority of the American Federation of Labor
is neither in its meagre financial power, nor in its
control of strikes, but in its so-called " moral" assist-
ance and its educational and professional conferences
1 Possibly a beginning in this direction has been made in the
National Industrial Conference Board, with its headquarters in Bos-
ton. See its publications on: Workmen's Compensation Acts in the
United States—The Legal Phase, April, 1917; Analysis of British War-
time Reports on Hours of Work as Related to Output and Fatigue, Novem-
ber, 1917; Strikes in American Industry in Wartime, March, 1918;
Hours of Work as Related to Output and Health of Workers— Cotton
Manufacturing, March, 1918; The Canadian Industrial Disputes In-
vestigation Act, April, 1918; Sickness Insurance or Sickness Prevention?
May, 1918 ; Hours of Work as Related to Output and Health of Workers-
Boot and Shoe Industry, June, 1918; Wartime Employment of Women
in the Metal Trades, July, 1918; Wartime Changes in Cost of Living,
October, 1918.
a Cf . Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United States,
I, 15; 11,42 ff.
THE SHOP 117
of leaders and representatives from the constituent
bodies. It is here that labor's policies are formulated,
here the public opinion of labor is crystallized, and
elsewhere these policies and opinions are adopted
and executed in the shops.
Naturally enough it was this great educational
conference of labor unions and the somewhat similar
National Industrial Conference Board of employers'
associations which were called upon by President
Wilson to create the National War Labor Board.1
For it was the crisis of war that gave national
importance both to the educational work of the
national organizations of capital and labor and to the
daily and hourly activities in the shops. The war
weakened, at least for a time, the executive and
legislative control of the national labor unions over
the shop unions, for it took away from national
unions the right to authorize, finance and support
strikes.
In England this was done by legislation which made
it a legal offense to interfere with production.2 In
America it was no less effectively done by the vol-
untary consent of the national leaders.
Yet while law or public opinion can reach the small
number of national leaders, or can tie up the funds of
the unions, it cannot reach the hundreds and thou-
sands who go out spontaneously in a mass on strike.
Illegal or unauthorized local strikes in England
forced the government to waive the penalties of the
I8ee Documents of National War Labor Board; Proclamation by
the President of the United States (April 8, 1918); Official Bulletin,
April 10, 1918, p. 3.
1 Munitions of War Act, July 2, 1915; Defence of the Realm Act,
AugiiBt 8, 1914; August 28, 1914; November 27, 1914.
118 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
law, to go over the heads of the national leaders,
and to negotiate directly with the strikers. It
could not even enforce legal penalties on the local
leaders, for that but shifted the demands of the
strike from the correction of shop grievances to the
release of the leaders. These leaders were simply
the " works committees" or the "shop stewards"
so-called, selected from among the workers by their
fellow-workers, to represent them in negotiations
with employers. Protected by this immunity the
shop committees, rather than the national unions,
became the spokesmen of unrest, and the main result
of legislation prohibiting strikes was to shift negotia-
tions from headquarters into the shops. Compulsion
failed, and the government after two and a half
years' experiment with compulsory methods, pro-
ceeded to recommend and introduce more nearly
voluntary methods into the shops and localities.
Since the object was to prevent shop friction rather
than to remedy it after it became acute, the govern-
ment not only recognized the "works committee"
system where organized labor had already installed
it, but extended it to factories where there was no
trade-union organization. Hence by pressure and
recommendation rather than legal penalties, the shops
of England have become organized more or less into
joint committees of employers and employees for
the purpose of dealing with their shop problems.
The details of these organizations are widely differ-
ent, according to previous conditions, but the under-
lying principle is the freedom of employees in each
shop to be represented collectively by committees
of their own choosing, and the duty of their employers
THE SHOP 119
to deal collectively with these committees in their
own shops. National or district organization, so-
called " joint standing industrial councils," represent-
ing national unions if such existed, were recommended
for the purpose of agreeing on standards that might
equalize conditions, but these standards were to be
only recommendations to the several " works com-
mittees."1
In America a similar policy was adopted after the
first year of war, but without the intervening experi-
ment of legislation prohibiting strikes. The National
War Labor Board, representing in equal numbers the
American Federation of Labor and the National
Industrial Conference Board, issued its statement of
policy to be followed whenever called upon to decide
a dispute. This policy asserted the right of both
workers and employers to organize in trade unions and
associations and to bargain collectively through
chosen representatives; and it prohibited either side
from discriminations or coercion in the maintenance
of the right to organize.
Instead, however, of providing for joint standing
industrial councils in the several industries, as was
done in England, the National War Labor Board
1 First Whitley Report, Interim Report on Joint Standing Industrial
Councils, March 8, 1917, Cd. 8606; Second Whitley Report, Second
Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils, October 18, 1917, Cd.
9002; Third Report, Supplementary Report on Works Committees,
October 18, 1917, Cd. 9001; Fourth Report, Industrial Reports, Num-
ber 2, March, 1918; Fifth Report, Fifth and Final Report of the Whitley
Committee, September 18, 1918. See also Monthly Revieio, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, September, 1917, pp. 130-132; October, 1917, pp.
33-38; March, 1918. pp. 81-84; May, 1918, pp. 59-61; June, 1918,
pp. 27, 28; August, 1918, pp. 76-79, 80, 81-84, 237-240; September,
1918, pp. 53-58.
120 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
reserved to itself a direct appeal from each shop, and
the appointment of its own members or agents to
take evidence where an appeal was made. The
provisions against discriminations and the appeals to
the outside board, render the system substantially
the same in its principles as those already described
in the early pages of this chapter.1
During the war a certain degree of compulsion
gave sanction to these policies and decisions of the
National War Labor Board, for the President was
given authority to take over the property of an em-
ployer as well as to make rules for drafting workers
into the army or assigning them to industries through
the federal employment offices. His prompt use of
this authority where the decisions of the National
War Labor Board were disregarded, added, of course,
an indirect compulsion to their decisions. Even so,
it is doubtful whether it has been his threat of com-
pulsion or his appeal to patriotism that has prevented
strikes.
In the face of necessary long delays in reaching
decisions by the National Board the enduring success
of the Board must turn on the successful working of
the shop committees and shop organizations. These
cannot always be expected to agree, and some pro-
vision for appeal must be made. It gets back again
1 See documents of the National War Labor Board, 1918, as follows:
Proclamation by the President of the United States (April 8, 1918);
Functions, Powers and Duties of the Board; Principles and Policies to
Govern Relations Between Workers and Employers; Method of Presenting
Complaints and Procedure of Board. Also Official Bulletin, April 10,
1918, p. 3.
1 Official Bulletin, June 4, 1918, p. 6; September 4, 1918, p. 8; Sep-
tember 18, 1918, p. 1. Docket 132, National War Labor Board;
Docket 273, National War Labor Board.
THE SHOP 121
to the spirit of democracy. Superior authority, for
a time, may install and impose the machinery of
democracy, but, if the spirit is lacking the machinery
clogs. And in time of peace, even the machinery
cannot be imposed on a large scale without conse-
quences more serious in other directions.1
The shop-committee system has been installed, and
may be installed by employers as a mere subterfuge,
designed to ward off a real shop organization by con-
trolling the elections of its committees, by mixing
unorganized with organized workers, by preventing
the employment of trade unionists. The committee
may have only a nominal existence and its recom-
mendations be disregarded by the management. It
may be permitted to deal only with social and ath-
letic activities. It may go further and deal with
accident and sickness prevention, mutual benefits
and insurance. These are, indeed, important and a
necessary beginning. They deal with non-controver-
sial questions, where there is no ultimate clash of
interests, since the disputes arise over methods to be
adopted for reaching an object already agreed upon.
The critical question is whether they are permitted
to go forward into the truly bargaining activities which
decide the ultimate clash of interests — whether they
take part in fixing wage and piece-rates, time and speed
standards, apprenticeship and training, introduction of
new processes, substitutions, transfers and promotions,
the execution of standards nationally agreed upon.
On these points is the test.
Probably in no shop should a single committee deal
with these several kinds of industrial problems.
* Below, Chapter XVI, Depression.
122 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
Social clubs and athletics are one thing; safety,
sickness benefits and insurance are another; wages,
output, discipline, are a third and very different.
The qualities and training, and above all the person-
ality needed for one are different from those needed
in the other.1 And the suitable personality on the
part of the employer's representatives is just as diffi-
cult to obtain as it is on the part of the workers'
representatives.
The machinery which I have described at the be-
ginning of this chapter could not have been developed
were it not that, back of it, on the part of the employ-
er's representatives, was the patience, the self-control,
the ability to listen to error as well as reason, the
willingness to submit to rules regularly adopted even
though vexatious and mistaken, in short, the person-
ality that constitutes the spirit of reasonableness.
And we know that organized labor is as likely to
be arbitrary as the employer if it has the power, and
its spokesmen can be as ingenious and plausible in
justifying it. In the name of democracy labor may
be as despotic as capital in the name of liberty.
Democracy is conservative. At all times in the
world's history the less privileged classes appeal
instinctively to custom as their protection against
arbitrary power. Whatever is customary is familiar
and safe. Innovation is a menace, a threat, a hard-
ship. The laborer instinctively opposes machinery.
When I told a cotton-mill operative that an auto-
matic loom had been invented by which one weaver
1 An interesting analysis of these different problems and corre-
sponding committees is made by C. G. Renold, Manchester, England,
reprinted in America by the Survey, Supplement, October 5, 1918.
THE SHOP 123
could operate twenty-four looms, he promptly said
the inventor ought to be shot.
Liberty is progressive. It breaks down custom.
How shall the two be brought together? Capital
has had its nineteenth century of unrestricted liberty.
It has broken down custom. Must it break down
democracy because democracy is conservative?
The labor unions of the country secured legislation
by Congress which prevents the government arsenals
and navy yards from employing any methods of time
and motion studies, of stop-watch or measuring
devices designed to ascertain the speed at which the
laborer can work.1 Certain unions seem to have
made it an unnegotiable demand in their proposed
agreements with employers. This is the obstructive
answer of organized labor to the unrestricted liberty
of capital.
But accurate methods of measurement are as neces-
sary for industrial democracy as they are for the
progress of industry. Before the " trade board" ma-
chinery, described at the beginning of this chapter,
was in working order, the piece-rates were made by
the foreman. He made and unmade the rates and
changed them at will. After three or four years'
experience the following regulation was evolved:
" Whenever a change of piece-rate is contemplated the matter
shall be referred to a specially appointed rate committee who
shall fix the rate according to the change of work. If the com-
mittee disagree the Trade Board shall fix the rate. In fixing
the rates, the Board is restricted to the following rule:
" Changed rates must correspond to the changed work and
new rates must be based upon old rates where possible."
1 United States Statutes At Large, Vol. 39, Part I, 64th Cong. I
Sess. (1916), Ch. 417; 64th Cong. II Sess. (1917), Ch. 180.
124 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
In practice it works out as follows: The two
representatives on the Trade Board constitute them-
selves a committee of time-and-motion study experts
in order to fix the prices of work. These work to-
gether with their stop-watch, if needed, to ascertain
and agree upon the time required to make the new
piece, and to calculate the corresponding piece-rate
required to make the standard wage. Of course,
they do not stand over the workers and make time
studies of all workers while at work. The study is
made of selected workers in an experimental labora-
tory, and is made, not to speed up the workers, but
to agree on a piece-rate. The decision is made by
the neutral chairman, and the new rates are always
provisional and temporary.
Thus does the machinery of shop committees
adjust itself to the scientific study of efficiency.
The notion is dispelled that a stop-watch is scientific
only when placed in the hands of a disinterested out-
sider. There are dozens of factors that cannot be
measured by a watch. The selection of the operative
whose motions are timed is a matter of opinion as to
whether he is representative of the general run of work-
ers. Whether he pulls out or holds back is a matter
of opinion. Whether he encumbers himself with
wasteful motions is largely a matter of opinion. On
these and other points opinions differ. And the
workers are just as much concerned as the manage-
ment to have the measurements accurate. For their
wages and speed depend upon it. Where opinions
differ there can be no accuracy, in the mechanical
sense, but there may be conciliation and a working
agreement. It all depends on that spirit of democracy
THE SHOP 125
which is patience and willingness to listen and act
according to that due process of law wherein all the
facts are considered and due weight is given to each.
And this depends just as much on labor's reasonable-
ness as on employers' reasonableness.
Thus shop organization is the focus of all problems
of employment. Politics, legislation, national associa-
tions of capital and labor, all else are outside and over-
head. They affect the shop somewhat, but it is
the shop conditions and the attitude in the shops
of the nation that tell what the nation shall be. There
is where, more than ever before, the nation's life is
maintained in war and peace. In the first year of
the world's war Germany fired five or six explosive
shells to every one fired by England and France.
In the last year of the war England and France fired
five or six to Germany's one. When the American
boys stopped the Germans at the Marne it was
because ammunition flowed to them like a river.
It was shop organization that won the war. Capital
and labor, for the time, laid down their industrial
war and united in the shop as Allies. The lesson of
war is the lesson for peace. Since the war is won
shall the shops return to war? Rather shall they
not make more perfect that willingness to listen,
that patience with the faults of others, that procedure
that consults first and acts afterward, which con-
stitutes the spirit and substance of democracy?
And shall they not, in peace as in war, combine
loyalty to the nation with loyalty to each other?
XIII
EDUCATION
In Pittsburgh I found the minimum value of the
English language was 2 cents an hour. Non-
English-speaking immigrants were getting 15^ cents
an hour, and English-speaking immigrants doing
similar work were getting 17J^ cents an hour.
Of the 9,500,000 young men registered for the
first selective draft, 1,200,000 were citizens of foreign
countries and could not be required to serve in the
American armies.1 Working side by side in our
factories and on our farms, 8,000,000 American citi-
zens could be drafted to offer their lives in behalf of
the prosperity and high wages of 1,000,000 privileged
immigrants free to remain at work.
The state of Arizona enacted a law to the effect
that employers in that state should employ at least
80 per cent of their force who were citizens and only
20 per cent who were not citizens. The Supreme
Court of the United States declared the law uncon-
stitutional on the ground that every person in America,
citizen or alien, has a right to work in American
industries.2
Such is the outcome of a theory that goes back to
the Declaration of Independence and asserts the
1 Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War, on
the First Draft under the Selective-Service Act, 1917 (1918), pp. 53-56,
86, 87.
» Truax v. Raich, 239 U, S. 33 (1915).
126
EDUCATION 127
natural and inalienable rights of man, without assert-
ing the accompanying principle that every right has
its reciprocal duty. The immigrant has a natural
right to work and the employer has a natural right to
employ him, but the immigrant has no reciprocal
duty to serve the nation that gives him liberty and
the employer no reciprocal duty to educate or
Americanize him.
Thirty years ago the state of Wisconsin placed on
its statute books a law requiring private and parochial
schools to give a minimum amount of instruction
in the English language and to be subject to the
inspection of the State Superintendent of Schools simi-
lar to that of public schools.1 On the plea of liberty
and freedom of worship the law was soon repealed,
and those who sought freedom in America have been
free of this particular duty to become American.
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were cen-
turies of struggle against autocracy and slavery.
The theory of natural and inalienable rights of man
served its purpose in the French and American
Revolutions and the American Civil War. Kings
and slaves disappeared.
But the results were negative. The twentieth
century will determine the kind of democracy or
even autocracy that will take the place of the old.
A theory of reciprocal and inalienable duties of man
is needed to determine positively the results of the
World War.
The employer who hires immigrant labor is hiring
cheap labor with low standards of living and ignorance
of self-government. They are one of his weapons
1 Wisconsin Statutes, 1889, Chapter 519.
128 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
to restrain American labor from obtaining high wages
and supporting a high standard of living. The
immigrant who works eight hours a day and earns
two or three times as much as he earned in Europe
for twelve hours, is reaping the harvest of liberty
and plenty which American labor and American democ-
racy have won for him.
The employer, or immigrant, or justice of a Supreme
Court, who fails to look for any reciprocal duty
attaching to this enjoyment of power, liberty and
prosperity, is living in the past and fighting an autoc-
racy that has ceased to exist. The new autocracy
that is arising on the ruins of the old is economic
rather than political, and it arises because it asserts
rights of liberty and property that have already been
won, and evades duties to the democracy that has won
them.
Duties subtract from rights. It costs something to
fulfill duties. How heavy the duties shall be made in
consideration of the rights is a matter of good judg-
ment under the circumstances, of willingness to do
one's share, of patriotism. In ordinary business the
law of demand and supply compels the employer to
pay producers the full cost of getting out the raw
material which he buys. The price that he pays for
coal, iron, lumber, wheat, cotton, covers not only the
cost of furnishing the material but also the cost
of depreciation, the costs of risks, the cost of keeping
up the fertility of the soil, or the cost of developing
additional sources of raw material to take the place
of that which is being depleted. He pays for conser-
vation of the resources from which his raw material
EDUCATION 129
is derived, else the supply would not continue to be
forthcoming.
Somebody must pay for the conservation of the
nation's human resources. If left to demand and
supply, the most valuable resources are not conserved.
For labor is both the source of demand for products
and the source of supply of the same products. A
nation of sick, ignorant, or rebellious workers produces
enough products to keep them sick, ignorant, and
unpatriotic. Demand-and-supply goes in a circle
when the thing demanded is the supply of health,
intelligence and the qualities of citizenship.
We have learned to compel parents to send their
children to school and to compel tax-payers to pay
for their schooling, even though the parent has no
desire for it and the tax-payer no children. It is
their duty to set aside the law of demand and supply
of school teachers.
We have learned somewhat to enforce the duty of
taking care of health where the menace is contagious
or infectious, and the duty of tax-payers to pay the
bills even though they do not demand the services of
physicians, nurses and hospitals for others beside
themselves.
We have been thinking somewhat of the duties of
citizenship and have seen the injustice of compelling
some to offer their lives for the good of others who
claim allegiance to other nations, or no nation.
Duties are as inalienable as rights. The problem
of democracy is how to distribute duties as well as
rights.
Employers control one-half to two-thirds of the
working hours of labor. Without this control they
130 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
cannot make profits. They convert the nation's
human resources, like its natural resources, into
products, and meanwhile they take their share.
These human resources come to them after a heavy
investment. The parents have invested something.
The tax-payers and the schools have invested some-
thing. Many children and youths have been lost
on the way but not charged off. The nation invests
several hundred — possibly several thousand — dollars,
unaccounted for and uncredited in every worker who
reaches the age of production. And many workers
come from foreign lands where much less has been
invested in bringing them up.
The employer of immigrant labor is paying less
than the full cost of production of American labor.
And the immigrant laborer is getting excess profits
on the investment that has been put into him.
That the employer should be required to send the
immigrant to school and the immigrant be required
to attend school in the day time on the employer's
time is but a duty that each may justly owe to the
preservation of the nation that enriches them both.
That the immigrant should become American and
that his employer should give thought and money and
leadership to bring to him an understanding and love
of America is but a small compensation for what
America does for them.
And no person is in such an advantageous position
as the employer. He controls the immigrant's time
and livelihood; he sets the example by which the immi-
grant gets an idea of what American democracy means.
How baffling was the experience of a member of the
American Labor Mission sent to Europe to win the
EDUCATION 131
workers away from the socialist propaganda of
Germany, when he was met by the retort of returned
Italian workers that America had ruined their health
and exploited their labor.
Like other duties the duty of education cannot in
fairness be borne by individual employers unless
their competitors carry a similar burden. If one
employer teaches English to his immigrants and
others do not, the others bid up the price and the
public-spirited one loses his investment. The asso-
ciated employers of Detroit, Cleveland, and other
cities have begun to bring pressure on their fellow
employers to teach English. I knew a corporation
that started a school for apprentices. After spending
considerable money on their education, as soon as
the apprentices reached the point where they could
return something on the investment, and even before
their education was completed, other employers
began to steal them by offering higher wages.
American industry needs schools for apprentices.
These schools must be in the shops and the apprentices
must get a living wage while learning. When the
tax-payers set up separate trade schools, only a very
few boys are financially able to attend, and they are
trained for only the small number of trades that
have not yet been broken up by machinery. The
state of Wisconsin attempts to get all employers to
take on apprentices, by enforcing apprenticeship
contracts, so that the boy may get an all-round tram-
ing, may be paid while learning, and be prevented
from leaving before his training is finished. But
the contracts themselves are voluntary. No employer
is compelled to take apprentices and no boy or parent
132 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
is compelled to sign a contract. Furthermore, public
opinion does not seem to support prosecutions for
enforcement of the contracts although the law imposes
penalties on the employer for violations and on the
boy for running away.1 The law is advantageous
but not universal. Like the separate trade school
it is limited by the small number of employers and
the small number of trades. Consequently, it merges
into the continuation school, which is universal
apprenticeship.
About two-thirds of the boys and girls who enter
school drop out at the end of the compulsory attend-
ance period, and nine-tenths of them drop out before
completing the four-year high school. 2 Then: industrial
education then begins. The employer is their school
master. For many of them, attendance is compul-
sory, for they must earn a living for themselves and
parents. The employer is conducting a compulsory
private school for the nation's future workers. His
fees are the profits he can make on the work of his
pupils. His school is as important as the public schools
in the scheme of compulsory education. In the public
schools, the child does not and should not learn to
be a worker. Then is the time for play. Yet to
learn to work and to be interested in work is the sure
foundation for advancement and citizenship.
Unfortunately, the employers generally have ac-
quired a bad reputation in the conduct of their schools.
They have been notorious in defending their right
to the fees and avoiding their duty to furnish the
1 Wisconsin Laws (1915), Chapter 133, Section 2377.
a Inglis, Alexander, Principles of Secondary Education (1918), p.
126.
EDUCATION 133
education. For a hundred years in Europe and
America they have resisted efforts to take away from
them their power over the child. Even employers
who know better and who strive to be models in their
own establishments have been found to line them-
selves up with competitors whose reputation is bad. In
this respect even the best of them have earned the
stigma of acting together as a class against the public
interest, instead of endeavoring to lift their competi-
tors to the higher level of meeting their obligations.
And so, when it comes to the continuation schools,
and the nation proceeds positively to require employ-
ers to devote five, six, or eight hours a week to the
education of their pupils as workers, many people
are loath to trust them with even a voice in the man-
agement of their schools. And this is true, notwith-
standing the cordial and sincere endorsement of the
compulsory part-time schools by leaders among the
manufacturers.1
Yet, who is there more fitted by his own training
and daily experience to have a voice in the manage-
ment of these schools? The employers, or at least
their managers, have come up through the shop.
They have learned by hard knocks just those little
1 National Association of Manufacturers: "We favor the establish-
ment in every community of continuation schools wherein the children
of fourteen to eighteen years of age, now in the industries, shall be
instructed in the science and art of their respective industries and in
citizenship." " It is the right of every one of these children to be given
an education that will make him efficient and reasonably happy, able
properly to maintain himself and meet the various obligations of life
and citizenship." "A nation cannot live half slave and half free,
half educated and half uneducated. God help the man whose vision
is not clear enough to see that the employers see this." Proceedings
of Annual Conventions, 1911; 1912, p. 150; 1913, p. 238.
134 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
turning points that are met every day and lead to
success or failure. They are in daily contact with
wage-earners and they know the qualities that get
the workers their promotions and the qualities that
keep them back.
The school teacher in the public schools or the
high schools, or colleges or universities, cannot really
know these details that fit the workers for promotion
in industry. They can teach what they know but
not what they do not know. When they are in con-
trol of industrial education they run it into arts, or
crafts, or manual training, or mechanical exercises,
or something that does not connect up with the shop
as it actually is in modern industry.
Yet they stand for what employers as a class do
not stand for. They stand for education and citi-
zenship, and not for the fees and profits. No wonder
that in the distrust of employers the school teacher is
listened to and often is given control where he is not
fitted to control.
And especially is the wage-earner bewildered by
this clash of school teacher and employer for control.
He knows that the school teacher does not fit his
children into industry and he distrusts the employers,1
1 American Federation of Labor: "If we permit the present aca-
demic educational group of the nation to dominate, the whole force
and virtue of genuine vocational trade training will be in danger of
being lost sight of and the nation's appropriations will probably be
misdirected along minor lines of endeavor, such as manual training,
amateur mechanics and other trifling, impractical valueless schemes.
Neither can we afford to permit this great measure to be over-weighted
by any special trade, commercial or vocational interests. The agri-
culturists should not predominate, neither should the commercial or
even the labor and industrial interests." Report of Proceedings, 1916,
p. 103.
EDUCATION 135
particularly in these days when the educator can
invoke the dread of " prussianizing " and "commercial-
izing" the continuation schools.1
Undoubtedly, the idea of compulsory part-time
school is German in its origin. It was first adopted by
imperial legislation more than twenty years ago.2
But it may be made American in its management.
If the employers alone are in control, it might be
"commercialized." If the school teacher alone con-
trols, it loses contact with the shop. If the wage-
earner alone controls, it might be used to restrict
apprenticeship. Joint control is democratic control.
It enlists the qualities of each that are needed, and
checks the defects of each.
The Federal Vocational Education Law of 1917
attempts to establish this joint control.8 It attempts
to give representation to the employer, the educator,
the wage-earner. It attempts to secure similar
joint control in the states and in the local continuation
l"What do I mean by Prussianizing our education? I mean
primarily this: (1) a subtle, even if unconscious, attempt to use the
children of the laboring people, including farmers, as cogs in a machine;
an attempt to follow the lead of the caste system in Germany, a system
which defrauds children of an opportunity for secondary education
and practically dooms nine-tenths of the people to be and to remain
hewers of wood and drawers of water; (2) a division of the school sys-
tem into two parts, each striving for financial support and developing
rivalries of a pernicious kind. It should be noted that in Prussia
there is no rivalry between the two systems, for everybody who count*
concedes that when the children of the common people finish the com-
mon school there is nothing more for them but toil and the army."
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Wisconsin. Educational Newt
Bulletin, November 1, 1918, p. 3.
1 Hoffman, Die Gewerbe-Ordnung, Section 120.
« Smith-Hughes Act, approved February 23, 1917. See Vocational
Summary, published monthly by Federal Board for Vocational Edu-
cation, beginning May, 1918.
136 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
schools. It attempts to eliminate autocracy, either
of employers, pedagogues, or wage-earners. It at-
tempts to secure representative democracy in educa-
tion. If this scheme of representative control suc-
ceeds, how great are its possibilities! It is universal,
industrial, educational.
The public grade schools give universal education,
but not industrial, and they should not. Theirs is
the all-round preparation for any and every position.
It is play, not work. But education cannot stop at
fourteen, or sixteen, or even twenty-one years of age.
If it stops, then there is no future, for the future is
advancement, and advancement stops when learning
stops. The high school, the college, the university,
the technical school, leads on to certain specialized
professions, increasing in number but always limited,
for they are not self-supporting. They feed on
industry and thrive only as industry thrives. It is in
agriculture, manufactures, transportation, merchan-
dizing, business, that the nation lives and the millions
find promotion. To open up the lines of advance-
ment in industry according to the aptitudes and
abilities of every individual is the aim of industrial
democracy. The trade school cannot do it. The
apprenticeship school cannot do it. They are limited
to the skilled trades. The public schools cannot do it.
They are not industrial. Only universal apprentice-
ship can do it, where the common laborer, the
unskilled worker, the immigrant and the children of
the entire nation shall have equal opportunities in
both education and industry.
And universal apprenticeship is but the compulsory
continuation or part-time school. It may be four,
EDUCATION 137
eight, or more hours a week, or even half-time,
according as experience and good judgment advise. It
may extend to the age of sixteen, then to eighteen,
according as the instruction is found practicable and
the teachers competent. It may extend still further
for immigrants who have not learned the English
language.
To be universal it must be compulsory, in the day
time and on the employer's time. The tired worker
in night school is not a learner. Attendance there is
neither compulsory, universal, nor fruitful. Only
on the employer's time, when the learner must
attend in order to earn his living, can attendance
be universal and instruction educational.
The first great awakening of England aroused by
the war is this union of education and industry. No
nation ever suffered more from the exploitation of
children in factories. And England led the world
in excluding young children from factories. But
education stopped where industry began. Two-fifths
of the boys and girls between the ages of twelve and
sixteen receive no further education after the age of
thirteen. " These figures," said a group of British
employers and trade unionists, "make it easy to under-
stand the superior success of Germany in so many
departments of activity. That success ... is due
to the fact that so very much greater a proportion
of young people in that country receive any systematic
education at all during the all-important years
between fourteen and eighteen."1 On the strength of
1 Memorandum on the Industrial Situation after the War, Carton
Poundation, Section 97 (1917). Reprint by United States Shipping
Board, Emergency Fleet Corporation (1918).
138 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
these facts the British Parliament enacted the law
of August, 1918, looking toward the continuation
school.
In America, conditions are similar. Probably a
million boys and girls leave school annually from
grades above the sixth grade, and nine-tenths of the
total number of children enter various occupations
before eighteen years of age. 1 The Vocational Educa-
tion Law of 1917 is America's awakening to this gap
between industry and education.
Rights have their reciprocal duties. Duties, in
the long run, are duties to the nation that grants and
protects the rights. But duties cannot be left to
autocrats or bureaucrats, or to a single class to impose
on other classes. Germany set the example of
enforcing duties on employers and parents to provide
universal education. If Germany's system is faulty
it is not on account of the recognition of universal
duties but on account of autocratic or bureaucratic
control in enforcing the duties. A wrong direction
may be given to a good thing. Chemistry acts
much the same in Germany as in America, but the
German government may use it for different purposes.
Modern industry is no respecter of nations, and the
psychology of boys and girls is about the same in
Europe as hi America. But one nation may direct
it toward conquest or obedience or the supremacy
of one class over other classes; another nation may
direct it toward democracy and equal opportunity
for advancement to every person in every class. It
depends on the control.
1 Inglis, Alexander, Principles of Secondary Education (1918), pp.
575, 676.
EDUCATION 139
No class can be trusted to decide for itself. No
class, either aristocrats, capitalists, educators or work-
ers, can see the needs, or rights, or duties, of others
as vividly as its own. Democracy in education, like
democracy in politics or industry, is not a philosophy
or a theory or even a " science" of education — it is
joint control over the teachers.
The modern advanced philosophy of education is
fully awake to the vocational needs of education.
It is fully aware that these needs cannot be met
while teachers adhere to their " traditional ideals of
culture, traditional subjects of study and traditional
methods of teaching and discipline."1 But these
advanced ideas are not and cannot be generally put
into practice while school teachers remain in bureau-
cratic control; for, like other experts, if uncontrolled
they followed the traditions of bureaucracy rather
than the science of education. When the teachers
are jointly controlled, when organized teachers,
organized employers and organized labor have each
an equal voice in the control, when democracy in
education is truly representative democracy, then
the teachers begin to see the connections of education
and industry, and to modify their traditional methods
according to both the needs of industry and the phil-
osophy of education.
For the business of the vocational teacher is to
make industry interesting. Very few laborers can
reach the top. On this account some people despair
of ever making work interesting. They feel that,
1 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education (1915), p. 114. See also
Ingiis, Alexander, Principles of Secondary Education (1918), pp. 572-
620; Miller, H. L., "Adequate Schooling for the Youth of the Nation,"
Inter-Mountain Educator, September, October, 1918.
140 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
since the workers are compelled to settle down in
grooves, industry can have no meaning or incentive
for them. If this conclusion is true, then the situation
is hopeless. For, as far as we can see, the forces of
steam, electricity, transportation, are driving indus-
try into large concerns. Twenty thousand men in
one factory can make automobiles cheaper than one
thousand. Room at the top is lessening and the
number of workers tied into grooves is increasing.
The outlook is menacing for the worker, for industry,
for the nation. The workers lose their interest in
industry just at the time when they become more
powerful than ever before in controlling industry
through labor organization or politics. Without
interest in their work they cannot be expected to pay
attention or have a care for the economy, efficiency,
or discipline, without which business goes bankrupt.
The inventors, the engineers, the business men, have
brought on this situation. They have mastered the
forces of nature and will increase their mastery.
They have converted nature into capital and labor
into an army. The problem of capital is the physical
sciences — chemistry, electricity, physics, biology. The
problem of labor is the human science, psychology. If
it is the engineer who is the expert in physical science,
it is the educator who becomes expert in psychology.
The future of industry is psychological. The inventors,
engineers, business men of the future will be industrial
psychologists. Industry must be educational, and
it is this very problem of opening up lines of promotion
where physical science has closed them that is the
problem of industrial education.
For interest in one's work does not depend on a
EDUCATION 141
remote expectation of reaching the top. It is the
next step that is interesting. The next step means
accomplishment, means overcoming obstacles that
are not hopeless, means initiative, means thinking
on the job.1 To the mere "intellectual" who ponders
over the labor problem, there is no hope if there is no
room at the top. Hence efforts to interest workers
even in the next step are despaired of. To the busi-
ness man and engineer whose opinions are formed in
mastering the physical sciences, the worker is often
preferred who does not think or talk back. But to
the educator it is these very qualities which others
reject that are his problem to be worked out. They
are the psychological problems of industry. If indus-
try has lessened the chances of promotion it is the
educator's business to open them up again. He must
work out lines of advancement that may serve as a
substitute at least for the lost chances of promotion.
He must know how to suggest these lines of advance-
ment to the employer and the worker and to work
them out practically. If he sees workers confined to
"enervating" jobs he must know how to get them
"energized."2 And, just as the business man has
employed and made use in the past of the inventor or
engineer who reduces the physical sciences to prac-
tice, so must he enlist the inventive educator in
making his business educational.
1 Of. Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, pp. 146-162; Marot,
Helen, Creative Impulse in Industry (1018); Commons, Labor and
Administration, pp. 363-381.
a Cf . Schneider, Herman, Report on Public School System, New York
Board of Estimate and Apportionment, 1911-12, Part II, pp. 765-773.
Education for Industrial Workers, World Book Company New York,
1915.
142 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
Then may we expect that industrial education will
take its proper place. Schools and industry will
dove-tail. Neither employer, laborer, nor educator
will dominate. The educator will come out from his
seclusion and will become industrial without being
commercialized, for he will bring to industry the
science of psychology. Business will become educa-
tional without being academic, for it will have its
daily problems of education which cannot wait for
a remote future. And labor will become more gener-
ally interested in the work, in addition to the com-
pensation.
XIV
LOYALTY
Lack of interest and lack of loyalty are frequent
complaints respecting the modern laborer. The com-
plaint comes from different sides. Some people are
hardened to it and expect it. With them lack of
interest or loyalty is a kind of original sin. There
is no remedy for it except to lay down the law of
hiring and firing, with its penalty of unemployment.
At the other extreme are the doctrinaire socialists
and anarchists. Man is born, as it were, with an
instinct of workmanship, and coercion crushes it out
of him. Abolish private property with its right to
hire and fire and its penalty of unemployment and
then you will " liberate" this suppressed instinct.
One extreme provokes the other. If there were
only the theories of original depravity and original
perfectibility, there would be no outcome but revolu-
tion and counter-revolution.
The problem is statistical. The wage system is
compulsory, but it is also persuasive. It rewards
and punishes. We could hardly expect that some
kinds of work or some kinds of employers would ever
inspire interest or loyalty; or that some kinds of
laborers would ever get interested or loyal. The
wage system with them is compulsory and penal.
Other kinds of work are interesting, other employers
143
144 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
are inspiring, other workers improvable. With them
the wage system is persuasive and energizing. There
are as many possible remedies for disloyalty and
indifference as there are differences in employers,
workers and kinds of work.
A mediaeval and romantic remedy goes back to the
time when the skilled worker did all parts of the work
and made a finished job from raw material to artistic
product.1
But how small was the number of skilled workers
compared with the number of all the workers ! There
is probably a larger proportion of highly skilled
workers and highly interesting work in modern indus-
try than there was in the mediaeval system, if we
take into account all the work from raw material
to finished product.
Besides, suppose the arts and crafts movement
should succeed and should enable the worker again
to make his all-round finished product. If there
were very many of them they would need to sell
their products in distant markets, and immediately
the factory system would start up again with its
artistic designers, its division of labor into skilled,
semi-skilled and unskilled, its big employers, its
wholesalers, jobbers, and distant retailers.
Or, suppose that trade unions of skilled workers
should succeed, as some have done for a time, in
preventing specialization and subdivision of labor,
in order that they might retain their all-round pro-
ficiency. If their product is shipped to distant
markets, or their partly finished work can be done
1 Morris, William, Art and Socialism (1884); A Dream of John Ball
(1888).
LOYALTY
near the source of raw material, then factories will
start up and eat into their jurisdiction.
Arts, crafts, and unions, in time, have yielded and
must yield to the specialization imposed by trans-
portation and large establishments. The worker's
interest and loyalty, if it is aroused, must be his
interest in a joint product and his loyalty to a going
concern.
A certain establishment takes its younger appli-
cants for employment on a trip throughout the plant
before setting them at work on their own specialty.
The different processes are pointed out, partly ex-
plained, and the finished product is exhibited. The
systems of payment are explained, the chances for
promotion, responsibility, and outlook are canvassed.
Then the applicant is asked to come back the next
day, after talking and thinking it over. If hired,
then a daily follow-up ensues until the beginner gets
acquainted with the work and with other workers
and feels at home. Immediately, in that establish-
ment, after starting this practice, the expensive
turnover of the first week or month of employment
and its resulting breakage of material, was reduced to
almost negligible quantities. Two things are be-
lieved to be accomplished. A narrow specialized
job is seen as an essential part of a marvellous system,
and the fellow-workers and management are seen
to be looking for steady workers and good companions.
A beginning is made in the spirit of workmanship
and loyalty to the business.
In another establishment a school is started for all
beginners. At first, skilled operatives were put in as
teachers. They knew how to do the work but not
10
146 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
how to teach it. They did the work themselves,
told the beginner to look on and then imitate. Even-
tually a school teacher was employed, and the skilled
operatives were sent back to their machines. The
teacher did not ask the beginners to look on and imi-
tate, but asked them to study out the machine, to
study their own motions, to study the whys and
purposes. The company pays them wages during
this period of studying. A beginning is made in
interest and loyalty — in interest, because there is
something to think about; in loyalty, because some-
body has given them a little taste of real thinking
and mental advancement. That establishment has
a supply of competent beginners when its competitors
are short-handed.
A worker on repetition work was telling how he
kept himself from going crazy. When he went to
work in the morning he would start up a line of
imagination, picturing himself perhaps as a prince,
going through a day of romance, adventure, combat,
heroism, love; or a line of reminiscence going over the
events of his childhood or of the night before. He
kept his mind away from his work.
In a public employment office I found that a large
proportion of the applicants for work were boys or
young men on these repetition jobs in machine shops.
They had been on one machine for a month, or two
months, or six months, and just wanted a change —
a different machine or even the same machine in a
different shop. But there were no middle-aged men in
this class of applicants. The older men had lost their
hankering for a change, had gotten used to monotony,
or had quit for good.
LOYALTY 147
Repetition work must be done by somebody. A
foreman told me he wanted fairly stupid peasant
women from Europe and did not want them to think.
There ought to be a place in industry for all kinds of
people. It is too bad that, just because a person can-
not think, he cannot find a job. But, somehow, when
one sees how ingenious, inventive, and enterprising
employers are at all points where they can make
money by improvements, one cannot help wishing
that it could be made unprofitable to keep any worker
on this kind of merely repetition work. The kind of
work creates its own supply of the kind of labor suited
to it. Perhaps, if the laborer's minimum wages were
materially increased or his hours materially shortened,
employers would substitute automatic or semi-auto-
matic machinery. A worker attending a dozen
machines has far more interesting work than one
who is feeding a single machine. And when the whole
factory gets automatic and the work comes along on
trolleys and conveyors, a thousand men and boys
strung along in a team have a more interesting time
than the same number working by themselves. Their
work is, indeed, repetition work, and each one adds but
his own little specialized motion to the total, but it is
sociable and democratic. Instead of a few skilled
workers each making an all-round product, hundreds
and thousands of unskilled get into the game. The
great automatic modern factory has probably more
chances for interesting work for more people than
ever did the medieval and romantic small shop.
Repetition work seems to be a transition stage from
handwork to automatic work. The automatic ma-
chine and factory may cost more money and require
148 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
a larger investment and a larger factory. As long as
wages are low and hours long it may be cheaper to
keep the repetition process. When wages go up
and hours go down then it may be cheaper to bring
in the more nearly automatic process.
Yet it would be foolish to suggest any one panacea
for uninteresting work. How to make work inter-
esting is just as much a field of investigation and
experiment as how to invent a machine or lay out a
plant. And business men, engineers, and educators,
can be just as ingenious and successful in doing it.
It is the big field of industrial psychology, which for
the twentieth century opens up like the nineteenth for
chemistry and physics.
There is a narrow business or engineering psychol-
ogy which overlooks this industrial psychology. It
is the idea that the only interesting thing is the amount
of compensation an individual can get, and so, by
experimenting and measuring, we find out about how
much bonus or premium is necessary in order to get
him to do his best. This undoubtedly will work for
a while, and will work for some individuals more than
others, and for the young more than the old, but if it
is too stimulating its effects are like intoxication.
When the dream is over the awakening is sour.
Industrial psychology is more temperate. It looks
ahead and measures the after effects. It sees not
only a lot of isolated individuals, each hustling for
himself, but sees the whole plant, the team work,
the going concern, the joint product, the goodwill
of employer and fellow-workers. And industrial
psychology is willing to take some chances on the
outcome.
LOYALTY 149
Yes, it is said, a big and rich corporation can try
experiments and take big chances ; the little man must
play safe. But look about, and see how little men
become big. It is by plunging a little on a new idea.
The new idea today is the interest and loyalty of
workers. They are free and organizing as never
before. Courts, legislatures and governments cannot
be depended upon as in the past to coerce them.
The business man with the new idea will get their
interest and loyalty. Some will fail, others will
succeed. But the chances of failure are probably
greater by sticking to the old ideas than by venturing
on the new ones.
For loyalty today is not the loyalty of former days.
The slave was loyal because he could not quit. The
laborer is loyal if he has no alternative to go elsewhere.
He is loyal in hard times and disloyal in good times.
The new idea of loyalty is the loyalty of those to
whom unemployment is no penalty. The law of
hiring and firing has no coercion for them. They
can find another job, or can wait until they find it.
The new loyalty is the loyalty, not of penalties, but
of goodwill. It is not afraid to quit or be fired, but
willingly stays and works. And this kind of loyalty
is not an inborn instinct of workmanship, but must
be taught and drawn out by education, and kept up
by continuous effort on the part of the employer.
There is no asset so fragile as goodwill. The least
inattention loses the customer. A year or two of
careless attention destroys many years of previous
effort.
In hard times, when workers are not free to quit,
no attention need be paid to the cultivation of loyalty.
150 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
The coercive penalty is enough. But it is at that very
time that goodwill is won or lost. The disloyalty
of good times when workers are free to quit, has been
produced by inattention to goodwill in the preceding
hard times. The employer who weeds out with a
club in hard times and complains of disloyalty and
lack of interest in good times, has not yet adapted
himself to the new kind of loyalty that is built up,
not on penalties, but on freedom.
Thus education, interesting work and loyalty go
together. Loyalty is not gratitude for past favors,
nor a sense of obligation, but is expectation of reci-
procity. If the future is not to be better than the
past, then gratitude loses its hold. Education is
not the teaching of gratitude or obligation for favors
received, but is the unfolding of possibilities in the
job and the worker. It is this that makes work
interesting and converts loyalty into goodwill.
XV
PERSONALITY
In the old romantic days the employer and his
journeyman and apprentice lived and worked together,
much as the small farmer does now with his hired
help. But those were rather miserable days. There
is nothing very romantic either for the hired man or
the farmer, much less for the farmer's wife. It is
not very regrettable that industry has gotten away
from that personal touch. Long hours, compulsory
association with each other out of working hours
are not conducive to personality.
For personality is a kind of specialization. You
need to get away. You need a little time for yourself.
You need to be different. You need to specialize.
The modern corporation has more chances for person-
ality than ever were known before in industry. And
it succeeds for that reason. If it has no monopoly
it succeeds because it has a soul.
Goodwill is the soul; and goodwill is a multiple of
all the different personalities that keep the business
agoing. For personality is not mere individuality.
It is that aspect of individuality that gets results.
And specialization is not mere peculiarity. It is thor-
ough preparation for the work of personality. Per-
sonality is power. It gets other people to do things.
But it is not physical or economic power. You do
not need much personality if you use a club or can
151
152 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
keep the other man from getting a living. Person-
ality is psychological power — the power of persua-
sion— the power to get across with free men. It is
the child of liberty and democracy.
The modern corporation specializes in personality.
And it specializes in the directions where those it
deals with are free to go elsewhere. One kind of person-
ality is successful in dealing with bankers, financiers,
and investors. A somewhat similar in dealings
with wholesalers and other manufacturers. A rather
different kind is sent out on the road to reach the
retailers. The auditors and accountants have their
characteristic qualities. Lawyers and lobbyists are
selected according to the personalities they meet
in courts, politics and legislatures. The engineers,
superintendents, and foremen are selected to get
out product and buy the commodity labor.
More recently, as labor becomes more free or in-
tractable, the labor psychologist is taken on. First,
perhaps, the trade unionist who knows the mind of
organized labor in the shop and in union meetings and
headquarters. Then a variety of labor specialists —
nurses, safety experts, health experts, welfare workers,
scientific managers, educators, employment managers,
service workers.
Naturally, these begin with the more obvious
physical aspects of their work. The employer is
inclined at first to be disappointed if his safety expert
is not a mechanical engineer. He thinks of safety
in terms of belts and set-screws.
But the safety expert does not produce safety, he
sells it. The factory may be mechanically fool-proof.
But that will hardly cut out more than one-third or
PERSONALITY 153
one-half of the accidents. The workingmen must buy
safety. It costs them something to play safe. They
must keep their mind on it. They must look out.
They must slow up. They must run the risk of
irritating the foreman who is paid for output.
So, the safety expert must sell safety also to the
foreman. It costs the foreman more than it does the
workman. The foreman must be shown. He may
not be able to see the pain and suffering. He has
been brought up on accidents, and even thinks he has
no accidents, when the truth is that he did not notice
them. He must get a bigger idea. He must be led
to see that, in the long run, safety increases the out-
put of his men as a whole. It saves time and absence
and turnover. The foreman must be educated to see
himself as a going concern and not to see merely the
irritating individual who plays safe.
To sell safety to the foreman it must be sold to the
employer. It costs the employer more than it does
the others. The smallest cost is what he spends in
money on safe-guarding machines and plant. The
largest cost is interference with production. He
must let his safety expert have some authority over
the foreman who thinks that safety reduces out-
put. He must let him get the workmen together in
committees.
Thus the safety engineer must be a social engineer.
If he can invent and educate the " safety spirit"
among the entire force from top to bottom, then the
workmen and foremen will invent and demand and use
more safety devices than he ever could think out and
install by himself. He adds his personality to the
going concern. He gives the corporation a soul.
154 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
And the nurse and doctor. The employer at first
thinks of "first aid," or headaches, or fainting spells,
or a medicine chest and cots and operating tables.
He orders his nurse not to go out into the shop at all.
The doctor is called only after the thing happens.
But the nurse and doctor must also sell health-
first to the workers. They quit work, lay-off, or
slow-up. The foreman loses their output and that is
about all he has time to investigate. The nurse and
doctor know more. The workers need to be en-
couraged to complain in advance of serious complaint.
The employer needs to be shown the value of health.
How far the nurse and doctor will be able to go,
whether into the shop or even into the homes, is
limited by their personality. One may offend and do
harm. Another may be welcome. A mechanical
expert in the hospital is one thing. People must
come in extremity. A social expert who can carry
the spirit of good health to the entire working force
is something additional. The one may make the
hospitals and beds look nice in photographs. The
other gives a soul to the corporation.
And so on down the line of all the possible labor
specialists. The great aim of them all is to make the
work interesting and the workers willing. All are
educators.
In the olden time the apprentice learned a trade by
imitating the journeyman. When once learned the
trade was fixed and irrevocable. But modern indus-
try is revolutionary. It breaks up the trades just
because it is based on underlying principles of chemis-
try, physics, psychology, which have thousands of
different ways of working out in practice. The
PERSONALITY 155
routine worker who only can imitate is left behind.
The one who can contrive new ways of doing things
that will work gets ahead.
We hear much of a " suggestion system. " Workers
are encouraged to write out their suggestions for im-
provements and send them in. Not many are real
improvements, perhaps, but whether the system works
or not depends on the personality that conducts it.
If a worker offers a suggestion it is because his mind
has waked up a little. If he is turned down without
knowing why or if he hears nothing of it, he sinks back
in a rut. If he gets a hearing or a voice in the decision,
and learns why one suggestion is an improvement
and another is not, then the system may accomplish
the object, not mainly of getting a few improvements,
but of getting the workers interested in the business.
The busy foreman or superintendent cannot spend
much time on fruitless ideas. His job is output of
product. What is wanted is output of ideas. It
begins with the education of the beginner. When
the boy or girl enters the shop he is full of questions,
of untried ideas, of suggestions. If he is simply
"broken in," so as to become productive as soon as
possible, his questioning is suppressed. If he tries
out his ideas he learns to select those that work and
the reasons for rejecting the others. Then when he
passes out from the " vestibule school" he is still a
questioner. He comes back to that school to try
out his ideas. The vestibule school becomes a gradu-
ate school. His education never is finished as long
as he has a question or an untried idea.
A new labor department is thus created — the
educational department. A new specialist is called
156 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
for — the teacher. Not the hand-me-down teacher
who passes on the traditions of the trade or shop, but
the dig-it-up teacher who is an investigator along with
every worker, old or young, who has a question or a
suggestion. A new personality is called for, not the
foreman who can get out product, but the teacher
who can get out ideas.
The factory has its scientific laboratory for a select
number of chemists or engineers, with their tests,
experiments and installation of new devices. Every
factory can have its educational department for all
the workers who have questions and new ideas. But,
if so, it all depends on the personality of the teacher.
A humdrum, routine teacher, who does it all him-
self, and demands imitation and repetition, is not a
teacher. The one who can provoke ideas, raise
doubts, stimulate ambitions, and then let the others
do it themselves, he is the teacher. And he, too, may
impart a soul to the corporation — the soul of hope,
personality, individuality, self-reliance, in the workers
because their work is interesting, promising and unfin-
ished. He, too, may impart the loyalty that is goodwill
—the loyalty that gladly sees then* own progress in the
progress and prosperity of the business. Here is the
true science of scientific management.
It is the defect of every new idea that it gets stand-
ardized for the sake of those who do not understand
it. Strong personalities have pioneered the move-
ment for scientific management. They have under-
stood human nature. They have come up through
the shop and have been a part of the psychology of
labor. They have known how to invent and sell
efficiency to the worker. But when the movement
PERSONALITY 157
spreads and large contracts are taken, smaller men
are put into the shop with their instruments of
measurement and their statistics and blue prints.
Hoxie found that the mass of time-study men in the
shops who actually set the tasks and make the piece
and premium rates are " poorly paid and not men of
an intellectual or moral quality and breadth of train-
ing and education" calculated to inspire confidence.
There are exceptional individuals at the top, but for
the staff that does the actual work the details are
reduced to mechanical routine without a grasp of
the social effects or labor problems that ensue.1
But the virtue of true scientific management is that
it never is finished. It always has a fringe of trial
and experiment. It always is ready to abandon a
previous standard for something better. It is along
this fringe of comparison and experiment that in-
terest in one's work is to be found. If the worker
does not share in this experimental side of his work,
the interesting part of it is taken away from him and
monopolized by the scientific manager. The great
field of scientific management is to make the work
interesting for the worker.
I know an inventor who was trying to work out in
practice a new mechanical device. His laboratory
experiments were perfect. His employer accepted
them and gave him every facility for introducing
them in the factory. The workers were indifferent
and interested only in their wages. The factory
experiments were disappointing. Finally he made
the employees partners in the experiments. Immedi-
ately a multitude of practical suggestions began to
» Hoxie, R. F., Scientific Management and Labor (1915), pp. 113-122.
158 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
come from them and the device rapidly became practi-
cable. He had tapped an unknown reservoir of ideas
and experience that may be found in every factory.
I do not say that the factory should be converted
into a laboratory for experiments. I only say that
the labor department of the factory should have its
experimental department, where new ideas are wel-
come and every worker with an idea can take part.
But, of course, it depends on the personality that
conducts the department. Here is the great field
opening up for scientific management. The leaders
and pioneers appreciate it.1 Two things especially
stand in its way: the demand of employers for quick
results and the notion that workmen are interested
only in the pay envelope.
The scientific manager may get quick results, may
reduce costs and increase output and profit, but if
he does it at the expense of losing the interest of the
workers, then quick results bring increased costs
elsewhere in the unrest and indifference of labor.
And the pay envelope is of course important. It takes
no genius to arouse interest in the pay envelope.
But it takes some ingenuity and personality to arouse
interest in the work that goes along with the pay.
Very nice and accurate computations may be made
of just the amount of payment by premiums, bonuses,
or piece-rates, that is necessary to get the worker
to exert himself. " Payment-by-results " keeps the
money inducement uppermost at every hour of the
1 See, for example, the experiments made by R. B. Wolf and re-
ported in the Bulletin of the Society to Promote the Science of Manage-
ment, August, 1915, March, 1917; Proceedings of the Employment
Managers' Conference, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 2 and 3, 1917,
Bulletin 227, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
PERSONALITY 159
day, and crowds out other inducements. To get
as much money as he can for as little effort or thought
as he must give up, becomes the main idea of the
piece worker and bonus worker. It requires no
genius or personality to get this idea into the worker's
head. Piece-work and bonus work are mechanical
substitutes for personality. The factory is wound
up, as it were, like a machine, with its wheels and
cogs adjusted to a schedule of prices, and the operator
can go away and let it work itself.
But personality cannot go away. It is the life of a
going concern. It is always on the job. The schedule
of prices is a schedule of thousands of labor contracts.
The labor contract cannot be tied up like a mortgage.
It is a new contract, a new agreement, every hour
of the day and every day in the year. The up-to-
date merchant does not employ even the cheapest
clerk who merely throws down the goods with their
labeled prices on the counter and lets the customer
take it or leave it. So the up-to-date employer
does not employ the foreman, straw boss, superintend-
ent, manager, who only knows how to figure out
prices and lets the worker take it or leave it.
For personality can be created. The merchant,
whether he knows it or not, has his school of sales-
manship, the employer his school of foremanship.
Personality of a kind is taught, or perhaps only
picked up, in the one and in the other. But not
many employers have their school of personality
with its separate organization for creating personality.
It goes without saying that the candidate must
know the mechanical details of figuring and getting
out the work. But that is not personality. Likewise
160 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
he must have a minimum of native character on which
to build. But mere individuality is not personality.
Personality is individuality plus power— it is the
psychology of influence without the power of compul-
sion. It is developed by trial and error; by experi-
ment, success and failure; by exchange of ideas and
experiences; by study of leadership; by self-examina-
tion; by cultivating health, vitality, courage, initia-
tive, self-confidence, enthusiasm, and, above all,
sympathy with the other man's point of view, imagina-
tion that puts one's self in his place, and sincerity
that inspires his confidence.
People are not born with these qualities; they are
not acquired by accident; the public schools may
not have learned how to teach them; vocational
schools may overlook them; but modern industry and
democracy require them. And the business corpora-
tion can teach them when the proprietors see that
they need them.
For the corporation can specialize in personality.
This is the meaning of the movement to set up a
" labor department," a " division of personnel,"
an " employment" or " service" department, a " trade
board" or "board of arbitration," in the factory, on
an equality with the sales department, the financial
department, or the production department. The
labor department is the school of personality that
deals with labor. Throughout its entire personnel,
from the nurse, doctor, the safety and welfare experts,
the apprenticeship school, the vestibule school, to the
foreman, the scientific manager, the employment
manager, its standards of success are the interest,
loyalty, goodwill, of labor. Each member of its
PERSONALITY 161
staff is a mediator between capital and labor. To
their technical knowledge of the needs of the businiw
must be added the personality that wins the confidence
of employer and employee.
But personality cannot be created by commands
nor bought with money. The sham may take orders
from above and be subject to the employer's will in
all details. But the true is independent. It issues
orders, even to the employer, and it cannot be bought
because it has risen to the level of a profession whose
members look for the approval of others in the pro-
fession over and above the approval of their employer.
They do what is "right," not what they are ordered
to do; they have sold to the employer, not themselves,
but their professional advice of what he ought to do.
We see this new profession forming itself about us
and beginning to fill the gap between capital and labor.
Its literature is taking shape. Its conventions and
conferences are held where experiences are exchanged,
experiments compared, scientific principles developed;
where professional ethics, professional enthusiasm
and pride in a noble calling are lifting its members
above dependence on any particular employer who
happens to hire them. They are beginning to lay
down the law, not of coercion, but the law of good-
will— the law of health and safety, of vocational
training, the law of employment, promotion, dismissal,
payment of wages, and all the other relationships of
capital and labor. They are beginning to be a new
personality in industry.
The very separation of capital and labor and the
concentration of absentee ownership calls them
forth and opens the gap for them to occupy. It
11
162 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
cannot be expected that all capitalists or employers
will recognize them as a profession or yield to them
that independence in the shop without which they
cannot develop. It requires considerable breadth
of view to be willing to submit to constitutional
government. The exercise of power in all its details
seems in itself to be attractive even though it costs
something at times. To come out on top is gratify-
ing, even at the expense of goodwill and personality
in others. For such employers there seems to be no
remedy except the superior power of trade unions or
government. I have seen a marked change occur in
the character of an employer through the influence
of a successful strike. Not that he becomes merely
conciliatory and willing to compromise, but that his
convictions and ethical beliefs themselves undergo
a change. He listens, gets the point of view, regrets
his oversight, is interested in remedying unnoticed
abuses, patient hi handling unfounded grievances.
It is then that he welcomes the specialist, defers to
another's judgment, enlarges his labor department,
gives his mediators a free hand.
And the right kind of legislation and administration
of labor laws has a similar effect. A certain employer,
who regularly kicked out the factory inspector,
ended by prosecuting him in court. But when the
workmen's compensation law came in, with its
automatic penalties for all accidents, he proudly
sat with the inspectors and the representatives of
labor, and helped them on behalf of the employers
to frame up the safety rules to govern his business.
In this way, unionism and government, properly con-
ducted, are a factor in creating personality. They
PERSONALITY 103
eliminate coercive power and call forth mental and
moral power.
Personality has been and always will be the con-
trolling figure in industry. Carnegie could pick out a
Schwab or a Frick, place a tremendous inducement
before him, then go away on long vacations and let
the business run itself. Rockefeller could surround
himself with geniuses. But personality in the past
could succeed in the few because it was lacking in the
many. It could use thousands and even millions of
immigrants from the oppressed nationalities of Europe
whose ignorance and submissiveness were the product
of conquest.
The new America promises to be an educated
America. " Americanization " means the spread of
independence in the shop. The individuals cannot
be swung in a mass by the boss, or the labor agent, or
the padrone, but may be expected to assert themselves.
Great and exceptional personalities there will be.
But they will work through hundreds and thousands
of lesser ones. The Carnegies and Rockefellers of
the future will not only pick out a few but will train
many of them, all along the line, for the thousands
of positions where the interests and prejudices of
labor must be consulted.
And the laborers themselves are producing their
own leaders with their own ideas and personalities.
The kind of leaders that they put forward is largely
determined in the end by the kind that the capitalists
select to meet them. At first they make mistakes.
They elect fool committees to represent them. They
have never been consulted and they suddenly acquire
a feeling of power and self-importance. They must
164 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
learn by their own mistakes. Here is the hardest
test of personality on the part of the employer and
his representatives — the patience and ability to con-
sult with those who have not yet learned how to
govern themselves.
In the end it is not masses or leaders, or committees,
that are dealt with. It is each individual worker in the
shop. Labor moves in a mass because that is the
way its individuals get more liberty and power.
What the individuals want determines what their
leaders demand.
It is in the daily and hourly dealings with every
worker in the shop that their ideas are formed and
their demands are formulated. There is where their
committees and leaders get their ideas and support.
There is where the employer's personality counts—
not a great personality at the top but scores and hun-
dreds of personalities at every point and every hour
of contact with every worker in the shop. The em-
ployer who has learned how to select and train these
subordinates, who has his school of personality for
those who represent him hi his dealings with labor,
is the one who is beginning to meet the situation.
A certain amount of idealism and imagination is
needed to grasp these new conditions and possibilities.
Says the " director of personnel' ' in a great corpora-
tion, "a new heaven and a new earth are being made
in the thinking along this line." But, he goes on,
"the promotion of such a view point might be diffi-
cult with the usual general manager unless the
employment manager had a better standing than he
ordinarily has." In his particular establishment the
"division of personnel" has this recognized standing
PERSONALITY 166
as a part of the whole enterprise, and for this reason hn
hopes to work out "something worth while."
It goes back to the board of directors, the stock-
holders, even the bankers and creditors. If they are
not converted to this new heaven and new earth,
then there is no place for a "director of personnel."
He is a dreamer, a utopist, to be tied down by strict
orders from above. He is suspected of ignorance of
human nature. He is raising dangerous hopes of
collective bargaining. His mistakes weigh heavy and
he is given no chance to make mistakes. He is
reduced to the level of a routine worker. But with
a little imagination on the part of capitalists that can
picture the daily life of the workers in their shops, with
a little idealism that can picture something different
from what they are accustomed to, the personnel
department may rise to a recognized place as
industry's school of personality.
And the reason why this personnel department is
attaining this high recognition is because the labor
problem has ceased to be a problem merely of the
demand and supply of labor. The personnel depart-
ment is not the employment department. It is not
the department of hiring and firing. It is the
department that deals with every human relation
within and without the establishment. It is the depart-
ment of industrial goodwill. It is the department
of justice as well as the department of health and
efficiency. It is the department of personality.
Raised to its proper place of equality with other
departments it is the department that guides the
entire establishment in the administration of justice,
industrial welfare, and service to the nation
166 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
With such an exalted position its motto for its own
guidance may well become that same "due process
of law7' which guides the judicial branch of govern-
ment under the American Constitution. No citizen
may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. But he may be deprived with
due process of law. No worker may be deprived of
his job, which is labor's life, liberty and property,
without due process of law. Due process signifies
investigation of all the facts in the case and due weight
given to each fact before decision is made. Inves-
tigation signifies the right to a hearing in order
that all the facts may be known. Due weight signi-
fies that the conflicting facts in the case shall be
weighed, and each shall be given its just weight and
importance in making up the final decision.
No single case is like any other, and no establish-
ment is like any other establishment. The facts are
always different and must therefore be weighed.
But they are always weighed according to the theory
and purpose entertained by him who weighs them.
If the judge or employment manager looks upon
labor as a commodity, then he weighs the facts
according to the theory of demand and supply. If he
looks upon labor as a machine he gives weight to the
facts that get maximum output from the individual.
If he entertains the goodwill theory then the facts
that promote goodwill are looked for and get a proper
emphasis in his mind. If he sees in labor the great
foundation of national welfare and national integrity
then the facts that promote patriotism get due weight
in his mind. If he finds a place in his heart for the
notions of solidarity, partnership, and democracy
PERSONALITY 167
of capital and labor, then the facts that lead in that
direction get larger emphasis and are seriously investi-
gated and found.
Only the foolish, the ignorant, the biased or th<«
arbitrary man ties himself up to a single theory.
Every theory has its proper place as an instrument
in weighing the facts. It is this that is due procew
of law. This is investigation of all the facts and due
weight given to each.
And it is this that gives to personality its highest
attribute — ' ' reasonableness. ' ' The employment mana-
ger, the scientific manager, the welfare worker, the
foreman, the superintendent, any or all of the employ-
er's representatives, may have all of the technical
qualities needed, but if he does not have reasonableness
he fails. And reasonableness can be cultivated in
the personnel department, like any other quality.
It is just ordinary common sense raised to the level
of a science. It is more than scientific management,
it is scientific justice. It is more than personnel,
it is personality. It is ability, not only to see all the
facts but to hunt for them and find them. It is
capacity to give every man a hearing; capacity to
distinguish the true and the false; capacity to dis-
tinguish the essential and the non-essential; capacity
to inspire confidence by reason of sincerity and open-
mindedness; above all, it is capacity to be guided by
that grand purpose of promoting public welfare that
should guide all industry and that gives to industry
a noble place in the nation's life.
XVI
DEPRESSION
A curve showing the movement of prices during the
nineteenth century is a picture of cycles of prosperity
and depression.1 Wholesale prices are employer's
prices. While wholesale prices are moving upward,
profits are increasing.
Retail prices are the cost of living. Retail prices
lag five or six months behind wholesale prices and
do not rise as high or fall as low as wholesale prices.2
The rise in employer's prices and profits increases
the demand for labor. The unemployed are set to
work, and those already employed get more work.
Without an increase in wages, the earnings of labor
on the whole are increased. Finally, the wages begin
to rise with the rise in retail prices, or cost of living,
and consequently earnings increase under the two-
fold influence of higher rates of wages and more work.
The downward movement is the reverse. Retail
prices and wages lag several months behind the fall in
wholesale prices. Profits decline, laborers are laid off
or put on short time, and, while the rates of wages
remain relatively high, unemployment or slack em-
ployment reduces the earnings of labor.
For a hundred years this wave has been moving up
and down across all the nations that have been bound
1 Figure I.
8 Figure II.
168
DEPRESSION
109
170
INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
Bog 8 8 § § g § g
Q CD «* »-« •-« H t-l H ,-IH
55
§ s
DEPRESSION 171
together by transportation and commerce. The curve
of prices and wages for America is substantially
the curve for Europe. And in all countries it has
had its reflection in labor movements and politics.
During the rise in prices and profits labor becomes
aggressive. Labor unions are organized, short and
successful strikes multiply, wages are advanced with-
out strikes. During the fall in prices labor unions
are less aggressive, strikes on a falling market are less
successful, and laborers turn to politics, protective
tariffs, socialism, panaceas or even revolution. The
long depression from 1837 to 1848 was the period of
Chartism in England; socialism, anarchism, revolution
in Europe; protective tariff and humanitarian reforms
in America. The prosperity that began in 1850
was the beginning of modern trade unionism in
England and America and the restoration of monarchy
in Europe. The Civil War period was one of pros-
perity and labor organization in America and Europe,
followed by the long depression, until 1879, with its
greenbackism, anarchism, socialism, and the decline
of trade unionism. The recovery after 1880 and the
ups and downs since that time are reflected in the
enlargement of trade unionism when labor has been
in demand, and political and socialistic panaceas
when unemployed.1
The wave climbed another summit in the midst of
the great war — an artificial height raised up by the
demands of governments and the substitution of
credit for money. Yet, unlike former periods, prices,
profits, wages and strikes were controlled and supplies
1 Figure III. See also Commons and Associates, History of Labor
in the United States.
172
INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
173
were rationed by the governments. Even a League of
Nations was created with not only its army but also
its international board of food controllers and it-
centralized boards of control over the world's indus-
tries, finance and shipping.
With the break-up of this national and international
control, the world again faces a period of deprc-
while competitive prices and wages are again seeking
their lower levels. Notwithstanding the destruction
of war, labor reached a high level of wages and earn-
ings in terms of money, on both sides of the battle
line, unknown in time of peace. With these high
prices and wages employers cannot be expected to
shift from war to peace while they are uncertain as
to the future decline of prices and wages.
The World War silenced for a time the contest of
capital and labor. Employers submitted to regula-
tions designed to eliminate profits by means of cost
contracts and excess taxes. Organized labor yielded
the right to strike in view of governmental regulation
of wages, hours and conditions of employment. Patri-
otism united capital and labor. But with the return
of peace and depression, this tie of patriotism is
loosened.
At the same time, organized labor in all lands
reached a political influence unknown hitherto. Its
leaders were admitted to a share along with capital-
ists in the governmental control of industry. While
they yielded the right to strike, they gained a voice
in the regulation of prices, profits and wages. No
previous war or previous prosperity offers a parallel.
Yet, just as in previous periods, outside the ranks
of organized labor, certain interests that are quies-
174 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
cent in time of prosperity come forth when aggressive
labor is weakened by depression and unemployment.
At the one extreme are those business interests which
since the Civil War have controlled American industry,
again looking forward to a return of then* uncontrolled
liberty in home affairs but also looking forward to a
new power and a new assistance of government in
enlarging foreign markets and foreign investments.
For them, the period of depression serves to weaken
the power of organized labor in industry and govern-
ment and to strengthen then* own promises to labor
of a return of prosperity, if they have control.
At the other extreme are the class known in Europe
as the " intellectuals" — physicians, lawyers, profess-
ors, politicians, economists — the leaders in socialism,
anarchism, politics, and other promises to labor, who,
in times of depression and unemployment compete
successfully with the leaders of organized labor for
the support of labor.
Each period of depression and unemployment
for a hundred years has seen this rivalry of capital-
istic politicians and labor politicians for the support of
labor. In Europe it has been the contest over
socialism, anarchism, syndicalism, culminating in
the revolutions of 1848 and the reaction of 1850; or
the revolutions of 1917 and 1918. In America it has
been contests over protective tariffs, greenbackism,
silver, monopolies, and control of the courts. The labor
politicians offer to labor political power over capital;
the capitalistic politicians offer employment and
wages.
Hitherto, in no period of depression, either in
Europe or America, have organized workers and or-
DEPRESSION 175
ganized employers joined together on a large scale
to eliminate the intellectuals and the politicians and
to tide over the depression by their own self-governing
arrangements. Perhaps it is too much to expect,
notwithstanding the evident advantages that might
be gained. While the control remains merely a con-
test for power, each takes advantage of all the agencies
that augment its power at the expense of the other.
In times of prosperity organized labor gets the upper
hand; in times of depression, organized employers.
But the Great War revealed another motive, patri-
otism, that mitigates the struggle for power.
While the " intellectuals " or labor politicians might
have taken advantage of the situation to make labor
the supreme power, the leaders of organized labor
restrained their followers. For, supreme power in
the hands of labor means, not the supremacy of
labor, but supremacy of the labor politician. In
Russia it has not been the workingmen who rose to
power, but the " intellectuals " who made impossible
promises to labor. The " dictatorship of the pro-
letariat" became the dictatorship of labor politicians.
The leaders of organized labor, especially in Eng-
land and America, have a different training. They
have come up through the shop. They are "manu-
als," not " intellectuals." They have known what
it is to lose out when they strike for the impossible.
They are aggressive but practical. They realize,
for the most part, that laborers cannot govern the
nation if they cannot govern themselves. More
important to them than illusory or extravagant
gains in wages that may soon be lost, is the preserva-
tion of their union which preserves what they gain.
176 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
Like all good business men they demand more than
they expect to get. Their position is difficult. They
are between the demands of employers, the promises
of the intellectuals and politicians on the outside, and
their critics and rivals on the inside.
The outcome often depends on the attitude of the
employers, or rather of the representatives and leaders
whom the employers put forward as their spokesmen.
For they too speak through their leaders. If they
select leaders to represent them, lawyers, intellectuals,
and experts, whose only idea is power and the inalien-
able rights of the employer, then organized labor is
likely to discredit its own cautious leaders and put
forth others whose only argument is power and the
inalienable rights of labor.
I knew a great labor organization whose leaders
were able during a period of depression to get their
rank and file to accept successive reductions of wages.
But it was because the employers granted that indis-
pensable condition, the preservation of the union.
With the union preserved against discrimination and
victimization of its leaders and officers, it could, in
cooperation with the employers, distribute the hard-
ships of unemployment and reduced earnings among
all its members.
The situation here, as in all other industrial relations,
goes back to the question of personality, and that
final test of personality, reasonableness. Industry
creates personality by education and selection. The
outsider, the intellectual, the politician, can never
attain the level of reasonableness because he never
can know by experience all of the facts that must be
given due weight in reaching a plan of action.
DBPRB88ION IT:
When employers and employees understand each other
and are striving not only for power but for reasonable
solutions under the circumstances, they do not need
the outsider, however much they may rely upon him
in other matters. Only when they rest their final
appeal on force and power and inalienable rights, does
the outsider seem to have a place, and then his greatest
service to both is the elimination of himself as soon
as possible.
For the proper place of the " intellectual" or expert,
so-called, is that of the agent and not that of the prin-
cipal. The principals in industry are the associated
employers and the associated employees. The expert's
place is that of attorney, statistician, accountant,
economist, mediator, adviser, agent, in short, em-
ployee— of the principals. The principals determine
what shall be done, their agents execute it. The agent
becomes the expert because he is a specialist, and
that signifies that he knows only the details of a small
part of all the facts that must be weighed in reaching
a decision. If the principals abdicate, and government
by experts takes their place, the result is no less arbi-
trary and coercive than other forms of autocracy.
It may be " scientific/' so-called, but it conceals in the
name of science its ignorance of facts belonging to a
different science.
For no one person and no class of persons, however
expert, can truly represent in due proportion all of
the interests that clash and must be reconciled in
reaching a final decision. Only the interests them-
selves, that is, the principals, must decide.
For this reason the great captains of industry them-
selves must come forward and deal with organized
12
178 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
labor directly instead of leaving it to their agents.
The captains are the stockholders, bondholders,
investors, bankers, financiers. Modern capitalism
hides, as it were, in the background, and puts forward
its lawyers, its presidents of corporations, its general
managers, its lobbyists, its agents.
However expert and even fair-minded these agents
are, they have no discretion outside their limited field,
and they cannot take into account all of the facts,
both because they do not truly know them and be-
cause they have no authority to act on all the facts.
They must win out at once, in the narrow field as-
signed to them. They cannot take into account all
the facts in different fields. They cannot take fully
into account patriotism, national welfare, the ap-
proaching national and international solidarity of
labor, the remote future effects and reactions that
are likely to follow, because they have no authority
to do so. They may succeed in making capitalism
powerful at a time when labor is weak, but they may
undermine its foundations when labor is strong or
goes into politics. Only the principals themselves
can take into account all of these other considerations,
and they cannot weigh them if their only source of
information is their own agents and experts. When
Carnegie went on a long vacation the Homestead
strike occurred. Today a similar strike might pos-
sibly spread to the nation or world. Thirty years
ago, an individual capitalist might act by himself.
Today the associated capitalists of the nation and
even of the world cannot avoid either personal or
joint responsibility.
Neither can organized labor act through advocates,
DEPRESSION 179
retainers, lawyers, intellectuals, politicians. These
may, for the moment, win a glorious victory, but
they leave a sting. They do not personally suffer
the after effects, because they do not go back into
the shop to earn their living. Immediate and stun-
ning results are enough for them. The long look
ahead, the future daily bargainings and negotiations
in the shop, the preservation of the union in time of
depression, the give-and-take that maintains goodwill,
cannot weigh very heavily on them in the flush and
thrill of putting the employer in a hole and getting
the applause of labor.
On the continent of Europe the leaders of organized
labor are often from the professional classes. To
them, a remote future of socialism or syndicalism,
when labor shall be supreme, is more impressive than
getting along with the foremen or managers in the
shop tomorrow and next day. Such leaders can
advance themselves in politics or professional prac-
tice, and do it even more successfuly on account of
the unsettled grievances or the troubles that they
can stir up, in the shop. Their leadership is proof
either of the immaturity and ignorance of the workers
or of the failure of employers to deal directly with
their employees.
Much the same is true of labor leaders themselves
who have dropped the idea of returning to the shop to
earn their living and are looking forward to a life of
politics or insurance agency or professional practice.
They have ceased truly to represent labor, for it is not
a person's memory of the past that guides his acts
but his expectations of the future. Neither the
employer who has come up from the shop nor the
180 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
labor leader who does not expect to go back to the
shop can give due weight to the expectations of the
workers in the shop.
For this reason the labor leader who, as in England,
attempts to combine the two activities of member of
Parliament and leader of his union, eventually finds
that new leaders, directly out of the shop, are put
forward to assert the claims of the rank and file.
This is one of the reasons for the "shop steward"
movement previously mentioned,1 for the shop stew-
ards are but committees of shop workers. They are
the real principals for they are the workers themselves
who expect to return to work.
"In England, members of Parliament formerly
were not paid salaries from the public treasury and
the labor leaders in Parliament received their salaries
from their unions. This has been changed and they
no longer depend on their unions for their salaries.
In America, where the political salaries are paid by
the tax payers, the attempt to combine the position
of politician and labor leader in one man is not
practicable. When elected, the leader becomes in-
dependent of the workers and looks to other classes
for support in the elections."
For this and similar reasons the progress of democ-
racy is forcing the separation of government into two
branches, the industrial and the political.
This separation has been dimly recognized by the
socialists of Germany. In that country, socialism,
their political branch of the labor movement, arose
before unionism, the industrial branch. The two
have been kept separately organized, though the
* Above, p. 118.
hLI'HKSSION 181
separation has been largely on paper, because the
same individuals have retained leadership in each.
In Russia they have not been kept separate and
consequently when Russia was on the verge of adopt-
ing a political government that should represent all
classes, the combination of manual unionism and
intellectual socialism set aside the constitutional con-
vention called for that purpose, and proceeded to
operate both industry and government by means of
their sovyets, or associations of workingmen leaders
and non-workingmen " intellectuals. "
France, too, has not kept separate the political and
industrial branches, and the Confederation of Labor
has been both a political party and a national federa-
tion of labor unions.1
In England, both Parliament and trade unions had
been long in existence in their separate fields and when
the unions felt compelled, on account of hostile
court decisions, to go into politics, they elected a
number of their trade union leaders to Parliament
(1906) and these, with the political socialists and
later with the cooperative societies (1917), constituted
themselves the British Labor Party. It is this mixing
of the political and industrial activities that has begun
to force recognition of their incompatibility through
the shop steward movement just mentioned, and this
has received recognition in the notable proposals by
parliamentary committees and the Ministry of Recon-
struction. Shop committees which, without recog-
nition, had asserted themselves as a menace to British
industry, are to be recognized and given a definite
1 Estey. J. A., Revolutionary Syndicalism, p. 44.
182 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
standing in industry but not in politics.1 Over and
above these shop committees are the Industrial Coun-
cils for districts and the nation, to be encouraged
and established in every industry where the repre-
sentatives of employers and the industrial, but not
political, representatives of the workers shall deliber-
ate, shall agree on the larger policies and the mini-
mum standards which then shall be recommended for
adoption in the shops.
Where there are strong employers' associations and
strong labor unions, extending over the shops of the
kingdom, these recommendations are enforced without
appealing to Parliament for compulsory powers. But
where these organizations do not exist, then the so-
called minimum wage boards, already existing in the
sweat shop industries, are to be extended, with their
compulsory powers of fixing wages, hours and condi-
tions of labor.2 Presumably these compulsory pow-
ers once applied will be withdrawn, or fall in abeyance,
if the voluntary organizations arise with sufficient
influence to take their place.
Without stopping to consider further details or the
extent to which this program of reconstruction is
practicable in all industries, the main purpose is
evident. It is the creation, outside the parliamentary
and political government of Britain, of representative
industrial governments, as free as possible from the in-
terference of those whose main interests are intellectual,
professional, or political. If the plans succeed then
1 Above, p. 119.
* Monthly Review, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, May,
1918, pp. 59-61; September, 1918, pp. 53-58. Commons and
Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, pp. 167-196.
DEPRESSION 183
England will have opened up two fields for the two
different kinds of leaders and the two different kinds
of problems to be met.
In the United States the two great political parties
are organized and controlled like private corporal i
and important legislation is determined not so much
by members of Congress and the legislatures as by the
party organizations which control those members.
In matters of labor legislation, Congress is more a
forum where the members issue campaign speeches
to their constituents than the real law-making body.
On this account the legislative efforts of both capital-
ists and organized labor are directed more toward
influencing the party machine than toward electing
their leaders to Congress or the legislatures. This
secret influence of the lobbyists on both sides makes
it even more urgent in America than in other coun-
tries, that industrial government should be separated
from the political government, and that, if legislation
is necessary it should first be agreed upon by organized
employers and employees and then presented to the
legislatures for adoption without material change
through political influence.
The mine inspection and safety laws of the state of
Illinois were for many years the plaything of politics,
were unenforceable and loaded with " jokers.'1
Finally, when the coal operators' association and the
mine workers' union agreed on a code of safety, it
was presented to the legislature and enacted into an
enforceable and reasonable law. The workmen's
compensation and accident prevention laws of various
states have sometimes been drafted in this extra-
political manner. Under the Industrial Commission
184 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
laws of New York, Ohio and Wisconsin, this method of
industrial legislation is applied to all branches of
labor legislation.1
The temptation, of course, to break over and to use
political influence on behalf of either class is great,
but the most effective and workable legislation is
probably that in which the two sides in good faith
stand by their industrial government. The political
government then remains, as it should, the instrument
that protects the general interests of the public,
furnishes the statisticians and similar experts, the
mediators when employers and employees disagree,
and the club that raises backward employers to the
level of progressive ones.
This arrangement, of course, is impossible where
either side refuses to deal with the other, or where
one attempts to break down the organization of the
other or to violate good faith by resorting to its politi-
cal influence. It is then that the party politician,
the intellectual, the lawyer, the lobbyist, breaks into
and widens the gap between employer and employee.
In times of prosperity and patriotism this is less likely.
In times of depression and class struggle it is more
likely.
Neither is the arrangement widely practicable as
long as the main fight of organized labor is for the
right to exist. The decisions of the Supreme Court
in the Hitchman and other cases already referred to,
continue to lie across the road to this reasonable
1 See Commons, Labor and Administration, pp. 401-404; Commons
and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, pp. 430-443; Final
Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations (1915), pp. 359-
361.
DEPRESSION 185
goal. Not until they are reversed can labor unions
keep out of politics.
It is not worth while to talk of ideal solutions. ,
problem is one, not of ideals but of alternatives.
Ideals are usually the ideals of an individual or a
class. The socialistic ideal ends, as we have seen, in
the dictatorship of organized labor and the supremacy
of intellectuals. The capitalistic ideal ends in conq
and imperialism. The problems of depression, of
unemployment, of wages, hours of labor, conditions of
work, efficiency, competition, are problems of adjust-
ment and accommodation which must be met every
day. It is not a "program" or a "platform" or a
schedule of "inalienable rights" that bridges over
the periods of hardship and depression, but it is the
spirit of true democracy, which investigates, takes
into account all of the facts, gives due weight to each,
and works out, not an ideal, but a reasonable solution
day by day.
The foregoing refers mainly to the legislative
branch of government. We have already noted the
conditions that apply to the administrative branch.
It is here, far more than in legislation, that the daily
cooperation of capital and labor is worked out.
The Great War forced the nation to organize its
administrative machinery on this basis, in order to
increase the supply of munitions of war. The prob-
lems of peace and depression call for similar organiza-
tion. The Federal Employment Service, operated
nominally by government but actually by its advisory
boards of employers and employees, should be the
agency kept permanently in existence for dealing
with depression and unemployment as it had begun
186 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
to deal with prosperity and employment. The Labor
Policies Board, which during the war attempted to
bring together all of the agencies of government,
should become the really governing committee of
employer and employee authorized by and in aid of the
Department of Labor. The War Labor Board with
its adjustment of disputes and its regulation of wages,
hours and methods of payment, should become
the National Joint Conference of Capital and Labor.
In each of these agencies the circumstances of war
made it necessary to have somewhat compulsory
powers. Such powers are not needed in time of peace
except in minor particulars. The industrial govern-
ment of the nation must become mainly a voluntary
government, for its success in the long run will depend
not on power, but goodwill.
XVII
THE WORLD
Seventy years ago Karl Marx and his fellow social-
ists issued from London their Communist Manifesto.
Two great conclusions were proclaimed, pacifism and
internationalism. Both of these doctrines grew out of
what Marx interpreted to be the economic develop-
ment of history. Modern industry had grown up
since the invention of the steam engine. Capitalism
had spread beyond the bounds of a single nation.
Capitalists knew no country and sought investments
and markets in all parts of the world where profits
could be obtained.
On the other hand, labor had nothing to expect from
the governments or capitalists of Europe. The work-
ingmen of all nations must organize throughout all
nations. Because capital had become international,
labor organizations must become international.
And so, while Marx attacked both property and
government, he also held up to the workingmen a
grand ideal of the international brotherhood of labor.
Labor would ultimately, without any effort on its own
part but by the natural evolution of industry, come
into possession of the machinery of production. The
capitalists would disappear, and with them would
disappear nations.1
But there were certain forces which Karl Marx
underestimated. He underestimated the power of
patriotism. He might indeed disregard patriotism in
1 Communist Manifesto, Chas. Kerr and Company, Chicago.
187
188 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
1848, for at that time the countries of Europe were
split into small principalities, republics, and king-
doms. Italy had not yet attained unity. The
German Empire was fifteen years ahead. Austria
and Hungary were exploiting subject races. No
one could very well picture a spirit of patriotism
toward these principalities and oppressors.
But with the struggle in Italy which brought about
Italian unity, with the struggles in Germany which
founded the German Empire, more powerful than
class struggle or the international brotherhood of man
is the spirit of patriotism which binds together the
peoples of a nation regardless of classes, and thus
builds up what we have seen in our own nation since
1865 — the spirit of nationality.
We have seen the socialists of a nation which, more
than any other, had adopted socialism, the most
powerful socialistic body in the world, the most ortho-
dox in the Marxian doctrine, abandon their principles
of internationalism and join with the capitalists of
then- own country to exploit the workingmen of the
rest of the world. We have seen this spirit of patriot-
ism degraded beneath the high principles of interna-
tional brotherhood which Karl Marx had set before
the workingmen of the world. Patriotism, a noble
principle, recognized in all nations as something that
should bring forward a better future for the world,
became the very foundation of a cruel struggle for
world empire and a denial of the brotherhood of labor.
Another thing that Karl Marx underestimated was
trade unionism. In 1848 the world had just passed
through, or was closing up, a period of depression in
business. After the panic of 1837 the workingman's
Till: \VURLD 189
condition throughout Europe and America had been
growing steadily worse. It was a long period of
depression, of unemployment, of poverty and misery.
On the basis of that experience of ten years, Karl
Marx laid down the universal law that the progress of
capitalism meant the pauperization of labor. So far
as he had the facts up to date he was correct. Through-
out the entire world, in Europe and in America,
had grown up many varieties of anarchistic and
socialistic doctrines. From that narrow foundation
of history Karl Marx predicted a future in which the
workingman would grow continually worse in his
poverty, until ultimately his condition would become
so bad, and capitalism itself would so completely have
destroyed its own power, that the workingman would
by some magic come into possession of those things
which capitalism had created.
But what has happened since that time? It is only
since 1850 that modern trade unionism has acquired
any particular power. Modern labor organization
began in England in the decade of the fifties and in
America in the same decade, spreading afterward to
Germany, France, and the world. This movement of
trade unionism has been, not a passive submission of
labor to economic evolution, but a struggle of labor to
better its condition day by day. Karl Marx could not
predict what trade unionism would accomplish. He
could not see that labor, through its own organization,
might ultimately be in a position to improve the con-
ditions of labor, to raise wages, to shorten working
hours.1
1 See Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United
States, New York, 1918.
190 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
Neither does trade unionism offer an ideal solution
for the remote future. It has no " program, " which
means revolution. It has only the every-day problem
of bettering the condition of labor under the existing
capitalistic government. If that government is impe-
rialistic then trade unionism shares the fruits of impe-
rialism. In Germany we have seen the triumph of
trade unionism rather than the triumph of socialism.
We have seen labor unite with the capitalists to reduce
the workingmen and farmers of Russia to the status
of vassals for the sake of higher wages for German
labor and higher profits for German capital.
Another thing which Karl Marx overlooked was the
possibility of labor legislation. When the Communist
Manifesto was written in 1848 there was but one
nation which had enacted any protective legislation on
behalf of the working people. Only one year before
the Manifesto was written, England, after many years
of agitation, put on her statute books the first law in
the history of the world requiring that the labor of
women in industries be reduced to ten hours a day.
This first example of labor legislation had occurred
so shortly before the date of the Communist Manifesto
that its consequences could not be estimated. But
since that time in all modern countries a great social
movement has brought about labor legislation in all
forms; the protection of women and children, mini-
mum wages, industrial education. All of these agen-
cies have come forward to improve the condition of
labor, and it was Germany again which profited most
and first by this modern movement for such legislation.
Germany, under Prince Bismarck, who had brought
about German unity, now turned upon the socialists
/•///•; WOHLb 101
in order to drive them out of Germany. In 1878 waa
enacted the famous anti-socialist law which prohibited
all organizations of labor and all agitation and propa-
ganda of socialistic doctrine. That law stood on the
statute books of Germany until 1890 — twelve years.
But it was not anti-labor legislation, it was pro-
labor legislation that saved Germany. Immediately
after the enactment of the anti-socialist law, Bismarck
proceeded to introduce in Germany the measures for
workmen's compensation, sickness insurance, health
and invalidity insurance, old-age pensions— that nota-
ble series of indemnities for labor against the insecurity
of accident, sickness, and misfortune.
Bismarck's policy was designed to undermine the
influence of socialism, to win the workingmen away
from the socialist movement and attach them to the
government.
Following this came that other forward step in
Germany, industrial and vocational education, in
pursuance of which German employers consented that
their workmen under the age of eighteen should be
allowed as much as one day a week, on pay, to devote
to an education in the trade or occupation in which
they were engaged.
Thus Germany cemented the labor element to the
Empire, and when, in 1914, the German government
called upon the socialist leaders to go out with their
propaganda into other nations and to break down the
morale of Italy, France, and Russia, the argument
which these leaders put forward to justify themselves
was the claim that social legislation in Germany had
done more for German workingmen than had been done
by any other nation for its workingmen. England and
192 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
France entered upon this class of legislation long after
Germany. Other nations have been twenty or twenty-
five years behind Germany in perceiving the national
importance of social and labor legislation.
We in the United States have been more backward
in this respect than any other great industrial nation,
partly because we have had an unlimited supply of
immigrants from European countries. Our employers
have not felt the need of conservation of labor because
labor was plentiful. The laborers who needed to be
conserved were very few, because they already were
more prosperous than in Germany or England. And
so employers have gone on in a contented way,
believing that the labor supply of the nation was
unlimited. Relying upon our great natural resources
and our inventive genius they have thought that we
could stand up as a nation without necessarily pro-
tecting our laboring people.
But now we and all the nations perceive, as never
before, that the next stage in industrial progress is
not that economic revolution which Karl Marx
predicted, it is not even development in machinery
and tools, but it is the increased production and
increased wealth of the world which are now dependent
upon the health, intelligence, goodwill of labor.
That nation which is foremost in giving heed to the
health and housing, the vocational education, secu-
rity and wages of its working people will be the
nation which will survive even in times of peace.
How much greater the need in war time of a strong,
healthy, and intelligent working people !
Another thing that Karl Marx overlooked was the
political power of capitalism. According to all that
THE WORLD 193
he could see at that time, the progress of industry
consisted in the big capitalists driving the small
capitalists out of business and absorbing the bu.<in«-.--.
In the final outcome it would naturally follow that a
few big capitalists would own all the industries, and
then it would be a very easy matter for the expropri-
ated wage-earners simply to take possession.
But he did not know the possibilities of the modern
corporation. There were at that time very few
corporations in existence. The modern corporation
has diffused capitalism throughout large masses of
people by building up a system of stocks and bonds, of
savings banks and insurance companies, and millions
of people who, under the old Marxian theory, would
have been expropriated, have become themselves
members of the propertied and capitalist class.
The political power of capitalism was demonstrated
in Germany more fully than anywhere else in the
world. For no other nation had gone to the limit
reached by Germany in subsidizing its exporters and
importers, in subsidizing banks that had their ramifi-
cations throughout the world, in subsidizing syndicates
of all kinds which enabled the German capitalist to
spread his markets throughout the world, in pur-
chasing railroads, building canals, and giving manu-
facturers differential advantages in order that they
might drive competitors from other markets. The
German government allied itself with capitalists,
and made a science of " dumping " — dumping their
products by underselling manufacturers of other
countries, and recouping the losses from taxes on the
German people. Having destroyed competitors in
foreign countries, they could perhaps get control of
13
194 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
those markets, and establish German monopoly.
This tremendous power of modern business, which
showed its largest fruit in the capitalistic socialism of
the German Empire, is something that Karl Marx
did not foresee.
These are the grand national and social forces which
have come into existence since the time of the Com-
munist Manifesto, and have nullified what otherwise
might have been accurate predictions of that Manifesto.
For Karl Marx had based his calculations upon the
purely mechanical, economic evolution of machinery,
of tools, of markets, of supply and demand. He had
not weighed these spiritual and psychological forces
which have revolutionized the modern world. He had
not seen beneath the economic forces. He had not
seen the power of patriotism by virtue of which the
divers classes of these different nations would finally
unite. He had not seen the movement of trade
unionism through which laborers learned to organize,
learned self-control, learned to negotiate with em-
ployers, learned that they need not fall back into the
pauper condition that Marx predicted, but that by
negotiation, by arbitration, they might make an
agreement with the capitalists, that they might come
to terms with the capitalists and divide the product
between them.
The spirit of trade unionism, instead of being that
of class struggle, is the spirit of partnership. The
trade union movement looks upon itself, not as the
irreconcilable opponent of capitalism, but as a mem-
ber of the family. Being a member of the family it is
entitled to have a row with the head of the family, and
to live apart for a time, but it has not yet taken out a
THE WORLD 195
divorce. Trade unionists do not presume, as Karl
Marx did, that the members of the family can do
without the head of the family. Trade unionism is
based upon that principle of partnership which we see
in a different way in the home. Consequently here
we have a spiritual movement which has not attacked
family, religion, and property, as Karl Marx had done,
but has organized itself to get a larger share of profits
by negotiation, by agreement, by strikes.
In America, when the war came on, the socialists
and their anarchistic partners, the Industrial Workers
of the World, promptly took the side of Karl Marx
with his theory of internationalism and were willing to
let Germany win. The trade unions just as promptly
took the side of America. Both had similar grievances
and similar aims. Both wanted more wages and
shorter hours of labor and better conditions of labor.
Both were organized to fight the capitalists.
But there was a world of difference. Nearly 3,000-
000 wage-earners were organized in trade unions.
Their employers recognized them and dealt with
their representatives. They had already established
representative democracy. These 3,000,000 wage-
earners already knew that they were a part of the
great American democracy. They knew that they
had an equal voice and equal power with capitalism.
The socialists, the Industrial Workers of the World,
the American Bolsheviki, hated American capitalism
and were willing to see it crushed by German capi-
talism. To them all capitalism was but industrial
autocracy and they saw no difference between American
and German autocracy. They held that capitalism
the world over must be destroyed and labor must
196 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
become the autocrat. They would have poisoned our
minds with hatred and would have broken down our
spirit as they did in Russia and nearly did in Italy.
But the trade union movement saved us. The
trade unionists had their grievances against capital-
ists. They had gone through many bitter fights and
were preparing for more. Not all capitalists would
recognize them or meet their committees. In fact,
only a minority of the employers of the country had
dealings with organized laborers. But it was that
minority that saved us. If they had been like the
majority of employers then there would have been no
organized labor ready to resist and overcome the
socialists, the I.W.W. and the other Bolsheviks in our
midst. Trade unionism justified itself and, next to
our armies going to France, the greatest asset of
America has been our trade union movement, and the
greatest protection of American capitalism has been
the capitalists who dealt with trade unions.
Karl Marx also overlooked that other spiritual
force, that humanitarian spirit which might look upon
the hardships of labor as something that should be
immediately cured; that spirit which has led to the
marvellous development of social legislation in which
many employers have taken the lead. It has been the
example of progressive employers for a hundred years
that has shown what could be done. Then the in-
fluence of politics has come forward to make universal
among employers that which progressive capitalists
had done voluntarily in their own factories. This
humanitarianism of capital, this spiritual force which
can look forward, in a humanitarian as well as in a
business way, to the improved condition of the work-
nn: \\<>ULD 197
ing population, this spiritual and social principle, he
did not recognize.
And now we in this country, as in all other countries,
are in a position to learn the lesson of history of the
past seventy years. We can free ourselves entirely
from the idea that economic forces, that supply and
demand alone, are to determine the destiny of this
nation or any other nation. That destiny will be )
determined by the spiritual forces, the forces of soli-
darity, the forces of cooperation, the forces of partner-
ship on the one hand and struggle on the other. It is
that nation which can look forward and adjust itself
to these spiritual forces, which can properly place
before its workingmen the inducements of a united
nation, a prosperous country, and fair treatment of its
own people and of foreign peoples; it is the nation %
which can appeal to goodwill instead of to the coercive I
power of the army, at home and abroad; it is the nation |
which realizes these great spiritual forces and rids
itself of purely economic and material ideals, that will
in the long run win.
No nation hereafter, not even America, can live to
itself alone. America has come out of the war the one
great industrial power of the world. Other nations
are bankrupt. America is their creditor. America
has the capital, the resources, the shipping, the man-
power. America may use its power as Germany tried
to do. It may subsidize its capitalists and trusts and
make a science of dumping. It may make other
nations eventually its enemies. Or it may submit its
excessive power to be regulated in partnership and
equality with other free nations. The struggles of the
future are industrial. The world may be governed
198 INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL
by supply and demand, and America will win by
superior control over supply. Or the world may be
governed in partnership and America will take an
equal chance of winning in the race of international
goodwill.
777 A' WORLD
REFERENCES
COMMONS, J. R., Labor and Admini.st ration, New York, (1013).
COMMONS AND ANDREWS, Principles of Labor Legislation, New York,
(1916).
COMMONS AND ASSOCIATES, History of Labor in the United State*,
2 vol., New York, (1918).
DEWET, JOHN, Democracy and Education, New York, (1917).
ELY, R. T.. World War and Leadership in a Democracy, New York,
(1918).
ESTEY, J. A., Revolutionary Syndicalism in France, London, (1913).
GROAT, G. G., Organized Labor in America, New York, (1916).
HILQUIT, MORRIS AND RYAN, JOHN A., Socialism, Promise or Menace,
New York, (1917).
HOXIE, R. F., Scientific Management and Labor, New York, (1915).
HOXIE, R. F., Trade Unionism in the United States, New York,
(1917).
KELLY, R. W., Hiring the Worker, New York, (1918).
LESCOHIER, D. D., The Labor Market, New York, (1919).
Profit Sharing in the United States, Bulletin 208, U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, (1916).
RUBINOW, I. M., Standards of Health Insurance, New York, (1916).
SCHNEIDER, HERMAN, Education for Industrial Workers, New York,
(1915).
SLIGHTER, SUMNER, The Turnover of Factory Labor, New York,
(1919).
Social Insurance, Proceedings of the Conference on, Bulletin 212,
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, (1917).
TAYLOR, FREDERICK W., The Principles of Scientific Management,
New York, (1911).
WEBB, S. & B., The History of Trade Unionism, New York, (1911).
Periodicals
AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, Washington, D. C.
MONTHLY REVIEW, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT, New York.
INDEX
Accidents, cause of, 62; cost of, 50, 53, 56, 59, 60; group responai
for, 54, 55, 67, 191; and industrial insurance, 83, 89; laws for, 183;
as part of industry, 56, 92, 153; prevention of, 59, 121, 152, 153;
public interest in, 53, 55, 162.
Adair v. United States, see Law cases.
Aliens, 126.
America, place in world of, 197, 198; Revolution, 127. See also
Labor; United States.
American Association for Labor Legislation, 97n.
American Federation of Labor, 39, 43n; authority of, 116, 117;
benefits in, 83; membership of, 172; and National War Labor
Board, 41, 119; Proceedings, 76n, 83n, 134n, 172n; cost of strikes
in, 83; unemployment in, 76.
American Federationist, 70n.
American Labor Legislation Review, 82n.
American Labor Mission, 130.
American Statistical Association, Quarterly Publications of, 169n.
Americanization, 127-131, 163.
Anarchism, 30, 39, 102, 143, 189; in America, 195; and democracy,
37, 43, 46, 185; in Europe, 171, 174.
Annalist, 170n, 172n.
Apprenticeship, 16, 121, 136, 151, 154, 160; and education, 131-133,
135, 136; in Wisconsin, 131, 132. See also Continuation schools;
Education.
Arbitration, board of. See Shop committees.
Arizona, alien law in, 126.
Arts and crafts, 144, 145.
Associations, of capital, 47, 48, 113-117, 125, 131, 178, 182; of labor,
47, 48, 113-115, 117, 125, 179, 182. See also Capitalism ; Partner-
ship; Trade unionism.
Austria, 188. See also Europe.
Autocracy, capitalism as, 195; and democracy, 40, 108; in 18th and
19th centuries, 127; in 20th century, 127, 128; theory of, 63.
201
202 INDEX
B
Baker's case, see Law cases.
Baldwin, F. Spencer, 91n.
Bargaining power, 22-24, 78; collective, 118, 119, 121, 165; equality
of, 35, 47; inequality of, 32-34, 46; new spirit of, 114; psychology
of, 69.
Base rate, 11, 12.
Basic hour day, 67, 69-71.
Benefits, class, 30, 33; funeral, 83, 84, 88, 95; private, 30, 33; public,
30, 32, 33, 41, 45; sick, 83, 93-96, 98-100; workers', 32, 88. See
also Insurance.
Beveridge, W. BL, Unemployment, 75n.
Bismarck, Prince, 190, 191.
Bolsheviki, 195, 196.
Bonus rate, 10-13; system, 103, 104, 148, 158, 159.
Brandeis, Louis, 35.
British Labor Party, 181.
Bureaucracy, 41, 80, 81, 139.
Business, education in, 140-142; regularization of, 66, 67; risks in, 51,
52, 54-56.
Capitalism, as autocracy, 195; disappearance of, 187, 189; in Germany,
193, 194; and goodwill, 73, 178; ideal of, 185; in industry, 187,
192, 193; politicians under, 174, 175; problem of, 140; spread of,
187, 193; and unionism, 45, 48, 81, 113, 194, 196. See also
Associations.
Carnegie, Andrew, 163, 178.
Casualty Actuarial and Statistical Society, 84n.
Chandler, W. L., 95n.
Character, 33.
Chartism, 171.
Chilicothe (Ohio) cantonment, 76, 77.
Citizenship, foundation of, 132; rights and duties of, 127-129.
Civil service, and employment office system, 79, 80.
Civil War, 127, 171, 174.
Class struggle, 24, 30, 47, 58, 175, 188, 197; becomes harmony, 27, 90,
171, 194; inevitable, 38, 39, 197; reconcilable, 39, 80, 89; and
separation of government, 184.
Cleveland, associated employers of, 131.
Closed shop, 7, 44, 45.
INDEX 203
Coercion, 34, 45, 143, 140, 150, ir.l, 197.
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, 111, 112n.
Colorado, legislature of, 31; State Industrial Commission of, 112;
Suprrme Court of, 32.
Commission on Industrial Relations, final report of, 82n, 184n.
Committee on Public Information, 43n.
Commodity theory of labor, 1-6, 17, 25, 63, 166, 192, 197.
Common law, 49, 54, 55.
Commons, J. R., Labor and Administration, 40n, 14 In, 184n; Propor-
tional Representation, 40n; Trade Unionism and Labor Problem*,
8n, lOn, 69n.
Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, 36n, 70n, 82n,
97n, 182n, 184n.
Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United States, 116n,
169n, 171n, 189n.
Communist Manifesto, 187, 187n, 190, 194.
Compensation, workmen's, 54, 55, 57, 59, 101, 162, 183; in Germany,
191; and insurance, 86, 89, 90; in New York, 55; in Wisconsin,
49-51.
Competition, 18, 19, 24, 25, 27, 29, 68, 69, 103, 115, 185; cut-throat,
28, 57, 90, 101; and goodwill, 26, 27, 102, 133; kinds of, 28, 57,
193.
Congress, see United States.
Conservation, of resources, 128-130, 192.
Continuation schools, 132-141. See also Apprenticeship; Education.
Coppage v. Kansas, see Law cases.
Day work, and piece work, 7, 8.
Declaration of Independence, 126.
Demand and supply, law of, 17, 33, 56, 65, 76, 128, 129, 165, 166, 197;
theory of labor, see Commodity theory of labor. See also
Labor; Prices; Wages.
Democracy, and anarchism, 37, 43, 46, 185; and autocracy, 40, 108;
basis of, 113; conservative, 122, 123; education in, 108, 109, 111-
113, 130; in education, see Education; and efficiency, 42, 79, 80;
in industry, 39, 40-43, 46-48, 51, 59, 79, 80, 111, 117, 1'J-
136, 139, 147, 166, 180, 195; and personality, 152; in politics, 30,
40, 139, 180; problem of, 129, 130; and socialism, 38, 43, 46, 185;
spirit of, 121, 124, 125, 185; and World War, 127, 128.
Partnership.
204 INDEX
Depression, 168-186; after 1837, 31, 171, 188, 189; after 1861, 171;
after 1918, 173, 174; cycles of, 66, 71, 72, 168; and government,
184, 186; labor's share in, 68, 70, 87, 174, 176; and labor turnover,
25.
Detroit, associated employers of, 131.
Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, 139n, 141n.
Dicey, Law and Opinion in England, 37n.
Disability, 85, 86, 88-90, 95, 98, 100, 104, 191. See also Insurance.
Discipline, in shop, 106, 107, 122.
Division of labor, 2, 16, 144, 145, 154.
"Due process of Law," 35, 55, 109, 125, 165, 167.
Duffy, Thomas J., 91n.
"Dumping," 193, 197.
Duties, see Rights and duties.
E
Earnings, see Wages.
Education, democracy in, 136, 139; in democracy, see Democracy;
department in industry, 155, 156; duties of, 128-131, 139, 140;
in public schools, 132, 136, 138.
vocational, 132-134, 138-140, 142, 149, 150, 153-155, 190, 192;
and apprenticeship, 131-133, 135, 136; characteristics of, 136,
137, 140, 141; continuation schools, 132-141; control of, 134-136,
138, 139, 142; in England, 137, 138; Federal Board for, 135n;
Federal Law, 135, 138; in Germany, 135, 137, 138, 191 ; and school
teacher, 134, 139, 156. See also Labor; Smith-Hughes Act;
Vestibule school.
Efficiency, in industry, 72, 102, 103, 124, 140, 156, 165, 185.
"Emergency squadron," 67.
Employers, associations of, 47, 48, 113-116, 125, 131, 178, 182; as
educators, 13 1-1 34; and hours of labor, 129, 130; as learners, 109;
as pioneers, 29.
Employment, department, see Labor department,
managers, 1, 2, 88, 152, 160, 164, 166, 167; Association of Boston,
17; Conference, Proceedings of, 158n.
offices, 74, 75; federal system of, 79, 81, 185; in Ohio, 76, 77; private,
5, 77, 78, 81, 82; public, 78-81, 146; sidewalk, 2.
regularization of, 65-67, 71, 72, 81; security of, 65-73; Service
Bulletin, 82n. See also Labor.
Engineer's theory of labor, see Machinery theory.
England, Chartism in, 171; Carton Foundation of, 137n; labor in, 114,
180, 181; Labor Party in, 181 ; legislation in, 117, 117n, 190, 192;
20.1
Parliament in, 180-182; reconstruction in, 181-183; shop com-
mittees in, 118, 119, 181, 182; and slavery, 34; and vocational
education, 137, 138; in World War, 117, 117n, 118, 125, 175, 17fl.
English language, in industry, 131, 137; value of, 126; in Wisconsin
schools, 127.
Establishment funds, 85, 87, 91, 100. See also Insurance
Estey, J. A., Revolutionary Syndicalism, 18 In.
Europe, anarchism in, 171, 174; labor in, 174, 175, 179, 187; prices and
wages in, 171; re volutions in, 174, 188, 189; socialism in, 171, 174;
in World War, 174, 175. See also Austria; France; Germany;
Hungary; Italy.
Facts and theories, 62-64, 71, 72, 166, 167, 176, 178, 180, 185.
Federal Trade Commission, 28.
Filene, E. A., 113n.
First aid, 154.
Fisher, Irving, 92n.
Food, control of, 173.
Ford Motor Company, 18.
France, Confederation of Labor of, 181 ; government in, 181 ; Revolu-
tion, 37, 127; in World War, 125, 191, 192. See also Europe.
Freund, E., Standards of American Legislation, 47n, 56n.
Fuel Administration, 42.
Germany, anti-socialist law of, 191; capitalism in, 193, 194; govern-
ment in, 180; and labor legislation, 190-192; policy of, 193, 197;
struggles in, 188, 190; trade unionism in, 180, 189, 190; vocational
education in, 135, 137, 138, 191; in World War, 125, 131, 191,
192, 195, 197. See also Europe.
Gide and Rist, History of Economic Doctrines, 56n.
Gilds, 15, 16.
Goodwill, advance in, 89, 148; and bargaining power, 19, 24, 26, 110,
115; and capitalism, 73, 178; and class harmony, 27, 28, 186;
commercial, 25, 26, 28, 66; competitive persuasion, 24, 45, 46, 74,
88, 115, 145, 146; incorporation, 20, 151, 153, 154, 156, 160, 186,
192, 197; as cost, 17, 96; credit, 26; as good reputation, 18, 103;
in government, 186; importance of, 28, 65, 161; industrial, 19,
26, 45, 63, 65, 67, 75, 109, 146, 148, 160, 165; from insurance, 87,
89; as intangible asset, 25, 26, 95, 96; international, 197, 198; and
206 INDEX
legislation, 29, 53, 67, 125, 162; V esprit de corps, 20, 96; and
liberty, 24; and loyalty, 148-150, 156; nature of, 19, 26, 53, 149,
192; as personality, 20, 151-156; as reciprocity, 19, 27, 113, 179;
and safety, 60, 102; scientific, 18, 20, 25, 73; and security, 73;
substitutes for, 24, 162; theory of labor, 17-27, 63, 65, 166; value
of, 20, 21, 25, 26, 53, 74.
Government, attacked, 187; goodwill in, 186; labor legislation and,
123, 183, 184; separation of, 180, 182-185.
Greenbackism, 171, 174.
Halsey, F. S., 8, 9, lOn, 11, 13.
Hard times, see Depression.
Harmony of interests, 10, 28, 39, 41-43, 51, 58, 105.
Hart, Shaffner and Marx Labor Agreement, 109n.
Health, of army, 92, 104, 105; and demand and supply law, 129; in-
vestigations, 35, 92; as public purpose, 32, 33, 35, 93-97, 101, 102,
105, 129, 152, 161, 165, 192; value of, 154, 192. See also Insur-
ance; Labor.
Hiring and firing, 2, 23, 48, 65, 76, 107, 143, 145, 149, 161.
Hitchman Coal and Coke Company v. John Mitchell, see Law cases.
Holden v. Hardy, see Law cases.
Homestead strike, 178.
Hoover, Herbert, 39, 41.
Hours of labor, of bakers, 33; in basic hour day, 67, 69-71 ; control of,
129, 130, 182; and disability, 103; first legislation, 190; of immi-
grants, 128; in mines and smelters, 32; in past, 151; and piece
rates, 70; Robert Owen and, 29; seasonal, 67-71, 185; and trade
unionism, 70, 71, 173, 189, 195; in Wisconsin, 29.
Hoxie, R. F., 21, 21n, 157.
Hungary, 188. See also Europe.
Illinois, safety laws of, 183.
Illwill, 52, 81, 96.
Immigrant labor, 1-4, 108, 127, 128, 130, 192. See also Labor.
Individualism, 30, 37, 102.
Industrial Management, 95n.
Industrial Workers of the World, 195, 196.
Industry, capitalism in, 187, 192, 193; control of, 173, 174; fluctua-
tions in, 71, 72; future of, 140, 141; goodwill in, 19, 26, 45, 63, 65,
67, 75, 109, 146, 148, 160, 165; interest in, 13&-141, 143-150,
INDEX 207
164-168, 160; loyalty in, 125, 143-160, 166, 160; psychology in,
11, 16, 140, 148, 152; stagnation in, 8; unreal in, 1, 2, 168.
Inglis, Alexander, Principles of Secondary Education, 138n, 139n.
Insurance, accident, 64, 55, 57, 59, 98, 121, 122; group, 84-91, 98, 100;
health, 92, 94, 96-105, 121, 122, 191; industrial, 83, 84; sic knew,
85, 86, 191; and workmen's compensation, 86, 89, 90; YearBook,
83n. See also Benefits ; Disability ; Establishment funds ; Health ;
Pensions, old age; Sickness.
Inter- Mountain Educator, 139n.
Internationalism, 187, 188, 195.
Italy, 188; in World War, 191, 196. See also Europe.
Ives v. South Buffalo Railroad Company, tee Law caaes.
Journal of Political Economy, 42n.
Judicial opinion, 31, 34-36, 44-48, 184.
Labor, American and European, 31; Commissioner of, report, 83n;
contract, 22-24, 26, 27, 45, 46, 77, 159; department, 106, 107, 109,
157, 158, 160, 162, 164, 165; division of, 2, 16, 144, 145, 154; as
force, 35, 129; investigation of, 35; market, 1, 2, 5, 27, 66, 74, 76-
78, 89, 101; Policies Board, 186; politicians, 174, 175; and prices,
171; problem, 22, 24, 140, 141, 165; recruiting of, 74-82; Secre-
tary of, 41, 79; theories of, 1-36, 62-65, 166, 192, 197; turnover,
17, 18, 20, 25, 65-67, 74, 85, 87, 96, 145, 153.
legislation, constitutional, 32, 34; development of, 33, 36, 63, 190;
in England, 117, 117n, 190, 192; in Germany, 190-192; and
goodwill, 29, 63, 57, 125, 162; and government, 123, 183, 184;
public purpose of, 36, 192, 196; unconstitutional, 29, 31-34, 116.
See also America; Demand and supply; Education; Employment;
Health; Immigrant labor; Safety; Scientific management.
Laborer as customer, 18.
Land agents, 5.
Law cases cited, Adair v. United States, 47n, 48n; Coppage v. Kansas,
47n, 48n; Hitchman Coal and Coke Company v. John Mitchell,
44n, 46n, 48n, 184; Holden v. Hardy, 31, 31n, 34, 35; Ives v.
South Buffalo Railroad Company, 55n; Lochner v. New York
(baker's case), 32, 33n; Nekoosa -Edwards Paper Company v.
Mittie Smith, 50n; David Smith Company v. Clausen, 66n;
Truax v. Raich, 126n.
208 INDEX
League of Nations, 173.
Leiserson, W. M., 76n.
Liberty, 26, 34, 35, 37, 43, 58, 72, 87, 90, 109, 123, 127, 128, 152, 164,
166.
Lochner v. New York, see Law cases.
Loyalty, 125, 143-150, 156, 160.
M
Machinery theory of labor, 7-17, 62, 63, 166.
Malingering, 99, 100.
Mangold, George B., 31n.
Manufacturers, National Association of, 133n.
Marot, Helen, Creative Impulse in Industry, 14 In.
Marshall, L. C., The War Labor Program and Its Administration, 42n.
Marx, Karl, 187-190, 192, 194-196.
Merchant's theory of labor, see Commodity theory.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 92n.
Migratory workers, 5.
Miller, H. L., 139n.
Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light Company, 95n.
Mine Workers of America, United, 42.
Minimum wage, 9, 10, 12, 147, 190; boards, 182.
Morris, E. B., Group Life Insurance and Its Possible Development, 84n.
Morris, Willian, 144n.
"Mysteries," 15, 16.
N
National Industrial Conference Board, 41, 116n, 117, 119.
National War Labor Board, 41, 42, 70n, 117n, 119, 120, 120n.
Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Company v. Mittie Smith, see Law cases.
New York, bakers' case, 32; Department of Labor Bulletin, 76n;
Federation of Labor, 91n; Industrial Commission, 170, 183;
Legislature, 9 In; Senate, health insurance bill in, 97n; workmen's
compensation in, 55.
Official Bulletin, 41n, 42n, 44n, 117n, 120n.
Ohio, State Industrial Commission, 9 In, 184; unemployment in, 76, 77.
Output, 7, 10, 17, 25, 67, 71, 96, 153, 155, 158, 166.
Owen, Robert, 29.
INDEX 20ft
P
Pacifism, 187.
Parliament in England, 180-182.
Partnership, between classes, 42, 43, 51, 52, 66, 69, 80, 81, 10,1.
194, 197; between individuals in class, 56, 157, 158, 176, 194, 195;
between nations, 173, 197, 198; theory of, 63, 166. See also
Associations; Democracy; Solidarity.
Patriotism, 30, 97, 128. 166, 173, 175, 178, 184, 187, 188, 194.
Pensions, old age, 85, 86, 88, 89, 95, 98, 100, 104, 191. See aUo
Insurance.
Personality, creation of, 159-162, 167, 176; of employee, 122, 163, 164;
of employer, 114, 115, 122, 153-156, 158, 160, 163, 164; and
individuality, 151. 160; as profession, 161-165; as reasonableness,
122, 167, 176; required in modern business, 151, 152, 159-161,
163-165; as specialization, 151, 152, 160; substitutes for, 159, 162.
Personnel department, see Labor department.
Persuasion, 45, 59, 152.
Piece rates, 7, 121, 157-159; in clothing trades, 69, 123, 124; cutting
of, 8, 9, 11; differential, 9-12, 70; and hours of labor, 70; and
labor cost, 20.
work, and day work, 7, 8; evils of, 103, 104, 159; and labor coat, 7-
rates and hours in, 70; system, 7, 9, 14, 103, 104; as task -and;
bonus system, 12.
Podmore's life of Robert Owen, 29n.
Power, 26, 34, 35, 43, 151, 162-164.
Premium system, 8-11, 13, 103, 104, 148, 157, 158.
Prices, in clothing trades, 69; under competition, 23, 24, 28, 30, 57, 68,
128, 129, 159; movement of, 168, 173; and profits, 168,171; retail,
168, 170; of wheat fixed, 39, 40; wholesale, 168-172. See also
Demand and supply.
"Principal and agent," 47, 48, 177, 178.
Profits, 18, 22, 26, 38, 58-61, 130, 158, 168, 171, 173, 187, 195.
Profit-sharing, 70.
Progress, 35, 105, 123, 156, 180, 192, 193.
Property, 25, 26, 33, 34, 38, 55, 143, 166, 187.
Prosperity, 25, 61, 168, 171, 173-175, 184, 186.
Provost Marshal General, report, 92n, 126n.
Prudential Insurance Company, 84n.
Psychology, in industry, see Industry.
Public opinion, 30, 31, 33-35, 89, 117, 132; utility, 42-48; utility theory
of labor, 28-36, 63, 166.
"Public, The," 28-36, 42, 43, 63.
14
210 INDEX
Q
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 42n.
R
Rate-fixing, 14.
Reasonable classification, 32, 64.
Reasonableness, 122, 125, 167.
Reconstruction, 181-183; Ministry of, 181.
Renold, C. G., 122n.
Repetition work, 146-148.
Responsibility, individual, 50-52, 55; common law theory of, 54, 56,
58; criminal theory of, 53, 54.
group, 54-57.
Revolution, 113, 143, 171, 187, 192; American, 127; Europe, 174, 188,
189; French, 37, 127; Russian, 38.
Rights and duties, 33, 47, 127-132, 138, 139, 166.
Risks in business, see Business.
Rockefeller, John D., Ill, 163; plan 112, 112n. See also Shop com-
mittees.
Roelse, H. V., 169n, 172n.
Ross, E. A., Russia in Upheaval, 38n.
Rubinow, I. M., Social Insurance, 84n, 92n, 97n.
Russia, 175; Revolution, 38; sovyets in, 181; in World War, 191, 196.
S
Safety, 53, 122, 162; Council, National, 59, 59n; in Illinois, 183;
mechanical, 59, 152, 153; profession of, 59-61, 152, 153, 160;
spirit of, 59, 153, 161. See also Labor.
Schneider, Herman, 14 In.
Science of Management, Bulletin of the Society to Promote the, 158n.
Scientific management, 12, 13, 15-19, 21, 22, 25, 65, 73, 110, 156-158.
manager, 21-23, 152, 157, 158, 160. See also Labor; Time-and-
motion studies.
Seasonal trades, wages in, 65, 68, 69.
Security, 65-73, 192.
Service department, see Labor department, worker, 152, 167.
Shipping Board, 42, 137n.
Shop committees, in England, 118, 119, 181, 182; importance of, 125;
machinery of, 107, 123, 124, 160; in Rockefeller interests. 111. 112;
as "shop stewards," 118, 180, 181; test of, 121, 122.
INDEX 211
"Shop, The," 106-125; democracy in, 108, 109, 179; discipline in, 10«,
107, 115, 117; leaders in, 178, 179; organization in, 113, 1U, IK,
personality in, 154, 165, 164.
Sibley Journal of Mechanical Engineering, 8n.
Sickness, cost of, 92; and industrial insurance, 84; and loss of work,
92, 93, 103; and piece work system, 104; prevention of, 94, 102,
103, 121, 122; and wages, 94, 95. See also Insurance.
Slichter, Sumner, 21n, 67n.
Smith Company, David, v. Clausen, see Law cases.
Smith-Hughes Act, 135n. See also Education.
Socialism, 30, 38, 39, 43, 72, 112, 143, 171, 174, 179, 187, 189, 195;
in Germany, 180, 188, 190, 191, 194.
Solidarity, 49-61; of individuals in class, 18, 19, 56, 58, 103, 178; of
labor and capital, 61, 101, 102; theory of, 51-53, 55, 63, 166, 197
See also Partnership.
Stocks and bonds, 20, 26, 193.
Strikes, 2-4, 69, 106, 111, 113, 117-120, 162, 171, 173, 178.
Subsidizing, 193, 197.
"Suggestion system," 155.
Supreme Court of United States, 32, 34, 35, 48, 126, 184.
Survey, 76n, 112n, 122n.
Sydenstricker, E., 84n, 92n, lOOn.
Syndicalism, 30, 174, 179.
System, 113n.
Taft, William H., 41, 44.
Tariff, protective, 31, 171, 174.
Task, 11-13, 19, 157.
Taylor, Frederick, 12, 13, 21.
Theories and facts, see Facts.
Time-and-motion studies, 14-16, 19, 21, 123, 124. See also Scientific
management.
Trade, board, see Shop committees; marks, 25; name, 25; reputation,
25; schools, 131, 132.
unionism, agreements under, 67, 123, 124, 194, 195; in America,
112, 114, 116, 171, 189; and capitalism, 45, 48, 81, 113, 194-196;
and discipline, 106; in England, 114, 171, 189; in France, 181,
189; in Germany, 180, 189; and hours of labor, 70, 71, 173, 189,
195; and insurance, 89, 90, 98-100; Karl Marx and, 188, 189, 194;
leaders in, 1, 2, 89, 90, 117, 152, 174-176; organization of, 44,
119, 171, 179, 180, 187; power of, 87, 116, 123, 144, 189, 194;
212 INDEX
purpose of, 45, 46, 190; in Russia, 181; and wages, 68, 71, 106
173, 189; in World War, 195, 196. See also Associations.
Truax v. Raich, see Law cases.
U
Unemployment, 2, 70, 72, 103, 143, 149, 168, 174, 189; and advertising,
76-78; distribution of, 70, 71, 176, 186; extent of, 75, 76, 78; in
Ohio, 76, 77; and prices, 69, 168, 171; problems of, 185.
United States, anarchism in, 195; army, 92, 126, 196; Congress of, 28,
39, 40, 123, 183; Constitution of, 23, 108, 166; government in, 180,
182, 185, 186; politics in, 183; prices and wages in, 169, 170;
public opinion in, 34; rights and duties in, 127-130; Statutes at
Large, 123n; Supreme Court, 32, 34, 35, 48, 126, 184.
labor in, Department of, 170, 186; leaders, 174-176, 180; Policies
Board, 186; Statistics Bureau of, publications, 76n, 84n, 92n,
lOOn, 119n, 158n. 182n; supply, 192. See also America.
Utah, legislature of, 31; Supreme Court of, 32.
Vestibule school, 155, 160. See also Education.
Vocation Bureau of Boston, 17.
Vocational education, see Education.
Vocational summary, 135n.
W
Wages, and earnings, 2, 65, 168, 173; increase of, 1, 18, 30, 56, 88, 131;
interest in, 157, 158, 185, 192, 195; movement of, 28, 31, 65, 66,
68, 69, 88, 173; and prices, 168; reduction of, 1, 69, 176; in seasonal
trades, 65, 68, 69; and sickness, 94, 95; system of, 143, 144; and
trade unionism, 68, 71, 106, 173, 189; in United States and foreign
countries compared, 4, 128. See also Demand and supply.
Walsh, Frank P., 41.
War Industries Board, 42.
Warren, B. S., 92n.
Washington State, Supreme Court of, 55.
Wehle, Louis B., Labor Problems in the United States During The War,
42n.
Welfare, 96, 97, 152; of labor, 30, 87; public, 30, 35, 46, 47.
Western Union Telegraph Company, 44, 45.
Whitley Reports, 119n.
INDEX 213
Wilson, President, 39, 41, 43, 44,
Wisconsin, apprenticeship in, l.".l. 132; English language in, 127;
hours of labor in, 2'.); immigration n^-nt of, 4, .r>; Industrial Com*
mission of, 49, 60, 52, 184; Insurance Commission, 84n; laws of,
127n, 132n; Superintendent of Public Instruction, 135n; Supreme
Court of, 50; workmen's compensation in, 49, 51.
Wolf, R. B., 168n.
Workmanship, instinct of, 143, 145, 149.
World Book Company, 141n.
"World, The," 187-198.
World War, and class struggle, 173, 175; and democracy, 127, 128;
and England, 117, 117n, 118, 125, 175, 176; and Europe, 174, 175;
Germany in, 125, 131, 191, 192, 195, 197; and health, 104; and
Italy, 191, 196; and labor, 79, 81, 117; lessons of, 125, 127;
National War Labor Board in, 41, 42, 70n, 117, 117n, 119, 120,
120n, 185; prices and, 169, 171; Russia in, 191, 196; and trade
unionism, 195, 196.
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